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1.1 Motivation for the research 
The rationale for this research is best illustrated by way of a scenario. Peter gets into an 
argument with Tim at their workplace. As a result, they get into a fight, where Peter stabs Tim 
in the shoulder and leaves him bleeding. The management board comes just in time to resolve 
this fight and both parties are dismissed from work on the basis of misconduct. Peter and Tim 
both leave the workplace. Unbeknown to Peter, Tim still holds a grudge against Peter for what 
Peter did to Tim’s arm. Later on the same day, Tim goes to Peter’s house, holding a gun, with 
the intention of getting his revenge from Peter. Just as Tim gets to Peter’s house, he sees Peter 
standing at the door holding his baby (X) in his arms. Without even thinking twice, Tim fires 
two bullets towards the direction of Peter. He misses Peter and shoots Baby-X who dies 
instantly. This is a dolus eventualis situation but also classified as a particular type of mistake 
known as aberratio ictus. The main issue in this scenario is whether Tim can be found guilty 
of murder in respect of Baby-X who was not Tim’s target. 
I will proceed with the issue on the assumption that three elements1 of murder in respect of 
Tim’s conduct have been satisfied except for the issue of intention. More specifically, Tim 
cannot be held liable for premeditated murder since he lacked both the direct and indirect 
intention regarding Peter. From the facts in the scenario above, Tim’s main target was Peter 
not Baby-X. If it can be proved that Tim foresaw that in aiming to shoot Peter, he might miss 
and fatally wound Baby-X, he will be liable for murder on the basis of dolus eventualis. In this 
instance, he will be said to have intention (to kill) in the form of dolus eventualis. A person is 
said to have intention in the form of dolus eventualis if he or she satisfies two requirements 
namely, foresight of the possibility of harm and reconciliation with the risk of harm occurring.2 
This dissertation seeks to analyse the elements of dolus eventualis. More specifically, the need 
for inquiry is based on a significant disagreement as regards the elements of dolus eventualis 
amongst legal writers. This inquiry involves an evaluation of the presence of the cognitive and 
conative element in the accused’s intent. Going back to the scenario, there must be foresight of 
                                                          
1 CR Snyman Criminal Law 6ed (2014) 437. The elements of murder according to Snyman are (a) causing the 
death (b) of another person (c) unlawfully and (d) intentionally.  




the possibility of harm (cognitive element) on Tim’s part. This essentially leads to the question 
of whether or not the degree of foresight in respect of the accused should be qualified. The 
question that would have to be determined as regards Tim’s foresight of harm towards Baby-
X is whether upon pointing the trigger towards the direction of Peter he had some real foresight 
or reasonable foresight or just foresight no matter how remote, unqualified by any adjective. 
Chapter 2 shall indicate which approach is preferable as regards the degree of foresight needed 
in the accused. Determining the cognitive element only is not enough, it will also have to be 
determined whether Tim reconciled himself with the risk of harm that he foresaw (conative 
element). In other words, it will have to be proved that Tim foresaw the possibility that he 
might kill Baby-X but carried on with his act anyway. This is also understood as an act of 
completely disregarding the consequences and will be discussed in detail in chapter 3. In South 
African criminal law, the position is that if Tim would have foreseen the possibility of harm 
occurring and nevertheless reconciled himself with the risk of that possibility occurring, he 
would have satisfied the conative element of dolus eventualis. If it can be established that both 
the cognitive and conative element have been satisfied in respect of Tim, he can be found guilty 
of murder in the form of dolus eventualis. However, as shall be discussed in detail in the 
dissertation, the relevance of the second leg of the test (conative) is subject to a lot of criticism. 
1.2 Outlining the concept of dolus eventualis in historical context 
The first section of this chapter briefly introduced readers to the concept of dolus eventualis 
through a scenario. To clearly understand the issues raised in the first section of this chapter, it 
might be necessary to give a brief description of the historical developments of dolus 
eventualis. Dolus eventualis in South African criminal law has in my opinion been accepted 
and applied in ways that can be deemed irregular in as far as substantive criminal law is 
concerned. In the 1940s, there was partial evidence of the study of legal intention. A legal 
writer, Gie, reveals that at the time of his writing, in the year 1941, analogues of dolus 
eventualis in South African case law are basically non-existent; the courts did not call for the 
real foresight of the outcome occurring in order for intention to be recognized.3 The reason for 
the scarcity of judicial reference to dolus eventualis at this stage has been argued to be the 
extensive influence exercised on the law by the assumption that the wrongdoer must have 
anticipated the natural and probable consequences of his act.4 It can also be submitted that, 
                                                          
3 CJC Gie ‘n Kritiek op die Grondslae van die Strafreg in Suid-Afrika’ (1941) PhD thesis, University of Pretoria 
126, “[V]oorbeelde van die laaste opsetsvariasie – die opset by moontlikheidsbewussyn – is geheel en al nie te 
vind nie, omdat die werklike voorsien van die moontlikheid van die intrede van die gevolg deur die dader nie as 
’n eis van opsetlikheid gestel word nie ...” 




even though it is now well-known that the test for intention is consistently subjective in nature, 
thus requiring the court to find, in relation to dolus eventualis, actual subjective foresight of 
the prospect of the harm imminent, it was not always the case. 
The Appellate Division actually referred to the objective test for intention with positive 
reception on quite a lot of occasions in the first half of the twentieth century.5 The objective 
test disregards the wrongdoer’s actual state of mind in probing whether a reasonable person in 
the same situation as the accused would have foreseen the possibility of harm ensuing.6 The 
important question is accordingly not whether the wrongdoer actually foresaw the harm (as per 
the subjective test), but whether the wrongdoer ought to have foreseen it. It is apparent that the 
rationale for the approval of the objective test for intention was the espousal from English law 
of the presupposition that a person intends the natural and feasible consequences of his or her 
actions.7 This presumption has been relied upon in a number of cases in South Africa.8 The 
most apparent explanation for intention is that it is unfeasible to determine the recesses of a 
wrongdoer’s mind; accordingly the law says that a person must be alleged to aim the reasonable 
consequences of his acts.9 
In using the presumption, “the courts have pointed out that the source of the presumption was 
fact rather than law and it could consequently be deduced or not depending on the evidence, 
and that it was rebuttable.”10 The major opposition to the so-called “presumption” of intention 
is that it results in an objective test of intention and, as a result there is an overlapping between 
intention and negligence.11 In 1920, before the Appellate Division’s extensive implementation 
of this presumption, Bodenstein’s warning against this “pernicious maxim of the English law” 
which has “had such fatal results in the past and caused the untimely death of thousands of 
human beings” was not heeded.12 He contends that the courts should once and for all drop the 
                                                          
5 EM Burchell, JRL Milton & JM Burchell South African Criminal Law and Procedure Vol I: General Principles 
(1983) 141. See also R v Jolly 1923 AD 176, 186; R v Jongani 1937 AD 400, 406; R v Longone 1938 AD 532, 
539-542; R v Duma 1945 AD 410, 417; R v Shezi 1948 (2) SA 119 (A) 128-130; R v Koza 1949 (4) SA 555, 560. 
6 Burchell, Milton & Burchell (supra note 5) 141. 
7 Ibid.  
8 Burchell, Milton & Burchell (supra note 5) 189 & 543 shows a list of the cases in which the presumption 
was applied. 
9 JH Pain ‘Some reflections on our criminal law’ 1960 Acta Juridica 297 citing Gardiner & Lansdown South 
African Criminal Law and Procedure, which shall be referred to as Gardiner and Lansdown (first edition in 1917). 
This statement echoes the well-known aphorism of Chief Justice Brian (YB 17 Edw IV, F 2, Pl 2) that ‘the thought 
of man shall not be tried, for the devil himself knoweth not the thought of man.’ 
10 R v Kewelram 1922 AD 213 at 217; R v Jolly (supra note 5) 181-189; R v Taylor 1949 (4) SA 702 (A) 713; R v 
Nkatlo 1950 (1) SA 26 (C) 31; R v Nsele 1955 (2) SA 145 (A) 151; R v Nkosi 1960 (4) SA 179 (N) 180-181. 
11 Burchell, Milton & Burchell (supra note 5) 189. 
12 HDJ Bodenstein ‘Phases in the development of criminal mens rea’ (1919) 18 SALJ 34. (The article concludes 




aberrations of past ages and get rid of the idea that it is feasible to say that a person intentionally 
caused results which he actually did not foresee, though he ought to have foreseen them.13 It is 
apparent that the employment of this view involved a simple approval of the objective approach 
to intention. Stuart avers that, the assumption, whether or not it is regarded as rebuttable, is 
basically the test of negligence – that of reasonable foresight – masquerading in a different 
form.14  
Prior to the adoption of the concept of dolus eventualis in South African courts, there was a 
book which provided insights about this form of intention. This is the book by Professors de 
Wet and Swanepoel15 entitled Strafreg, the first edition of which was in 1949. It introduced a 
strongly argued theoretical structure for criminal liability for the first time in South African 
criminal law, which was broadly based on the writings of modern-day Dutch and German 
writers.16 The case of R v Horn,17 which was one of the earliest cases to introduce the concept 
of dolus eventualis, cited this book with approval. The case of R v Horn involved an assistant 
stock-inspector and overseer of a farm, who, after spotting two local women stealing melons 
from the lands on a farm on which they did not belong, had run to catch them up and then asked 
them who they were and what they were doing in the field.18 The deceased had failed to stop 
after the appellant had called upon her to do so for the third time, then he produced a small 35 
pistol which he carried and shouted that he would shoot if she did not stop.19 When she still did 
not stop he had fired a shot “just to frighten her”, from a distance of about 36 paces, aiming to 
fire a few paces past her to the right.20 The bullet had, nevertheless, struck and killed the 
deceased.21 
Based on the facts in this case, the question for decision by the trial court was whether the 
verdict should be one of murder or culpable homicide. The evidence was such that only if the 
Crown could prove dolus eventualis22 on the part of appellant could he be found guilty of 
murder, and this intent would be proved if the appellant, who did not have the direct intention 
to fatally harm the woman, fired the shot accepting that death was a likely result of his act, but 
                                                          
13 Ibid. 
14 S Hoctor (supra note 4) 21. 
15 Ibid, 22. 
16 Ibid. 
17 R v Horn 1958 (3) SA 457 (A). 








nevertheless fired, reckless as to whether death would follow or not.23 In this manner, it can be 
seen that the court’s conclusion was largely influenced by the appellant's use of the words “if 
you don't stop I shall shoot.”24  
It is common cause, as Van Blerk JA observes, that these words were uttered in the anticipation 
that the deceased would stop and that it would not be necessary to shoot.25 Van Blerk, JA 
further held that if the appellant had intended to kill her it is reasonable to suppose that he 
would have taken careful aim, and instead of calling upon her to stop he would have saved his 
breath, and fired at her while she was still within easy gunshot range. He did neither of these 
things, and when he did fire, it was from such a distance that the probabilities are in favour of 
his explanation that he wanted to frighten her into stopping and against any desire on his part 
to kill her. In my view, this sort of explanation says a lot about the accused’s intention, and 
therefore the trial court erred by rejecting it without giving reasons for doing so.26 
Some inconsistencies in the concept of dolus eventualis were already being seen the first time 
this concept was adopted in case law. This aspect is indicated by the error made in the trial 
court of R v Horn,27 where they made a finding that an intention to kill could be inferred from 
the circumstances in which the shooting took place.28 A closer analysis reveals that, 
constructive intent to kill must be proved by applying a subjective test.29 Intention must be 
rather about what the accused foresaw rather than what it ought to have foreseen.30 The trial 
court, it seems, in my view failed to clarify this distinction. Van Blerk JA went on to apply the 
test for dolus eventualis using the exact words from Bodenstein’s article on his earliest writings 
about dolus eventualis.31  
It was held that intention to kill will be present where the evidence is such that the Crown 
proves dolus eventualis on the part of appellant if he is guilty of murder, and this intent would 
                                                          
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid, 458D. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid, 458H. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Rex v Mkize 1951 (3) SA 28, 33 Where it was held that, “The test as to whether an accused has the particular 
intent required in a charge when the Crown must prove that intent is a subjective test: The Court must enquire 
whether the accused had in fact that intent.” 
30 R v Horn (supra note 17) para D. 
31 Ibid 457G. The case of R v Horn is interesting in that it applied the test for dolus eventualis in its exact words 
as suggested given by HDJ Bodenstein (supra note 12) 347-348. In the case of Horn, however, the determination 





be proved if the appellant, who did not have the direct intent to kill the woman, fired the shot 
appreciating that death was a possible result of his act, but nevertheless fired, reckless as to 
whether death would follow or not.32 The most important point of departure of this recklessness 
is that the accused must in fact have (not ought to have) predetermined death as a consequence; 
because it would be impossible for him to be reckless as to whether death ensues or not if he 
never actually appreciated that death was a possible consequence. The appreciation of death as 
a possible consequence is a fact which cannot be proved by an objective test. In this manner, 
the Crown failed to prove that the appellant appreciated that death was a possible result of his 
act, and consequently failed to prove the intention to kill.33 
After the case of Horn, the case of S v Malinga34 also adopted the concept of dolus eventualis. 
This case involved four appellants who were convicted of the crime of murder by Kennedy J 
in the trial court,35 and two assessors in the Durban and Coast Local Division who were given 
a death sentence. In the trial court, it was held that the five accused, including one Mabaso, 
who gave evidence for the State and was discharged from liability to prosecution, acting in 
concert, set out in a motor car to commit the crime of house-breaking with intent to steal and 
theft; that one of them (accused number 4) knew that the other accused armed with a loaded 
revolver; that, in endeavouring to shake off the subsequent pursuit of the car by the police, 
accused number 4 shot and killed a policeman, Warrant Officer Werner, who was in a flying 
squad car which had been able to draw alongside; that the other accused must have foreseen 
the possibility of such an occasion and were a party to and equally guilty of the murder; and 
that there were no mitigating circumstances.36 
The relevant issue brought out in this case was how these five accused were guilty in terms of 
each being a socius criminis.37 Further, the main points raised on appeal were that the trial 
Court erred in not regarding Mabaso as a trap; that there was inadequate proof of any common 
purpose existing at the time when the deceased was shot,38 alternatively that it could not be 
said that the use of the revolver by the 4th accused was a likelihood foreseeable by the other 
                                                          
32 See Bodenstein (supra note 12) 347-348. His writings were strongly influenced by Boehmer Meditationes in 
C.C.C 
33 R v Horn (supra note 17) 457D. 
34 S v Malinga (supra note 2) 693. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
37A Latin term which refers to a person who is an accomplice in a crime. 




accused; and that in any event there were mitigating circumstances in respect of those who did 
not fire the shot.39 
In view of the fact that the five accused committed the crime as a group and with a common 
purpose, it would certainly be wrong, in my opinion to regard their actions as vicarious. The 
mental state of each one of the accused has to be put into consideration. Holmes JA observed 
that since these appellants were acting in concert when the deceased was shot, the liability of 
socius criminis is whether each one of them foresaw the possibility that his socius would 
commit the act in question in the persecution of their common purpose.40 In considering the 
issue of the intention to kill, the court applied the dolus eventualis test which is, “whether the 
socius foresaw the possibility that the act in question in the prosecution of the common purpose 
would have fatal consequences, and was reckless whether death resulted or not”.41 
In determining the intention in the accused, it is apparent to note that the issue is not about what 
the accused “ought to have foreseen” but what he actually foresaw.42 The accused must have 
foreseen that the use of a loaded firearm would have grave consequences, in this manner, they 
can be said to have been reckless into whether or not death would result.43 It is also in my view; 
just the same way as Holmes JA stated it in the Appellate Division that, the test to prove 
intention must be consistent with social necessity in regard to concerted crimes such as violence 
and housebreaking.44 Schreiner JA also stated that it is socially important that groups of 
criminals one or more of who is armed with lethal weapons should be aware of the extreme 
risks they run in embarking upon ventures that are so evil and dangerous to the community.45 
The same can be said about the accused in the case in point, that is, the Malinga case.46 Based 
on the test for intention given above,47 Holmes JA upheld the decision of the trial court that 
Mabaso foresaw the consequences of the actions he got himself into, and therefore was equally 
guilty as his gang. 
 




42 Ibid, 694. 
43 Ibid. 
44 S v Malinga (supra note 2) 695. 
45 R v Nsele (supra note 10) 148 D-E. 
46 S v Malinga (supra note 2). 





It can be seen that the test for dolus eventualis was finally formulated in the case of S v 
Malinga,48 as Holmes JA said, “In the pure form in which it is now applied”. Even though the 
test for dolus eventualis was finally formulated in the Malinga case, what seems to be the 
problem is the inconsistency associated with this concept. From the earliest case of Horn, 
which appears to have been the earliest case on legal intention, the trial court already was 
making errors which can be seen being problematic in present-day cases.49 The aim of this 
dissertation therefore is to highlight that, ever since the concept of dolus eventualis was 
introduced into South African criminal law, it has been very controversial and confusing 
amongst legal writers. A possible remedy therefore is the introduction of a more nuanced 
approach to dolus eventualis, which does not treat dolus eventualis cases in a one-size-fit-all 
concept. Having looked at the historical origins of dolus eventualis, I shall proceed to look at 
other forms of intention recognised in South African criminal law.  
1.3 Other forms of intention recognised under South African law. 
Snyman observes that there are three forms of intention recognised under South African 
criminal law.50 These include direct intention (known as dolus directus), indirect intention 
(known as dolus indirectus), and dolus eventualis. Dolus directus, can be interpreted in the 
plain ordinary meaning of the word, which in this instance refers to the wrongdoer willingly 
proceeding with a certain act even knowing that his act and consequences of that act are 
unlawful.51 Elaborating this state of affairs hypothetically, X is certain that he is committing 
the prohibited act and does not regard the commission of that act as a mere possibility.52 It is 
also known as intention in its ordinary grammatical sense,53 which is present when the 
accused’s aim and object is to bring about the unlawful consequence, should the chance of its 
resulting be small. An example will be where X approaches and shoots a person who is leaving 
                                                          
48 Ibid, 694. It can also be added that the concept of dolus eventualis is a foreign notion, and borrowed from it the 
criterion of recklessness. It has been argued that perhaps the reason why this concept is ambiguous is due to the 
fact that it is a combination of Roman and English Law. According to Bertelsmann, blending Romanist with 
English common-law notions does not always enhance conceptual clarity or logic. At first sight, the choice of 
“recklessness” as a criterion for a form of intention could even strike one as quite irrational, because the gist of 
recklessness in English law is “foresight ... without intention”. “However, translated into current South African 
terminology, this means foresight without actual intention,  that is, without dolus directus and dolus indirectus”. 
See W Bertelsmann ‘What happened to Luxuria? Some observations on criminal negligence, recklessness & dolus 
eventualis’ (1975) SALJ 71. 
49 More specifically in the high profile cases of Maarohanye and Another v S 2015 (1) SACR (337) SG, S v 
Humphreys 2013 (2) SACR (1) SCA. DPP, Gauteng v Pistorius (96/2015) [2015] ZASCA 204 (3 December 
2015), S v Van Schalkwyk [2016] ZASCA 49 (unreported, SCA case no 680/15, 31 March 2016). 
50 CR Snyman (supra note 1) 176. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. 





the bank in hope of robbing them of their money. X knows that shooting a person might cause 
fatal injuries, and certainly knows that robbing that person is an unlawful act, but proceeds with 
such an act because it is his goal anyway. 
It is also relevant to point out that dolus directus and premeditation are not identical. 
Premeditation murder results in dolus directus, but where the accused has dolus directus it does 
not always mean they would have premeditated the murder act. This can be illustrated by case 
law,  
Clearly the concept suggests a deliberate weighing-up of the proposed criminal conduct as 
opposed to the commission of the crime on the spur of the moment or in unexpected 
circumstances. There is, however, a broad continuum between the two poles of a murder 
committed in the heat of the moment and one which had been conceived and planned over months 
or even years before its execution... Only an examination of all the circumstances surrounding 
any particular murder, including not least the accused’s state of mind, will allow one to arrive at 
the conclusion as to whether a particular murder is “planned or premeditated”. In such an 
evaluation the period of time between the accused forming the intent to commit the murder and 
carrying out this intention is obviously of cardinal importance but, equally, does not at some 
arbitrary point, provide a ready-made answer to the question of whether the murder was “planned 
or premeditated”.54 
 
Dolus indirectus refers to indirect intention. If this has to be illustrated hypothetically, X 
decides to get his revenge on his neighbour as soon as he sees him leaving the house. He (X) 
therefore sets his neighbour’s house on fire intending to damage their property. When X set the 
house alight he knew that there was a baby sleeping so when he heard the baby mercilessly 
crying, he (X) quickly breaks open the locked door and tries to save the baby from the fire. 
Unfortunately, the baby dies instantly. In this manner, X originally could not have been guilty 
of murder because he did not intend death. However, X foresaw death as a virtual certainty to 
occur from his actions, yet proceeded to take that risk; he indirectly intended to kill the victim, 
even if it was not his primary goal. The third type of intention, which is the main focus of this 
dissertation, is dolus eventualis. As discussed in the first chapter, dolus eventualis is when the 
accused’s main aim is to commit an unlawful act, though he has foresight of the fact that the 
consequences of his actions are unlawful he reconciles himself with the consequences 
regardless. 
 
                                                          




There is also a concept known as dolus inderteminatus which was explained in the recent case 
of DPP v Pistorius55 as follows: “The perpetrator has the intention to kill and goes ahead with 
his act…although the perpetrator’s intention to kill must be in connection with the person 
killed, this does not mean that the perpetrator must know who the victim is.”56 Similarly, if X 
causes a bomb to explode in a crowded place he will most likely be ignorant of the identity of 
his fatalities, but will, even so have the intention to kill those who might die in the ensuing 
explosion.57 If this has to be put in the legal language of a lawyer, it is known as intent in the 
form of dolus indeterminatus, which means the killing of an indeterminate person.58 Snyman59 
reveals that our courts have always held persons engaged in a wild shootout in the course of an 
armed robbery to be liable for murder on the basis of their having acted with both dolus 
eventualis60 and dolus indeterminatus where persons were killed as a result.61 Having 
highlighted the above, I shall now turn on to the area of focus. 
 
1.4 AREA OF FOCUS  
1.4.1 Central research question 
The central issue mainly dealt with in this dissertation is, “An alternative approach to dolus 
eventualis.” This concept has been described as a riddle62 simply because of how complicated 
it is. Professor Hoctor observes that such uncertainties of the concept are due to the failure of 
our courts to vividly outline the significance of the concept of dolus eventualis.63 In this regard, 
it can be observed that the uncertainties surrounding dolus eventualis adversely affect 
                                                          
55 DPP Gauteng v Pistorius (supra note 49) 31. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid. Notable is the fact that, “dolus indeterminatus not a form of intention apart from dolus directus or dolus 
eventualis; it is merely a label meaning that the perpetrator’s intention is directed at a person or persons of 
unknown identity”. It has been observed that a wrongdoer can, in this manner, act with dolus indeterminatus at 
the same time with dolus eventualis.  Kemp et al Criminal Law in South Africa (2012) 184 also recognises this 
concept of dolus indeterminatus, where he says, ‘‘along with dolus eventualis, these forms of intention may be in 
the nature of a specific, focused intention, or dolus indeterminatus, for example where a person’s intention does 
not encompass a specific or known victim, ‘but he or she is willing, for example in cases of murder, to kill any 
person who may be present.’’ 
59 CR Snyman (supra note 1) 197. 
60 There is another form of intention similar concept to dolus eventualis; which is called dolus generalis. The 
logical distinction between the two is that in the case of dolus eventualis, the particular victim is foreseen, whereas 
in the case of dolus generalis the classic example is someone firing into a crowd of people knowing full well that 
one or more persons may be injured or killed, but not having any thought as to which specific person or persons 
this may be. All three of these types of intention can be sufficient for a finding of murder. By Taitz N, “Judge 
Masipa was right on Dolus and murder. http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2014-09-12-judge-masipa-
was-right-on-dolus-and-murder/#.Vt7BmXlf2M9”, Accessed at 12 September 2014. 
61 This was the situation in the case of S v Nhlapo & another 1981 (2) SA 744 (A).  
62 Focus ‘Dolus eventualis’ 1988 SACJ 414. 




substantive criminal law and if possible, they must be resolved. Paizes adds that judicial 
opinions on this issue have been characterised by uncertainty and a surprising lack of clarity.64 
He submits that this uncertainty is undesirable as it is contrary to the principle of legality, which 
forms the basis of criminal law.65 Besides, it constitutes a serious obstacle to any logical and 
constant system of criminal law.66  
My main aim is to focus on the elements of dolus eventualis because I believe that this is where 
lack of clarity exists regarding the application of this concept. The substantive law regarding 
the interpretation of the cognitive element of dolus eventualis (which has for years been 
described as “foresight of the possibility of harm”)67 is problematic. The main problem is what 
degree of foresight in the cognitive element should be regarded as acceptable. Some legal 
academics are of the view that the degree of foresight must be qualified68 whilst some are of 
the view that it must be interpreted in unqualified terms.69 After presenting the arguments for 
and against defining the cognitive element in qualified terms, the author will suggest a better 
approach to be followed by legal academics.  
As regards the conative element, the main problem is whether this element is a significant part 
of the test for dolus eventualis. Some academics are of the view that the conative element 
should be ignored as it is not a relevant inquiry of dolus eventualis.70 Some on the other hand 
argue that the conative element is a significant part of the test for dolus eventualis because the 
original definition of dolus eventualis includes it and there is no decision in South African 
courts which has regarded it as irrelevant.71 After presenting the arguments for and against the 
relevance of the conative element the author will suggest a best possible approach that legal 
writers should rather accept. 
                                                          
64 A Paizes ‘Dolus eventualis reconsidered’ 1988 SALJ 636. 
65 Ibid. 
66 S Hoctor (supra note 4) 14. 
67 DPP Gauteng v Pistorius (supra note 49) 26. See also S v Stiglingen ‘n ander 1989 (3) SA 720 (A) 722 I-J. S v 
Malinga and others (supra note 2) 695; S v Mangondo 1963 (4) SA 160 (A) 162; S v Sigwahla 1967 (4) SA 566 
(A) 570B-C; S v Mtshiza 1970 (3) SA 747 (A) para 752; S v Kramer enandere1972 (3) SA 331 (A) 334; S v P 
1972 (3) SA 412 (A) 416; S v Sikweza 1974 (4) SA 732(A) para 736F; S v Grove-Mitchell 1975 (3) SA 417 (A) 
422; S v Sabben 1975 (4) SA 303 (A) 304; S v V 1979 (2) SA 656 (A) 668; S v Nhlapo 1981 (2) SA 744 (A) 750-
751; S v Mbatha 1987 (2) SA 272 (A) 285; S v Nomakhlala and another 1990 (1) SACR 300 (A) 303. 
68 R v Horn (supra note 17) 467B; JM Burchell (supra note 53) 370. To avoid repetition, more writers supporting 
the view of a qualified foresight are discussed in depth at note 124 to note 202. 
69 R v Nsele (supra note 10) para 148A; JR du Plessis, The Law of Culpable Homicide in South Africa unpublished 
PhD thesis, Rhodes University (1986) 153: ‘a possibility actually foreseen no matter how remote, is a possibility 
and constitutes dolus eventualis’. To avoid repetition, more writers supporting the view of an unqualified foresight 
are discussed in depth at note 203 to note 274. 
70 JM Burchell (supra note 53) 390. 




The final issue will be an examination of the concept of dolus eventualis as a whole. This shall 
be done in way to determine whether the controversy associated with this concept is coming to 
an end with time, or it is actually getting more complicated by the day. The most recent high-
profile cases in South African criminal law regarding the concept of dolus eventualis shall be 
analysed. This shall be done in order to see how the courts have succeeded in explaining the 
concept of dolus eventualis which for years has been regarded as an ambiguous concept. The 
current high-profile dolus eventualis cases to be discussed in this regard are, DPP Gauteng v 
Pistorius,72 S v Humphreys,73 and Maaroahanye v S.74 Following a study of the very recent 
judgement in the case of Van Schalkwyk,75 the submission of the dissertation is that the 
approach to dolus eventualis in case A cannot necessarily be used in case B because it may 
lead to incorrect results (each case must be assessed on its own merits). Therefore, a more 
nuanced approach to dolus eventualis must be considered, one which deviates from the 
traditional one-size-fits-all concept.  
1.4.2 Key questions asked 
(i) How should the cognitive element be expressed? Should it be defined in qualified 
or unqualified terms? 
(ii) How should the conative element be expressed?  
(iii) Is the conative element a relevant part of the test for dolus eventualis? 
(iv) What are the general models of dolus eventualis in South African criminal law? 
(v) Should the approach to dolus eventualis be similar in all cases? 
1.5 Research methodology 
This dissertation will be a desktop review of the applicable legal material. The legal doctrines, 
systems and opinions set out in this dissertation will be subject to analysis and criticism. It will 
be based on the applicable primary and secondary sources relating to South African criminal 
law. The study will refer broadly to leading cases, text books, articles and law journals on the 
topic. Other sources will include comments on decisions, reports and electronic sources on the 
topic. Therefore, this dissertation will be based on a critical analysis of relevant literature. 
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1.6 Limitations of the study 
This dissertation involves a research on the difficult theoretical problems and principles 
relating to dolus eventualis. This will be only based on South African law. The only instance 
where the author refers to foreign law will be on the historical origins of dolus eventualis, in 
the second Chapter. Seeing that the scope of the theory of dolus eventualis is very wide, I shall 
mainly focus on the theoretical approach relating to substantive law rather than the evidential 
law. This is done so as to determine what approach can be the best preferred: an approach 
which can best be followed to avoid uncertainties surrounding dolus eventualis. This 
dissertation will discuss and elaborate only the relevant principles relating to dolus eventualis 
as provided for in case law and legal academics.  
1.7 Time frame 
This dissertation will be completed within a year; it was begun on the 9th February 2016 and 
was completed on the 31st December 2016. 
1.8 Overview of the chapters-The dissertation will be divided into five chapters 
                                                     
Chapter 1: Introduction -This chapter will introduce the main question, which is: What is the 
best approach for the definition of dolus eventualis in South African law? The problem question 
will be introduced, where I shall briefly explain the motivation for this research. In this Chapter, 
the limitations of the dissertation shall be highlighted; furthermore I shall explain how the 
research will be conducted. 
Chapter 2: The cognitive element of dolus eventualis -This chapter will be on a critical 
analysis of the cognitive element of dolus eventualis. It will examine whether or not the degree 
of foresight must be defined in qualified terms in terms of South African criminal law. 
Chapter 3: The conative element of dolus eventualis -This chapter will critically analyse the 
conative element of dolus eventualis. Furthermore, arguments for and against the relevance of 
the conative element in the test for dolus eventualis will be discussed. It shall be shown that it 
is to a greater extent that the conative element has been regarded as an irrelevant part of the 
test for dolus eventualis. 
Chapter 4: A critical examination of the interpretation of dolus eventualis in South 
African law -This chapter will analyse how the concept has been interpreted by academic 




of R v Horn76 till present day. There will be a critical examination of whether or not South 
African courts must apply the same approach of dolus eventualis to all murder cases, 
particularly death by reckless drivers and intention based murder. This critical examination is 
done because of the confusion regarding the interpretation of this concept amongst the 
academic writers. 
Chapter 5: Conclusion –This chapter will be a summary of the insights as to the degree of 
effectiveness on the approach of dolus eventualis in South African criminal law. It will also 
summarise how this concept has been used, and also provide recommendations of how the 
concept must be approached. 
All issues introduced in this chapter shall be discussed in depth in the chapters to follow, save 
for the historical developments of the dolus eventualis concept which have already been 









                                                          





2 THE COGNITIVE ELEMENT OF DOLUS EVENTUALIS 
2.1 Introduction 
The test for dolus eventualis, as highlighted in the previous chapter, is twofold, including both 
a cognitive and a conative element. This chapter deals only with the first requirement which is 
the cognitive element. The second section of this chapter explains what the cognitive element 
entails, and traces its origins prior to the 1950s. It shall be shown that in the cases of R v 
Hercules,77 S v Nsele,78 and R v Bergstedt79 an approach to the cognitive element different from 
the one applied before the 1950s was formally recognised.80 This new approach is a subjective 
inquiry rather than the objective inquiry which was used before. The third section of this 
chapter deals with the general approach in South African law as regards the degree of foresight 
required for the cognitive element to be satisfied. Case law and differing academic views 
pertaining to this issue will be discussed. Thereafter, I shall decide the most preferable view 
possible to follow, in so far as the determination of the degree of foresight in the cognitive 
element is concerned. 
2.2 Defining the element 
The cognitive element is an inquiry which entails that, in committing the crime the wrongdoer 
foresees the consequences of his actions leading to harm. In other words, when the wrongdoer 
engages himself in a certain act he must have a certain degree of knowledge in so far as its 
consequences are concerned in terms of the cognitive element. The issue of the degree of 
knowledge required is controversial and shall be discussed in more detail under the next 
subheading. Burchell takes us back, prior to the 1950s, where the cognitive element was 
considered from an objective point of view.81 The inquiry back then was whether a reasonable 
man would have foreseen the consequences of his actions.82 If on this basis it could be 
concluded that the accused foresaw such a consequence, then the conclusion is that the accused 
must have foreseen it and thus did foresee it.83 
                                                          
77 R v Hercules 1954 (3) SA 826 (AD) 831. Also held in the case of S v Du Randt 1954 (1) SA 313 
78 R v Nsele (supra note 10). This shall be referred to as the Nsele case throughout the dissertation. 
79 R v Bergstedt 1955 (4) SA 186 (AD) 188. 
80 Notable is the fact that this is not a closed list of the cases that adopted the subjective approach of intention after 
the objective approach had been done away with. 






Before the year 1954, the objective approach to intention was commonly applied in our 
courts,84 although a subjective approach was followed by the Appellate Division in R v 
Valachia,85 R v Sikepe,86 R v Thibani,87 and R v Mkize.88Across the Limpopo in R v Ncetendaba, 
Beadle J, having reviewed the evidence for the prosecution also applied the subjective approach 
and held that, “on this evidence I think the Crown has failed to prove that the accused knew or 
must have known”.89 In my view, the judge by following a subjective approach in the 
Ncetendaba case did not set the case as precedent for all intention cases, in that it was still not 
clear which approach must be followed, as most case decisions90 supported the objective 
inquiry. After the 1950s, South African courts let go of the objective test and adopted a new 
approach, a subjective test of intention. Pain argues that the ultimate rejection by the Appellate 
Division of the objective approach to criminal intention has been the most important and far-
reaching development in South African criminal law.91 He observes that this development has 
been very significant as it came after so many years of judicial disharmony regarding criminal 
intention.92 
 
In 1954 and in the two years which followed, the Appellate Division articulated a clear 
preference for the subjective test which subsequently discredited the objective test. Van den 
Heever JA in R v Hercules, after referring to the difficulty of proving a person’s mental 
processes, continued; “It is a matter of inference, however; but it cannot be based, as the learned 
Judge stated in his summing up, on what the appellant ought to have foreseen. Apart from 
recklessness whether death, the probability or possibility of which was foreseen, results, that 
is, dolus in law, a person cannot commit murder by negligent conduct”.93  The subjective 
approach was subsequently adopted by the Appellate Division in R v Nsele.94 Van den Heever 
JA held that, “Stupidity, lack of foresight, negligence - which may consist in non intellegere 
                                                          
84 R v Jongani (supra note 5) 406; R v Longone (supra note 5) 539-542; the direction of Tredgold J, (as he then 
was) to the jury in R v Kewelram (supra note 10) 213; R v Duma (supra note 5) 417; R v Ndhlengisa 1946 AD 
1101-1105; R v Shezi (supra note 5) 128-130; R v Koza 1949 (4) SA 555 AD 560; R v Mtembu 1950 (1) SA 670 
684. We have statutory recognition of the objective approach in sec. 140 (a) of Act No. 24 of 1886; and it has 
been decided that sec. 7 of Act No. 27 of 1914 applies an objective test – see R v Radu, 1953 (2) SA 245 (E); R v 
Maxaulana 1953 (2) SA 252 (E). 
85 R v Valachia 1945 AD 826, 831. 
86 R v Sikepe 1946 AD 745, 756. 
87 R v Thibani 1949 (4) SA 720 AD 730. 
88 R v Mkhize 1951 (3) SA 28 AD 33. 
89 R v Ncetendaba 1952 (2) SA 647 SR 648. 
90 R v Jongani (supra note 5) 406; See all case citations referred to at Supra note 84. 
91 J H Pain, ‘Some Reflections on Our Criminal Law’ Acta Juridica, (1960) 298. 
92 Ibid. 
93 R v Hercules (supra note 77) 831. See also S v Du Randt (supra note 77). 




quod omnes intelligunt - cannot to my mind ever be a substitute for the intent, actual or 
constructive, which is requisite to support a charge of murder”.95 
In the case of R v Nsele,96 Schreiner JA commented on the commonly-known formulation of 
the doctrine of common purpose in R v Garnsworthy,97stating that it has been widely used in 
trial courts, and also pointed out that it has been referred to on different situations by the 
Appellate Division without doubt being expressly cast upon its correctness.98 This equivocation 
in turn worked to his advantage, as it supported his application of a subjective test for intention 
later in the judgment.99 Similarly, in the case of R v Bergstedt, Schreiner JA, revealed that there 
was no doubt the subjective test should be applied, saying:  
As appears from R v Nsele...the words “or ought to have been”, though they have frequently been 
used in the past, do not, when applied to crimes like murder and attempted murder where intention 
must be proved, state the legal position accurately... But the words “was or ought to have been 
known” contrast knowledge with a merely reprehensible failure to know and wrongly import that 
either is sufficient to bring common purpose into operation.100  
This indicates a successful transformation and the common acceptance of the subjective 
intention in South African criminal law. 
Burchell observes that the subjective test recognises the state of mind of the wrongdoer only, 
the issue being whether the wrongdoer himself or herself foresaw the consequences of his or 
her act.101 It no longer benefits the prosecution to prove that, although the accused did not 
foresee the consequences of his or her act, a reasonable person would, or should have foreseen 
them.102 In the case of S v K,103 Centlivres CJ observed, in relation to the case of S v 
Bergstedt,104 that, Schreiner JA’s usage of the words, “knew or ought to have known” contrasts 
knowledge with a merely reprehensible failure to know and wrongly import that either is 
sufficient for proving intention. The subjective test is therefore more in accordance with justice 
than the objective test, since it excludes the possibility of “useful” or “imaginary” intent, that 
                                                          
95 Ibid, para 151. 
96 R v Nsele (supra note 10). 
97 R v Garnsworthy 1923 WLD 17, 19. 
98 A classic example is the case of R v Duma (supra note 5) 410; R v Ndhlengisa (supra note 84) 1101. 
99 J H Pain (supra note 91) 147, Pain observes that, with great respect, the words of Dove Wilson, J in Garnsworthy 
(supra note 97) 22 do not support the learned judge’s conclusion, the statement that the accused “must be taken 
to have known”  is qualified by the words “as rational reasonable men”. 
100 S v Bergstedt (supra note 79) 188. 
101 J M Burchell (supra note 53) 353. 
102 This has been held to be the situation in the cases discussed at note 85. 
103 S v K 1956 (3) SA 353 (A) 356. 




is, the imputation of criminal intention to the wrongdoer when he did not in fact have such 
intention.105 On the other hand, the adoption of the subjective test entails that the more dim-
witted, gullible and lacking in foresight the accused is, the more complicated it is to establish 
his or her fault.106 
It has further been observed that some Roman-Dutch authorities have used the term “evil” to 
qualify the intention and the  High Court case of Dougherty favours this approach.107 It has 
thus been argued that adding this standard aspect of intention was part of the decisive process 
to the meaning of the concept of intention, which introduced vagueness into the definition, and 
this standard aspect was unnecessary since the courts have now isolated the respective zones 
of normative unlawfulness and subjective intention.108 Foreign laws like the Scots law have to 
struggle with the mercurial meaning of “wicked” which is used to describe “recklessness” in 
that system of law, and the English law has for a long time had to confront the slippery concept 
of “malice aforethought”.109 It is thus apparent to note that, what has saved us the irritation of 
trying to define the almost obscure terms is the clear distinction between intent regarding fact 
and intent regarding law.110  
Notable is the fact that, the English law has once reverted from the objective test of intention, 
but eventually went back to the subjective test. A case in point to illustrate this is the case of 
DPP v Smith, where the court reverted to the objective approach taking a step back to the 19th 
century. Their Lordships decided that the objective approach, had always been the law and that 
the presumption of intention was one of law and irrebuttable in the absence of “proof of 
incapacity to form an intent, insanity or diminished responsibility.”111 Regrettably, the court’s 
notice was not directed to the case of R v Loughlin112 where the trial judge held that: “the appeal 
was on the grounds of misdirection by the judge on the intent necessary to the commission of 
the crime of attempting murder.” Pain observes that, it was unfortunate that the judge in this 
case had dealt with the issue as though it were a matter of law,113 whereas it was of course only 
a matter of fact114 which the bench should bear in mind together with every proof available in 
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111 DPP v Smith (1961) AC 290.  
112 R v Loughlin (1959) CrimLR 518 (CCA) 228.    





deciding whether the accused had the necessary intent. The judge had told the bench that if a 
man deliberately did an act, he intended, in law, the natural and probable consequences of that 
act, and he could not come to court and say “I did not intend to do that”. It is however 
particularly important to note that South African courts will not apply their law retrospectively, 
as the case in the English law. Having highlighted on the history of the determination of 
criminal intention in the cognitive element and the subsequent adoption of the subjective test, 
the author now turns into the general approach of the cognitive element of dolus eventualis in 
SA law. 
2.3 The general approach in South African Law as regards the degree of foresight 
required in the cognitive element of dolus eventualis. 
Foresight required in the cognitive element of dolus eventualis must be “actual foresight”. 
Legal writers115 use various terminology to define what entails “actual foresight” and this, in 
my view, has created a lot of confusion about what degree of foresight is appropriate for the 
cognitive element, and whether or not the cognitive element should be defined in qualified 
terms. Some old cases116 favoured the view of a qualified possibility whereas some decisions 
after the case of R v Horn117 favoured the unqualified possibility. As shall be discussed in detail 
below, such a transition has in my view left some legal academics in a state of confusion 
regarding the degree of foresight required in the cognitive element of dolus eventualis.  
 
2.3.1 Case law and legal writers who define the degree of foresight in qualified terms 
First and foremost, the author shall provide a discussion on case authority and academic views 
in support of qualifying the degree of foresight in the cognitive element. From the old cases 
like Qenele Xutu,118 Du Randt,119 and R v Bergstedt120 one can observe different terminology 
regarding what entails actual foresight. In these cases it can be observed that the degree of 
foresight should be qualified and defined as that of “some risk to life”.121 In certain older cases 
it was accepted that the guilty party must have foreseen that his conduct was likely122 to cause 
                                                          
115 These legal writers shall be discussed in detail in subsection 2.3.1 
116 Old cases in the exact citation at supra note 84 above. 
117 R v Horn (supra note 17) 467B. 
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119 R v Du Randt (supra note 77) 316. 
120 R v Bergstedt (supra note 80) 188E-188ff. 
121 R v Du Randt (supra note 77) 316. 
122 R v Valachia (supra note 85) 831; R v Koning 1953 (3) SA 220 (T) 231E-F; S v K (supra note 103) 356B; R v 
Sikunyana 1961 (3) SA 549 (E) 552D-H; R v Mawena 1962 (1) SA 896 (FC) 904G. In R v Thibani (supra note 
87) 729, it was however, subsequently held that ‘likely’ is a confusing word, in that it can refer both to the 




the consequence in question, almost always the death of the victim. This was regarded as 
enough proof of the existence of the cognitive element in the accused. This is one of the pitfalls 
of qualifying the degree of foresight, which shall be explored in detail later on. 
 
Courts tend to be specific when they refer to the requirement of foresight in dolus eventualis. 
Research has shown that a number of cases qualify and require the degree of foresight to be in 
the form of a real possibility. In S v Ostilly,123 the court held that foresight of a real possibility 
is a sufficient requirement to prove dolus eventualis. The court in the Ostilly case referred to 
Burchell and Hunt as their influence towards this suggestion. Even though Burchell and Hunt 
cited this case as their authority in their second edition,124 it has been observed that these writers 
were relying on their own authority in the first edition.125 Thus, scholarly views against 
qualifying the degree of foresight can find such a reference as a weakness, because precedent 
from case authority normally holds a stronger influence on law application than secondary 
cases. Nevertheless, in S v Moodie,126 the need for “not merely a remote but a real possibility” 
was acknowledged by the court without any further explanation.127 In my view, the failure of 
the court to explain further in this regard was an indication of the court being satisfied by the 
notion of the degree of foresight being expressed in qualified terms, and further that such a 
notion should be the one to carry more weight.128 
It has further been observed129 that, in spite of the unclear support in the South African case 
law for the qualified foresight position, in what Paizes describes as “a significant acceptance 
of…the correct position”,130 it has been put forward that the case of S v Makgatho131 has 
irreversibly changed the law such that “[a]ny doubt that foresight of a remote possibility might 
suffice has now been eliminated.”132 The Supreme Court of Appeal examined the “nub of the 
appeal, whether the appellant acted with dolus eventualis when he caused the death of the 
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128 My emphasis. 
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deceased”,133 thereby rejecting an appeal against conviction and prison term on a charge of 
murder. In the light of the above assertion, Shongwe JA, held that:134 “A person acts with 
intention, in the form of dolus eventualis, if the commission of the unlawful act or the causing 
of the unlawful result is not his main aim, but he subjectively foresees the possibility that in 
striving towards his main aim, the unlawful act may be committed or the unlawful result may 
ensue, and he reconciles himself to this possibility.” Shongwe JA specifically quotes and 
concurs with Ackerman AJA, who (in the case of in S v van Wyk 1992 (1) SACR 147 (Nms) at 
161b), expressed himself as follows: “…I am accordingly of the view that the subjective 
foresight required for dolus eventualis is the subjective appreciation that there is a reasonable 
possibility that the proscribed consequence will ensue.” In view of the quoted parts of the 
Makgatho case judgement, it can be deduced that the degree of foresight must be defined in 
qualified terms. 
Some cases have required foresight of a “reasonable” possibility, as opposed to an unqualified 
foresight requirement. Holmes J135 in the case of R v Suleman,136 expressed the test for dolus 
eventualis using this term, even though he was also referring to some passages in two Appellate 
Division cases which provide specific authority for foresight of a remote possibility.137 The 
cases of R v Du Randt138 and R v Nemashakwe,139 also required foresight of “some risk to life”, 
before stating that the requirement is an appreciation of “a reasonable possibility of risk to life”. 
There is however no indication of how this requirement was established from the authority 
cited, but in the case of R v Horn, “likely” was compared with “probable.”140 Hence from the 
terminology used in these cases to qualify the degree of foresight, one can argue that qualifying 
the degree of foresight is the best approach to follow.  
Whiting is of the view that the degree of foresight is determined by social factors. He argues 
that the degree of likelihood with which the happening of the result must be foreseen will not 
                                                          
133 S v Makgatho (supra note 131) 8. 
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135 As he was referred to as such in those years. 
136 R v Suleman 1960 (4) SA 645 (N) 646H. 
137 Ibid, 647A, citing R v Thibani (supra note 87) 729-30 and R v Horn (supra 17) 467. 
138 R v Du Randt, (supra 77) 316. 
139 R v Nemashakwe 1967 (3) SA 520 (RA) 140. 




be the same in all situations.141 It has been observed that in most cases, the happening of the 
result will have to be foreseen as a substantial possibility. In this manner, it can be seen that 
Whiting accepts the view of qualifying the degree of foresight. He further observes that cases 
where one or more factors militating against a finding of dolus eventualis are present, the 
occurrence of the result will have to be foreseen as something more than a substantial 
possibility, unless there are countervailing considerations neutralising the effect of such 
factors.142 Whiting further argues that in a case where it is the purpose of the person concerned 
to create the risk, it will be sufficient if he foresees the occurrence of the result only as a remote 
possibility.143 
 
The Appellate Division also discussed the question of the degree of foresight criterion and 
defined the cognitive element in qualified terms, in S v Beukes en ‘n ander.144 The court was 
aimed at discussing the volitional element of dolus eventualis, but first of all gives some insight 
as regards the cognitive component, noting that the sufficiency of the remote possibility 
criterion was confirmed in a series of decisions.145 Specifically, the court146 confirmed the 
question of whether foresight of a remote possibility could constitute the cognitive component 
after it had been left unresolved in the R v Thibani147whether foresight of a remote possibility 
could constitute the cognitive component. The court then goes on to discuss some of the 
academic debate surrounding the conative component, and issues of proof. It was held that:  
…where a court establishes that the accused foresaw a consequence, invariably the conative 
component is also held to be present. The chances that an accused will admit, or that it will be 
otherwise proved, that he foresaw a remote consequence are extremely slim. A court will 
therefore draw an inference concerning the accused’s state of mind from the facts which indicate 
that, objectively assessed; it was reasonably possible that the consequence would occur. In the 
absence of such possibility, it is simply accepted that the accused did not foresee the consequence. 
If such possibility is established, it is usually accepted from the fact that the accused continued 
to act that he reconciled himself to the ensuing result. 148   
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In this regard, it can be submitted that the view in the case of Beukes en ‘n ander149 is in support 
of the view that the degree of foresight must be qualified.  
Van Heerden JA, in the Beukes case, further went on to argue that, the conative element is 
normally only satisfied if the wrongdoer foresees the consequence as a reasonable possibility. 
The court’s analysis has been criticised in respect of its conclusions regarding problems of 
proof.150 It has been argued that Van Heerden JA has attempted to fake a fundamentally 
unsound relationship between “the substantive principles relating to the degree of foresight 
required for legal intention” and “the rules governing inferential reasoning”.151 Argued further, 
it is not true that it is more difficult to prove foresight of a remote possibility than foresight of 
a real or substantial possibility by means of inferential reasoning, and that in fact the opposite 
is usually true. Moreover, Paizes comments that the reasonable possibility of a consequence, 
objectively viewed, does not entitle the court to infer subjective foresight of such a possibility, 
and that even if this was feasible, this does not “furnish a rational basis for concluding… that 
one only takes into the bargain or reconciles oneself to a consequence if one foresees the chance 
of that consequence ensuing as reasonably possible.”152 
Notable is the fact that, in as much as some authors have expressed approval of the court’s 
support for the reasonable possibility criterion,153 it has to be borne in mind that the judgment 
does not eliminate foresight of a remote possibility. The decisive cases which establish the 
remote possibility principle are approved and not directly overruled by the court, and 
essentially the court states that liability for dolus eventualis will normally154 only follow where 
the possibility is foreseen as a strong one. Even though there could be uncertainties on the 
argument employed in the judgment prior to this statement, there can be no disagreement with 
this conclusion, as it basically reveals the complexity involved with proof of a state of mind. 
Hoctor observes that, it is easier to prove foresight where the objective probabilities based on 
general human experience indicate that it would be present, than when the possibility 
supposedly foreseen is more unlikely to occur.155 Notable is the fact that, the interpretation 
placed on the judgment in Beukes in the Namibian case of S v Van Wyk156 was different. 
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During an appeal against a murder conviction, the court looked at the question what the 
requisite degree of foresight should be for dolus eventualis in greater detail.157Ackermann AJA 
commences the argument by referring to the “authoritative formulation” of the test for dolus 
eventualis in S v Sigwahla,158 which entails the need for a subjective foresight of the possibility 
of the consequence (death) ensuing. To be more precise, given that the definition cited is of an 
unqualified foresight criterion, Ackermann AJA goes on to mention some of the cases where 
it is indicated that a remote or slight possibility suffices, although he notes that in each case the 
wide formulation is not further motivated.159 Nevertheless, Ackermann AJA goes on to state 
that the judgment in S v Beukes must be taken to have overruled these cases, by necessary 
implication.160 This evaluation is concluded in the following terms: 
There can, in my view, be no doubt that in this passage,161 and particularly by virtue of his 
repeated reference to “redelikemoontlikheid” (“reasonable possibility”), also when discussing 
the two reasons he advances for the retention of the two criteria, the learned Judge of Appeal lays 
down a test to the effect that, without proof that the actor foresaw, as a reasonable possibility, 
that the particular consequence would result, dolus eventualis cannot be established.162 
This case judgement is erroneous. For it to be accepted, a few suggestions have to be put 
forward to it. The reader is directed to the question as to why did Van Heerden JA choose not 
to specifically overrule the cases favouring the remote possibility criterion? Further, why did 
he hold that liability would normally only be established where the possibility is reasonable, 
accordingly leaving open the possibility of liability based on foresight of a lesser possibility? 
This question is particularly appropriate, given that the context for the discussion in Beukes is 
the impact of the seemingly lacunae on proof of dolus eventualis.163 In summing up his 
argument, Ackermann AJA cites case law in support of foresight of a qualified possibility,164 
and to the opinions of writers, mainly those who support this view,165 prior to stating that in his 
view to satisfy the cognitive element it is required to establish the “subjective appreciation that 
there is a reasonable possibility that the proscribed consequence will ensue”.166 It has been 
observed167 that the Van Wyk judgment contains an instructive explanation on the process of 
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proof of dolus eventualis.168 It may still be noted that Ackermann AJA’s interpretation 
concerning the effect of the Beukes judgment has not found a clear acceptance elsewhere.169 
Another case revealing a statement concerning foresight of a reasonable possibility is found in 
S v De Ruiter,170 the solitary case in which Beukes has been openly followed as regards to the 
degree of foresight. The analysis in Beukes was viewed as follows: “that the “reasonableness” 
referred to does not import an objective element into the requirement for intention, but indicates 
the basis upon which the court must draw an inference from the facts to establish whether an 
accused, who disputes having dolus eventualis, actually had such intent”171 as Hoctor 
observes.172 This conclusion basically mirrors the process of proof of the cognitive component 
of dolus eventualis: that the wrongdoer foresaw the possibility of harm has to be the only 
reasonable inference that can be drawn: in this regard, it has been argued that the court in 
Beukes was not advocating for a doctrinal sea change but simply revealing an evidential 
reality.173 
The reasonable possibility standard has been applied in S v Cameron174 and Dlamini and 
another v S.175It was submitted that,176 even though S v Van Wyk is cited in the second case, 
the court referred to the discussion of the process of proof,177 rather than Ackermann AJA’s 
discussion of the reasonable possibility criterion. Similarly, in the recent case of S v Ziqhu,178 
the court approves the reasonable possibility criterion, but the importance of this approval from 
a substantive perspective is somewhat diluted by the fact that the court immediately proceeds 
to cite a case which favours an unqualified possibility.179 
Paizes180 and Whiting181 are of the view that the degree of foresight must be defined in qualified 
terms. They support the requirement of foresight of a substantial possibility; nevertheless, both 
of them admit that in certain specified cases, foresight of a remote possibility will be enough.182 
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They make use of similar examples to illustrate their arguments. Whiting cites the imaginary 
case of the guns:  
A person possesses a number of pistols, knowing that only one is loaded but not knowing which 
one it is. He takes one of the pistols at random, puts it against another person’s temple, and pulls 
the trigger. His object is not to kill the other person but merely to expose him to the risk of death. 
If he happens to have selected the loaded pistol, with the result that the other person is killed 
when he pulls the trigger, will he be guilty of murder? Superficially it might appear that the 
answer should depend on how many pistols there are in all, because obviously the more pistols 
there were the slighter would be the possibility of a fatal outcome.183 
However, the case differs from the ordinary case of killing with dolus eventualis in an important 
respect, namely that here it is the wrongdoer’s purpose to expose the victim to the risk of death, 
or, to put it another way, he has dolus directus in relation to the creation of the risk. It seems 
that a case like this should be treated in the same way as a case where the wrongdoer has dolus 
directus in relation to the result itself. If so, it should not matter how many pistols there were 
in all: “even if there were a hundred pistols, so that he saw the chance of a fatal outcome only 
as very slight, the wrongdoer should still be guilty of murder”.184 Paizes uses, at most the same 
illustration, excluding the point where he refers to the number of chambers in a revolver instead 
of the number of pistols.185 In this regard, the two authors are of the view that, where it is the 
wrongdoer’s purpose to expose the victim to the risk of death,186 the wrongdoer will have dolus 
eventualis regardless of the remoteness of the possibility.187 Hence from the above views, it 
can be shown how these two academics are against the notion of foresight of an unqualified 
degree. 
Further support for the view that the degree of foresight in the cognitive element should be 
qualified is Paizes’ argument, where he disputes the utility of foresight of a remote possibility. 
Paizes argues that even though there are assertions by our courts at the uppermost level which 
regard foresight of a remote possibility to be enough, dolus eventualis has not once been found 
to be present where the accused has foreseen the possibility of the relevant consequence 
eventuating as slight or remote, but not real.188 In support of Paizes, Whiting states that there 
is “a remarkable disparity” connecting such statements and the manner in which the courts 
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have in fact applied the law.189 Other schools of thought have further submitted that it is very 
doubtful that courts would actually put such assertions into practice.190 Professor Hoctor adds 
that the question of utility is surely framed by willingness to prosecute, informed by evidentiary 
constraints, and does not address the question of legal principle as to whether foresight of a 
remote possibility should constitute the cognitive component of dolus eventualis.191 
 
Further support in view of expressing the degree of foresight in qualified terms is Burchell and 
Hunt’s submission.192 The argument is mainly directed on the acceptance of the notion of a 
remote possibility, where it has been argued that if foresight of a remote possibility is accepted 
it will lead to inconsistent results193 and raises the spirit of injustice. This idea has been viewed 
as “too wide”194 by other academics. Burchell and Hunt use an example of a motorist, stating 
that applying the remote possibility principle would mean that whenever someone drives his 
car, he would have dolus eventualis in respect of harm to other users of the road, and therefore 
would be a murderer should death be a consequence of his driving.195 This example is based 
on assumption that recklessness is present.196 Morkel argues that if a remote possibility 
amounted to sufficient foresight for liability, this would mean that the wrongdoer could be held 
liable for a crime requiring intention where her conduct did not even fall short of that of the 
reasonable person.197 
Burchell and Hunt point towards their support to the view of foresight of a probability, but also 
state that in light of the rejection of this standard by the courts that the minimum degree of 
foresight required is foresight of a real or substantial possibility.198 According to Burchell and 
Hunt, by insisting on this standard, intention would be confined “to a state of mind that can 
properly be regarded as such and keep the dividing line between intention and negligence clear 
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cut.”199 Burchell supports this view, and is of the opinion that foresight of a “real”, “substantial” 
or “reasonable” possibility is required.200 Snyman supports the above views as he accepts that 
a real or reasonable possibility is required.201 However, his persistence on this requirement is 
disrupted by his acknowledgment that dolus eventualis “is not limited to cases where the result 
is foreseen as a strong possibility.”202 Nevertheless, one can argue that Burchell and Hunt’s 
arguments can be accepted as evidence for the view that the degree of foresight must be defined 
in qualified terms. 
2.3.2 Case law and legal writers who define the degree of foresight in unqualified terms 
I shall now discuss case law and the arguments of academics who support the view that the 
degree of foresight must be defined in unqualified terms which is the view favoured by this 
dissertation. To begin with, Loubser and Rabie 203 submit that what must be foreseen is only 
the possibility204 and not necessarily the probability205 or the likelihood206 of the occurrence of 
the result in question – thereby accepting the degree of foresight in unqualified terms. It can be 
submitted that following Loubser and Rabie’s opinion is preferable because foresight of an 
unqualified possibility is a notion that has been firmly established207 under South African 
criminal law and thus it clearly supports the dominant view in the courts as to what degree of 
foresight is required in the cognitive element.  
To further show that the unqualified possibility is the preferable approach, it is important to 
refer to the words of Van Blerk JA, in the case of R v Horn,208 where he states that, “It would 
be incongruous to limit a wrongdoer’s constructive [sic] intent to cases where the result  which 
he has foreseen was likely to cause death and not to infer such intent where the result he had 
foreseen was, although possible, not likely.” Even though it can be argued that the Makgatho209 
case set precedent for the view that the degree of foresight must be defined in qualified terms, 
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this can be disputed by the weight that is carried over by the judgement in the case R v Nsele.210 
Some academics211 even argue that the dictum in the Nsele case was passed in the 1950s, but 
has since became the prevailing approach to the degree of foresight required for dolus 
eventualis to suffice.212  
 
In support of the view that foresight should not be qualified, Schreiner JA in R v Nsele213 held 
that, “...provided that the risk must have been and therefore, by inference was, present to the 
mind of the accused, and provided that he was reckless whether or not it matured in death, I do 
not think that the seriousness of the risk is material.” Further support of the view that the degree 
of foresight should be defined in unqualified terms is taken from an analysis of the case of R v 
Thibani214 where Schreiner JA held that:  
 
It seems to me to be clear that a man may have the intention to kill even though he does not 
visualize death as more likely than not to result from his acts. Supposing for instance that he was 
expressly warned at the time of the danger of death resulting from his act and, while realizing 
that there was such danger, nevertheless did the act, reckless whether death resulted or not, I do 
not think that it would matter whether he thought that death would very probably result or whether 
he thought that, though reasonably possible, it would very probably not result… I shall add that 
provided the requisite recklessness is present it may even be correct to say that realization of the 
possibility of death resulting, even as a remote chance, would suffice, though it is not necessary 
for present purposes to go to that length. 
Schreiner JA in this case shows that qualifying the degree of foresight in the accused’s conduct 
does not necessarily affect the actual foresight present in the accused. The accused shall be 
regarded as having foresight, even if the realization of a harmful consequence is slight. 
In the case of S v Mini, 215 Holmes JA found that intention to kill was present where “the 
appellant did foresee the possibility, even if slight, of death resulting from his conduct and 
proceeded reckless of the consequences.” Holmes JA further goes on to support the view of 
foresight of an unqualified possibility in S v De Bruyn,216 where he states that if “an accused 
were to admit that he foresaw the possibility of death, on the footing that anything is possible, 
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that would contribute to a conviction for murder.” Furthermore to note is the fact that the 
Appellate Division in the case of S v Shaik,217 concurred with Holmes JA in S v De Bruyn 
regarding the degree of foresight. The Appellate Division in the Shaik case seemed to be in 
support of the view that the degree of foresight must be defined in unqualified terms. This is 
revealed where the Appellate Division applied the views of Holmes JA that “legal intention is 
present if the accused foresees the possibility, however remote, of his act resulting in death to 
another.”218 The Shaik case rejected the argument that the accused must have foreseen the real 
possibility of death, shown by the use of words “based on misconception.”219 The court’s 
reasoning behind this rejection was that “if an accused admits that he foresaw a possibility of 
injury or worse, or there is other direct evidence to that effect, or if the facts are such that an 
adverse inference must be drawn, it will not assist the defence to show that the risk of injury or 
worse appeared unlikely, highly improbable or remote.”220  
 
In the case of S v Ngubane,221 the court looked at the cognitive element and the conative 
element at the same time therefore the explanation given for possibility of foresight in the 
cognitive element is closely connected to the conative element. In this manner, it can be said 
that Van Heerden JA could not find a situation in which the accused had foreseen a 
consequence but had not been reckless in respect of its occurrence. It has been observed222 that 
the reason for this was, he considered, clear: the chances that the perpetrator will admit, or that 
it will appear from other direct evidence, that he “foresaw a remote consequence” are very 
unlikely.223 The court will in this regard objectively determine an inference his state of mind 
from the circumstances which indicate that it was, reasonably possible that the result in 
question will follow. 
If such a possibility does not exist, it has to be accepted that the wrongdoer was not aware of 
that result. An inference from the fact that he acted and took the consequences into account are 
normally indicative of the existence of such a possibility but it should not matter, for the 
purpose of determining whether an accused has dolus eventualis, whether he foresees the 
possibility “as strong or faint, as probable or improbable”.224 Van Heerden JA did say, 
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however, that the “likelihood in the eyes of the agent of the possibility eventuating must 
obviously have a bearing on the question whether he did ‘‘consent to that possibility”225 and 
that, “if the agent persists in his conduct despite foreseeing a consequence as a real or concrete 
possibility, the inference could well be drawn that he “reconciled” himself to that consequence, 
that he was “reckless” of that consequence.”226 According to Paizes, “it would seem that the 
inference is that an accused is less likely to consent to or reconcile himself to or take into the 
bargain consequences if one foresees the likelihood of their ensuing as slight or remote than if 
one foresees this likelihood as real or concrete.”227 It has thus been submitted that the fallacy 
of such a suggestion is manifest: one who acts after foreseeing the real possibility of his act 
causing the death of another consents to the real possibility of death ensuing; one who acts after 
foreseeing only the slight possibility of his act causing the death of another reconciles himself 
to the slight possibility of death.228 In light of this submission, one can argue that the degree of 
foresight should be defined in unqualified terms. 
 
Further support of the view of an unqualified possibility is the case of Nkosi and another229 
where the court accepts that the appellant was convicted on the basis of foresight of “no more 
than a remote possibility”. In the case of Mazibuko and others230 the court cites the judgment 
of the court a quo, which convicted the accused of murder on the basis of foresight of the 
“remote” possibility of death occurring. The court in the case of S v Humphreys adopted the 
terminology used in the Ngubane case, and held that foresight of a “remote” possibility is 
sufficient.231 In the case of S v Dladla, it was also indicated that the requirements for dolus 
eventualis would be satisfied by foresight of a possibility which was “faint”.232 
 
Loubser and Rabie233 observe that, even though South African law has settled the view that the 
accused need only foresee the possibility and not necessarily the probability of the victim's 
death, the probability or likelihood of its occurrence may be applicable in drawing the inference 
that the accused did in fact foresee it, in that the greater the likelihood or probability of death, 
                                                          
225 Ibid, 685G-H. 
226 Ibid, 686A-B. 
227 A Paizes (supra note 64) 637. 
228 Ibid. 
229 S v Nkosi and Another 1991 (2) SACR 194 (A) 201I. 
230 S v Mazibuko and others 1988 (3) SA 190 (A)199H-200C.  
231 S v Humphreys 2012 JDR 0277 (WCC) 60. 
232 S v Dladla 1980 (1) SA 1 (A) at 3G indicates that foresight of a “vae” (faint) possibility suffices. 




the stronger would be the inference that the accused in fact foresaw it.234 On the other hand, as 
highlighted in the case of Shaik, the more improbable the consequence in question was, the 
more difficult it would be to prove, by inference, that the wrongdoer actually foresaw it.235 
Remoteness of the possibility is of course relevant in drawing an inference of the wrongdoer's 
subjective foresight of that possibility;236 “the more remote the possibility the less likely it is 
that the accused did in fact foresee it.”237 However, it does not mean that a person who does 
foresee a possibility of death is entitled, because the risk is slight, and death is unlikely, highly 
improbable or remote, to take a chance and, as it were, gamble with the life of another.238 In 
view of this contention, it can safely be argued that there is strong support for the view that the 
degree of foresight in the cognitive element must be defined in unqualified terms. 
 
Further support for the sufficiency of the unqualified degree of foresight in the cognitive 
element can be deduced from Engers’ view. He argues that, to say that foresight of a remote 
possibility is not foresight is complicated in so far as both language and logic are concerned.239 
It has been observed that, using a phrase from Glanville Williams, to say that foresight is not 
foresight, is simply a misuse of language.240 The real meaning of dolus eventualis is that the 
wrongdoer should be found guilty of intentional conduct because he foresees the possible harm, 
and accepting that it might possibly occur, he then decides to take a risk that such a consequence 
will not result,241 instead of abstaining from his or her proposed course of conduct. Remoteness 
of the possibility may be related to punishment, but in principle it cannot affect criminal 
liability: the accused consciously chose to take the risk, however remote, and so in principle 
has a “heartless disregard” for the prospect of the harm occurring.242 
Some academics who support the idea of qualifying the degree of foresight argue that applying 
the remote possibility principle to a motorist would mean that whenever someone drives his 
car, he will have dolus eventualis in respect of harm of other users of the road, and therefore 
would be a murderer should death be a consequence of his driving.243 Professor Hoctor states 
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that, even though the prospect of thousands of potential murderers who drive (who, despite 
having slight worries about their conduct, can hardly be described as manipulative killers) is 
rather disturbing, this potential mass liability must be viewed by virtue of circumstance.244 
Primarily, it has to be analysed once again that where a motorist foresees the possible harm 
arising, but goes on to disregard the risk of harm, in the sense of not reconciling himself to the 
risk, there can be no liability for murder on the basis of dolus eventualis.245 From this assertion, 
one can argue that defining the cognitive element in unqualified terms is the best approach. 
Even though it has been indicated earlier that some courts have occasionally found it proper to 
express their application of the cognitive element of dolus eventualis in qualified terms, the 
standard approach of accepting proof of an unqualified possibility as adequate for the purposes 
of liability has not been dismissed formally.246 For example, in the case of Van Aardt in the 
court a quo, Froneman J applied the standard approach of foresight of an unqualified possibility 
of the risk of death ensuing;247 when the matter was taken for an appeal, the full bench of the 
Eastern Cape High Court, faced with the argument whether the possibility foreseen should be 
“strong or slight” held that the issue did not merit discussion as the appellant had in fact 
foreseen the “reasonable” possibility of harm on the facts;248 and the Supreme Court of Appeal 
upheld the conviction, on the basis of subjective foresight of the possibility of harm, expressed 
in unqualified terms.249 It is also of paramount important to bear in mind that in dealing with 
the issue of proof of dolus eventualis the court refers to the classic formulation in S v 
Sigwahla.250 
To support the view that the degree of foresight must be defined in unqualified terms, I shall 
turn to Burchell & Hunt’s opinion which in my view is to a certain extent flawed. This is when 
Burchell & Hunt251 said: “It is sufficient if the accused, having foreseen the real possibility of 
the existence of the circumstances in question, nevertheless persisted in his conduct irrespective 
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of whether it existed or not.”252 In other words, Burchell & Hunt are of the view that foresight 
of a real or probable possibility rather than a remote possibility of that consequence must be 
foreseen. In support of Burchell & Hunt, Morkel253 similarly suggests that the possibility 
should be a substantial possibility while Snyman254 believes that it should be a material or 
reasonable (wesenlike of redelike) possibility. Burchell & Hunt255 further state that it is 
doubtful whether a person can be said to foresee a possibility if he thinks of it but considers it 
very remote. This opinion may, in my view, lead to incorrect conclusions as it is based on the 
mere speculation256 of the imaginary possibility of the consequence in question. It can thus be 
said that too much attention must not be placed upon the mere observation by the accused of 
the hypothetical possibility of the consequence in question, with a consequent neglect of his 
consideration as to whether or not an anticipated result will occur.257  
In addition to the above views, Loubser adds that it is not only the abstract statistical possibility 
that must be considered in establishing the accused’s intention, but that possibility, and 
particularly the likelihood of its occurrence in the light of the particular circumstances of the 
case in question.258 In this manner, the consequence must at any rate be concretely possible, as 
Morkel suggests. In short, the accused who does not foresee a possibility as real, does not 
foresee that it will materialize in the circumstances. The mere fact that the accused at some 
stage contemplated or foresaw the occurrence of a result as possible, should not invariably lead 
to a conclusion that he had dolus eventualis in respect of that result. It may be that the accused, 
although initially contemplating the possibility of such occurrence, at a later stage, but before 
concluding his action, decides that the result will nevertheless not ensue. He may, for example, 
rely upon his own skill or on defensive measures taken by him, and trust that he is able to avoid 
the result in question.259 In such an instance the accused in fact does not foresee the possibility 
that the consequence will materialize. It appears therefore that what is required is not merely 
foresight of an intangible possibility of a consequence, but that the accused concluded that it 
might occur in the particular circumstances.260 It follows that a wrongdoer who considers a 
possibility as remote, but nevertheless foresees that it may ensue in the circumstances, has 
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dolus eventualis.261 In this manner, it can thus be said that defining the degree of foresight in 
unqualified terms is the best approach. 
It has been observed elsewhere that the citation262 from Burchell and Hunt where they mention 
foresight of a real possibility is however erroneous. Professor Jonathan Burchell was 
responsible for the third263 edition of this work in 1997, after the original authors had passed 
away, but this statement is not found at page 131.264 The Annual Survey reference refers to part 
of the discussion of the general principles of contract – authored, notably, by Hunt – wherein 
it is stated that fraudulent intent is established “if one actually foresees that a statement may be 
false, but nevertheless makes it”.265 Despite the fact that this reference clearly supports the 
subjective foresight requirement, it does not provide support for the qualified possibility 
approach. The references cited in the Makgatho case undoubtedly originate directly from the 
case of S v Ostilly and others,266 which are a clear indication that the source of the first quote 
is the first edition of Burchell and Hunt, published in 1970.267 It is argued that it was not the 
intention of the court to dismiss almost five decades of precedent in the face of a single 
academic argument, there was therefore an error.268 I find this observation quite reasonable; 
hence, with lack of support for the qualified possibility of foresight, the author is of the view 
that the unqualified possibility is the best approach. 
The nature of the state of mind required for dolus eventualis may be illustrated with reference 
to cases where an accused intended to scare another by shooting at him but aimed to miss, and 
relied for this upon his skill as a marks man. In Horn,269 Haines270 and Du Preez 271 it was 
found that the accused did not in the light of all the evidence subjectively foresee the 
materialisation of the possibility of death or injury, while in De Zoete,272 on the other hand, the 
court held that the accused in a similar situation did in fact foresee the victim's death or injury 
in the circumstances. In Van Jaarsveld273 the court held that the accused did foresee the 
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possibility that he may hit the victim, but that he nonetheless concluded that he would be 
successful in aiming to miss. This would seem to imply that although the accused did 
contemplate the possible death of the victim, he was satisfied that such death would not ensue 
in the circumstances; in other words, that he did not actually foresee the victim's death in the 
circumstances.274 In other words, what was accepted as sufficient for liability was remote 
foresight; the court did not necessarily qualify the degree of foresight in any terms. 
 
This dissertation supports the view that the degree of foresight must be of any foresight, no 
matter how remote, unqualified by any terms with support from the case of S v Malinga275 
which favours foresight of a remote possibility. In the case of Malinga, it was held that 
remoteness of the possibility is significant in drawing an inference of the accused’s subjective 
foresight of a possibility;276 the more remote the possibility the less likely it is that the accused 
did in fact foresee it.277 But that is not to say that a person who does foresee a possibility of 
death is entitled, because the risk is slight, and death is unlikely, highly improbable or remote, 
to take a chance and, as it were, gamble with the life of another.278 Furthermore, the author 
favours the view of an unqualified possibility because the requirement of a real possibility has 
been expressly rejected.279 The requirement of a real possibility was rejected following a 
decision in South African case law that what is required for dolus eventualis is not foresight of 
any possibility, but only of a real possibility280 or foresight of a substantial risk281 or of a 
reasonable possibility of risk to life.282 In the case of Beukes283 reference has been made to 
foresight of a reasonable possibility,284 but it appears that they do not go as far as setting this 
as a general requirement.285 This requirement would be in conflict with the view which either 
does not qualify possibility or even allows a remote possibility to suffice.  
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The formal and substantive definition for the cognitive element of dolus eventualis reflects the 
ultimate purpose of this test, namely the assessment of the degree of foresight required in the 
accused. It has been shown in this chapter that there is no set rule as to what amount of foresight 
is the required one in South African criminal law. Some academics286 favour the notion that 
the degree of foresight should not be qualified, thereby accepting a remote287 or a slight 
possibility288 of harm as sufficing for dolus eventualis. However, this view has been criticised 
on the basis of being too broad289 and concerns are that such a concept can lead to unfair 
results.290Some courts qualify the degree of foresight to a reasonable one, some a real 
possibility.  
However, qualifying the degree of foresight has been criticised on the basis of being difficult 
to interpret. This is affirmed by Loubser’s submission that, it is difficult to apportion a legal 
meaning to these everyday terms like “reasonable”, or “real” into day to day terms of a lay 
person.291 Therefore, based on the above criticism against qualifying the degree of foresight, 
this dissertation submits that the use of foresight should be defined in unqualified terms. It has 
been submitted that this approach is the prevailing one in jurisprudence.292 Furthermore, it has 
been observed that such prevalence is an indication of the acknowledgement by the courts, that, 
if it is indeed established beyond a reasonable doubt, whether on the basis of inferential 
reasoning or direct evidence, that the accused had actual subjective foresight of the possibility 
of harm, whilst continuing to act despite such foresight, an accused is said to have intention in 
the form of mens rea.293 From the above arguments, it can be argued that the degree of foresight 
in the cognitive element of dolus eventualis should be assessed in unqualified terms under 
South African law as this approach has been the most prevalent in the case law, as well as 
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3. THE CONATIVE ELEMENT OF DOLUS EVENTUALIS 
3.1 Introduction 
The conative element can be understood as the second leg of the test that must be satisfied in 
order for intention in the form of dolus eventualis to be established. The second section of this 
chapter shall attempt to define and explain the contents of the second leg of the test for dolus 
eventualis. Further, the historical origins of the second limb of the test prior to 1945 shall be 
briefly traced, and thereafter it will be highlighted how it was finally adopted into South African 
criminal law in 1945. I shall constantly refer to the second limb of the test as the conative 
element throughout the chapter, and also indicate in detail how other legal writers define it. In 
the third section of this chapter, some insights regarding the acceptance of the conative element 
as a significant part of the test for dolus eventualis in South African criminal law shall be given, 
and it shall be highlighted how courts and academics have attempted to give content to this 
element. As shall be discussed in the chapter, legal writers have found it difficult to figure out 
the correct definition and purpose of the conative element. As such, it has been rejected as a 
superfluous and an irrelevant concept.294 
 
In as much as some academics reject the conative element as confusing, in subsection 3.3 it 
shall be highlighted that South African court decisions have introduced this element as a 
necessary part of dolus eventualis. These cases include S v Beukes,295 S v Ngubane,296 S v 
Valachia,297amongst others.298 Furthermore, the chapter shall provide some evidence to the 
view that the definition of dolus eventualis from historical sources law involves the conative 
element and this makes it important. Arguments for and against the recognition of the conative 
element shall be given in detail. In the last subsection, I shall make an evaluation and give some 
input concerning whether or not the conative element can indeed be said to be redundant, in 
South African criminal law. 
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3.2 Elaborating on what the conative element entails 
For the sake of clarity, it is in my view important to reflect on the historical development of 
the conative element before criticising some legal writers’ interpretation of this concept. Before 
1945, courts have not been applying the conative element of dolus eventualis. What made it 
hard for courts prior to 1945 to give meaning to or recognise the conative element is that in 
almost every case where the accused was acquitted on the ground that he had no intention, the 
element found to be lacking was foresight, and recklessness was not discussed at all.299 As it 
happened, it was crucial for the courts to examine the requirement only in those rare cases 
where, although the accused foresaw the possibility of harm, recklessness was not present in 
all its possible senses (an example being a situation where the accused did care about the result 
of his act).300 
After 1945, the phrase “regardless of whether death results or not” appears to have been taken 
to portray recklessness in the earliest cases,301 but in the cases before 1945 it is uncommon.302 
Some academics briefly examined the issue of recklessness, for example Gardiner and 
Lansdown (in their first edition) who observe that: “If one person commits an act upon another, 
knowing that this act is likely to cause death but reckless whether death results or not, he is 
held in law to intend to kill.”303 In their fifth edition304 the case of R v Valachia305 is cited in 
support of this statement. Smith observes that after the fifth edition was published by Gardiner 
and Lansdown, no express authority of the term recklessness is given, but the learned authors 
are thought to have been probably relying on Section 140 of the Transkeian Penal Code,306 
which they set out as a good reflection of the law of intent to kill.307 Section 140 of the 
Transkeian Penal Code provides that: Culpable homicide308 becomes murder in the following 
cases: 
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a. If the offender means to cause the death of the person killed. 
b. If the offender means to cause the person killed any bodily injury which is known to the  
offender to be likely to cause death, and if the offender, whether he does or does not mean to 
cause death, is reckless whether death ensues or not. 
c. If the offender means to cause death or such bodily injury as aforesaid to one person, so that 
if that person be killed the offender would be guilty of murder, and by accident or mistake 
the offender kills another person, though he does not mean to hurt the person killed. 
d. If the offender for any unlawful object does an act which he knows or ought to have known 
to be likely to cause death, and thereby kills any person, though he may have desired that his 
object should be effected without hurting anyone. 
 
In the result, it is arguable that the decisions before Valachia’s case justify the conclusion that 
dolus eventualis involved only foresight of consequences. It has been observed that when 
recklessness does occur, it is more a manner of speaking than a separate element of intention; 
and the statements of law in which it is found would have lost nothing by its omission or 
replacement with the test of foresight.309 
The learned judge, after referring to different cases, where none of them used the term 
“recklessness”, said: 
It is interesting to see that Section 140 of the Transkeian Penal Code . . . which has not 
infrequently been found to have incorporated in its provisions the correct view of what our law 
is, provides that culpable homicide becomes murder in a number of cases, one of which is that if 
the offender means to cause the person killed any bodily injury, which is known to the offender 
to be likely to cause death, and if the offender, whether he does or does not mean to cause death, 
is reckless whether death ensues or not.310 
The learned judge of appeal continued: “We may, I think, conclude from these authorities that 
the crime of murder will at all events have been committed if it be proved ... that the accused 
killed the deceased by an act which they must have known to be of such a dangerous character 
that death would be likely to result therefrom, and were reckless whether it did or not.”311  
It can gladly be admitted that the Valachia case set precedent for giving effect to the second 
element of dolus eventualis, which it explained as recklessness. After this, most cases have 
been seen applying the principles of dolus eventualis in the manner set out by the Valachia 
case regarding the element of recklessness.312 It has been observed that the “requirement of 
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recklessness in dolus eventualis is the result of a historical accident. In adopting Section 140 
of the Transkeian Penal Code,313 the court in Valachia case introduced into South African law 
a concept that was not only unwarranted by the weight of previous decisions, but also a 
misleading expression of the English Law.”314 It can be observed that after the Valachia case 
the conative element has been defined in interchangeable terms amongst courts and academic 
writers. Some define it as “recklessness”,315 some say it is the “reconciliation of harm”,316 some 
express it as “persistence in such conduct, despite such foresight”317 and some say it is the 
“volitional element”.318 These expressions can be explained to mean that the wrongdoer must 
be in a position where he accepts the possibility of a consequence, where even if it is clear that 
the consequence is unlawful, he reconciles himself with that possibility and proceeds with his 
actions. A person is said to have reconciled himself319 when he accepts the possible 
consequences that can be brought about from his actions and lives with it when it happens.    
It is particularly important to highlight on the advancement in the clarification320 of what 
entails the conative element from the time when meaning was given to it by Jansen JA, in the 
Ngubane321 case up to the time when a more advanced meaning was given to it by Brand JA, 
in the Humphreys322 case. Brand JA’s main emphasis is on the fact that the alternative term to 
the conative element “recklessness” is confusing support of this observation is taken from 
Jansen JA’s words which read:323  
A man may foresee the possibility of harm and yet be negligent in respect of that harm ensuing, 
for example by unreasonably underestimating the degree of possibility or unreasonably failing to 
take steps to avoid that possibility . . . The concept of conscious (advertent) negligence (luxuria) 
is well known on the Continent and has in recent times often been discussed by our writers… 
Conscious negligence is not to be equated with dolus eventualis. The distinguishing feature of 
dolus eventualis is the volitional component: the agent (the perpetrator) “consents” to the 
consequence foreseen as a possibility, he “reconciles himself” to it, he “takes it into the 
bargain”… Our cases often speak of the agent being “reckless” of that consequence, but in this 
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context it means consenting, reconciling or taking into the bargain . . . and not the “recklessness” 
of the Anglo American systems nor an aggravated degree of negligence. It is the particular, 
subjective, volitional mental state in regard to the foreseen possibility which characterises dolus 
eventualis and which is absent in luxuria. 
As highlighted in the above extract from the Ngubane case, the court used a lot of 
interchangeable terms stating that the accused’s state of mind with regard to a possibility, must 
be one of “consenting” to the materialisation of the possibility, “reconciling” himself or herself 
to it, “taking [the foreseen possibility] into the bargain” or “recklessness” with regard to that 
possibility.324 Brand JA, in the Humphreys case however seems to think that the use of all this 
terminology (especially the term “recklessness”)325 can be confusing and therefore is the reason 
why the court a quo made an error in finding that Mr Humphreys reconciled himself with the 
consequences in question. This echoes with Jansen JA’s emphasis on the need for courts to be 
cautious when dealing with the conative element. This can be seen from “the way in which the 
court formulated its finding on this aspect, namely – freely translated from Afrikaans – which 
the appellant, appreciating the possibility of the consequences nonetheless carried-on with his 
conduct, reckless as to these consequences”.326 
Brand JA, further explains that “once the second element of dolus eventualis is misunderstood 
as a synonym of recklessness in the sense of aggravated negligence, a finding that this element 
had been established on the facts of the Humphreys case seems predictable. In the most obvious 
way, the appellant was extremely reckless”.327 But, Jansen JA explained that this is not what 
the second element entails. He held that “the correct enquiry under this heading is whether the 
appellant took the consequences that he foresaw into the bargain; whether it can be inferred 
that it was irrelevant to him whether these results would flow from his actions. Explained in 
different terms, the principle is that if it can reasonably be established that the appellant may 
have thought that the possible collision he subjectively foresaw would not actually occur, the 
conative element of dolus eventualis would not have been established”.328 The author observes 
that “the mere fact that the conative element (“reconciliation with harm”) is defined in the 
Humphreys and Ngubane case is indicative of the recognition of this second limb of the test as 
part of dolus eventualis”.  
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Prior to the Humphreys case, it can be observed that there are some cases which define the 
conative element as recklessness in a confusing way – confusing in the sense that three different 
explanations of the conative element are given which mean different things. The first one is the 
case of Sethoga,329 where Smalberger JA acknowledged that dolus eventualis involves the need 
by the state to prove that the guilty party had subjective foresight of the possibility, though 
remote, of his or her unlawful conduct fatally wounding others, and continued with such 
conduct with a reckless disregard of the possible consequences thereof.330 In S v Campos,331 
the Supreme Court of Appeal described “the recklessness element of dolus eventualis in murder 
as did [the accused] not care...whether death would result.” On the other hand, Holmes JA in 
the case of De Bruyn332 portrayed recklessness in the context of the element of dolus eventualis 
required for murder, as “persistence in such conduct, despite such foresight” or “the conscious 
taking of the risk of resultant death, not caring whether it ensues or not”. In respect of these 
three different explanations for the conative element, some academics like Burchell marvelled 
at the confusing nature of the concept and questioned the necessity of recklessness as an extra 
element for dolus eventualis.333 
 
One interesting observation made is that, in the case of Ngubane, Jansen JA redefined 
recklessness in the similar way as Snyman:334 accepting the foreseen possibility into the 
bargain. According to Jansen JA, the execution of this formulation was to a greater extent 
influenced by the distinction between foresight of a real possibility and foresight of only a 
remote (or faint) possibility.335 Furthermore, the Judge of Appeal observed that “if the agent 
persists in his conduct despite foreseeing such a consequence as a real or concrete possibility, 
the inference could be well drawn that “he reconciled” himself to that consequence, that he was 
reckless of that consequence”.336 In view of the phraseology in this passage, (that such a 
deduction “could well be drawn”), Burchell observes that, it can only mean that it is within the 
court’s discretion to hold that even though the accused foresaw only a remote or faint 
possibility of a consequence ensuing from his conduct, he might be said to have accepted this 
consequence into the bargain, reconciled himself to it, or consented to it.337 
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3.3 Can it be argued that the conative element of dolus eventualis is redundant? 
The first and second subsections of this chapter indicated that the standard definitions of dolus 
eventualis include a further element in addition to the basic requirement of foresight of the 
possibility of the happening of the result in question. This further element consists in 
recklessness as to whether the result ensues or not, which can also be said to consist in 
reconciling oneself to the possibility that the result will ensue or taking this possibility into the 
bargain. This section will provide arguments for and against the acceptance of this element. I 
am of the view that the best way to describe the conative element would be the phrase 
“reconciliation with harm” as was recently illustrated by Brand JA, in the Humphreys338 case. 
However, some academics describe the conative element in different terms; I shall portray the 
conative element in their339 terminology where applicable.  
3.3.1 Arguments for the view that the conative element is redundant 
In as much as many academics accept the view that the conative element is a significant part 
of the test for dolus eventualis, some are of the view that the conative element is redundant, 
and therefore should not form part of the test. Whiting340 does not approve of the explanation 
given in the De Bruyn case about the conative element, where it was held that the second 
element of dolus eventualis “involves the conscious taking of the risk that the result will ensue, 
not caring whether it ensues or not.”341 He argues that the first part of this statement is clearly 
unnecessary, because a person who acts with foresight of the possibility that a result will ensue 
can always also be said to have consciously taken the risk that the result will ensue.342 He 
further argues that the second part of the statement is even more erroneous and positively 
ambiguous. If a person hopes that a result will not ensue and does everything he can, short of 
abandoning his contemplated action, to ensure that it will not ensue, he can hardly be said not 
to care whether it ensues or not, yet the fact that he cared would surely not prevent him from 
being guilty of dolus eventualis in relation to the result in question if he then proceeded with 
his contemplated action, realising that despite his precautions there was still a substantial 
possibility that the result would ensue.343 It is for these reasons that Whiting argues that the 
second element of dolus eventualis must be done away with. 
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Furthermore, Burchell argues that the conative element is an unnecessary appendage.344 His 
argument is mainly based on the outcome of the Supreme Court of Appeal’s decision in the 
Humphreys345 case concerning the conative element of dolus eventualis, which in this case was 
referred to as the volitional element. The appeal court approved the trial court’s decision that 
the appellant had, by means of inferential reasoning, subjectively foreseen the death of the 
school children in the mini-bus as a possible outcome of his conduct,346 however, “it had not 
been established that the accused “reconciled” himself with the consequences of his conduct 
which he subjectively foresaw.”347 Brand JA in the Humphreys case was of the view that “if it 
can reasonably be inferred that the appellant may have thought that the possible collision he 
subjectively foresaw would not actually occur, the second element of dolus eventualis would 
not have been established.”348 
According to Brand JA, the inference that the appellant may have thought the foreseen collision 
would not actually occur was not only a “reasonable one, but indeed the most probable one”.349 
The judge of the appeal court gave two reasons for this conclusion, i) there was no 
substantiation that the appellant reconciled himself to the possibility of his own death or the 
death of his passengers because he thought this would not happen, and ii) he had “successfully 
performed the same manoeuvre in virtually the same circumstances previously.”350 On this 
basis, the Supreme Court of Appeal held that negligence, not dolus eventualis had been 
established. Burchell argues that the approach of the Supreme Court of Appeal on the volitional 
element of dolus eventualis disregards an essential aspect of the initial foresight inquiry into 
dolus eventualis: “did the accused foresee the consequence as a real or substantial possibility 
or not?”351 Burchell therefore suggests that the inquiry of “foresight” is the one to be recognised 
(the same one which the Supreme Court of Appeal in Humphreys ignored) and argues that the 
volitional addition to the dolus eventualis formulation is an unnecessary addition.352 This 
assertion by Burchell adds weight to the argument that the conative element as a second 
element of dolus eventualis does not have a significant force as the cognitive element.  
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In addition to the above views, Burchell makes some more observations regarding the 
Humphreys case which the author believes are particularly important to highlight. It has been 
observed that (regarding the Supreme Court of Appeal’s reasoning on the volitional element), 
it is hard to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused willingly went on with his actions 
in circumstances where death to him was foreseen, but their supposed optimism caused them 
to pay no attention to the consequence.353 Further, a person who agrees to race his car on high 
speed against a vehicle driven by another on a public road indisputably foresees (or is legally 
inferred to have foreseen) the real possibility of death ensuing to someone, including himself.354 
This assertion is not weakened by the fact that the accused and others may have managed to 
get away unharmed from such races in the past or that he may have an over-optimistic 
impression of his driving ability.355 In my view the approach used in the Humphreys was not 
satisfactory (for the court to conclude that Mr Humphreys did not reconcile himself because he 
had previously performed the overtaking manoeuvre and succeeded) and thus gives weaknesses 
towards the validity of the conative element as an independent inquiry in the test for dolus 
eventualis. 
Analysing the judgement in the Hedley356 case in my view makes it easier to understand why 
South African legal academics argue that the conative element of dolus eventualis is a very 
confusing inquiry. The Hedley case supports the conative element but it expresses it in terms 
of conscious negligence and not the volitional element per se. The court held that dolus 
eventualis should be limited to foresight of the real or substantial possibility of harm and 
foresight of anything less, that is, the remote possibility should qualify as conscious negligence 
only if a reasonable person would have taken certain preventative measures to ensure that such 
a possibility will not result.357 Most frequently the conative element is concerned with whether 
the accused acted with foresight of a possibility of harm and could equally apply to foresight 
of both real and remote possibilities.358 If the wrongdoer fails to act, in spite of having foresight, 
he will not be charged, and if the person modifies his or her conduct so that he or she no longer 
believes that there is any risk, foresight is again absent.  
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The suggestion by the Hedley359 case is in my view indicative of the fact that the conative 
element is more of a conduct than an independent element of intention. However, the view in 
Hedley case that the conative element can be confusing as it is closely similar to conscious 
negligence is a resolvable problem. The volition purportedly required for dolus eventualis 
seems to connote the sense of passive acceptance or acquiescence rather than positive will or 
desire.360 In effect, volition in such passive form connotes nothing more than a conclusion or 
awareness on the part of the accused that the harmful result may occur in the particular 
circumstances, and the purported volition therefore appears to be of a cognitive rather than a 
voluntative nature. If it is accepted that dolus eventualis essentially involves a cognitive 
awareness or conclusion that the harmful result may occur in the particular circumstances, it is 
possible to distinguish between dolus eventualis and conscious negligence on a logical basis. 
In the case of conscious negligence, the accused is aware of the possibility of the harmful result 
occurring, but discounts this possibility. In the case of dolus eventualis the accused concludes 
that the result may occur in the circumstances, but nevertheless proceeds with his action.361 
Thus, it cannot be a strong argument to say the conative element must be regarded as irrelevant 
simply because it sounds like conscious negligence. Loubser and Rabie also doubt the conative 
element, and reframe it in terms of a decision rather than risk-taking,362 but it could be argued 
that this fits in with the cognitive rather than the conative element. 
It can further be observed that, the other reason why it has been argued that the conative element 
is redundant is the fact that it is sometimes referred to as a descriptive part of the cognitive 
element.363 It has been indicated that recklessness is primarily to be inferred from the 
consequences which result from the accused’s act and the still graver consequences which 
might be expected to result from it.364 More so, the case of R v Horn reveals that the gravity of 
the risk which an accused took would also be a factor from which it could be inferred that he 
was in a reckless frame of mind.365 A finding of recklessness for the purposes of dolus 
eventualis, presupposes subjective foresight of the possible consequences. It can further be 
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observed that, reckless conduct without such foresight is not sufficient to establish dolus 
eventualis.366 If the perpetrator did not actually appreciate that death was a possible result, 
“there can be no question of his not caring about it; he did not think about it”,367 for example 
where a person drove into a crowd of people sincerely believing that the crowd would 
disappear.368 It would therefore be reason enough to argue that the conative element of dolus 
eventualis is dependent on the cognitive element. Loubser and Rabie observe that the presence 
of the element of recklessness is, like that of subjective foresight, normally proved by 
inference.369 In this manner, recklessness, (for example in the Poteredzayi case), may be 
inferred from previous deliberation and preparation, coupled with a failure to assist and the 
absence of any signs of surprise, regret or sympathy.370  
Snyman371 also makes an observation which in my view raises questions about the relevance 
of the conative element. He observes that the remoteness of the foreseen possibility may be a 
significant factor in deciding whether the accused subjectively foresaw a possibility at all.372 
He further holds that “if the possibility of the result ensuing was remote or far-fetched, dolus 
eventualis will probably be absent in that X did not reconcile himself to the possibility that the 
result might ensue.”373 After this, readers tend to wonder whether to accept judgemental factors 
such as social utility of the perpetrator’s conduct as relevant in the subjective inquiry of dolus 
eventualis or rather go for a normative inquiry into negligence or the objective aspect of 
conscious negligence?374 To further highlight the confusion associated with this element, it is 
helpful to look at the decision of the Appellate Division in the Maritz375 case. It has been argued 
that as a matter of legal principle, the conclusion of the Appellate Division that the appellant 
had not taken the risk of death into consideration because he was convinced he could avoid 
it376 is perhaps better explained on the basis that he did not foresee the materialisation as a real 
or reasonable possibility. On this contention, Paizes observes that this decision discloses the 
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advantage of disregarding the volitional element and reverting to the distinction between real 
and remote possibility in the context of foresight inquiry.377 
In the case of S v De Bruyn,378 Holmes JA provided a different way of interpreting the volitional 
element. According to Holmes JA,379 recklessness is another way of stating the rule that the 
unlawful conduct must exist contemporaneously with the mens rea.380 This theory of 
recklessness (volitional element) given by Holmes JA in De Bruyn has been referred to as the 
Holmesian concept by Smith.381 The Holmesian theory to recklessness is said to have certain 
errors which Paul Smith pointed out as follows: 
The accused who, initially foreseeing the possibility of harm, has not taken a conscious risk, 
[using Holmesian terminology], has either not acted at all [in which case there would be no 
charge] or has acted involuntarily, in which case there is no actus reus [unlawful conduct], or has 
modified his conduct so that he no longer believes that there is any risk of harm, in which case 
there is no foresight.382 
Regarding the issue of recklessness, Holmes JA in De Bruyn also mentioned that, “the 
conscious taking of the risk [of resultant death], not caring whether it ensues or not.”383 In this 
regard, Whiting argues that whether the perpetrator cares about an unlawful consequence or 
not is definitely irrelevant to his or her ability for taking a foreseen risk.384 The perpetrator’s 
worry about the risk ensuing has more to do with the object or reason for acting than his or her 
foresight. In other words, Whiting and Smith are of the view that the Holmesian terminology 
regarding recklessness was flawed. In support of the above critics,385 Morkel argues that 
recklessness in the Holmesian sense is a confusing concept and one that is not useful to the test 
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for dolus eventualis.386 These arguments therefore point to the view that the conative element 
is redundant, and is an insignificant part of dolus element.  
Morkel387 likewise rejects the requirement of recklessness as superfluous, because in his view 
it merely involves the fact that the accused foresaw the possible consequences, but nevertheless 
persisted in his conduct. He states that a person, who acts despite his knowledge of the possible 
infringement of the law, “commits himself to such infringement by the very fact that he 
becomes active despite such knowledge…should the prospective actor decide against the 
relevant infringement he will refrain from acting.”388 According to Morkel, dolus eventualis 
can be understood as a concept that only consists in foresight of the possible consequences 
combined with persistence in the relevant course of conduct. Therefore, two views emerging 
are that dolus eventualis either lacks a volitional element and contains only the cognitive 
element of foresight; or contains a volitional element that may be inferred from the fact that 
the accused persisted in his conduct despite foresight of the harmful result.389 In my view this 
is very confusing, it is therefore understandable that legal academics are finding the second 
limb of the test for dolus eventualis to be irrelevant. 
Furthermore, Morkel points out that the requirement of volition in addition to foresight of a 
concrete possibility could produce unsatisfactory results from a policy point of view, and refers 
in this regard to the case of Jolly.390 In this case the accused derailed a train with foresight that 
injury or even death of passengers might occur. Morkel argues that it would not have availed 
the accused to satisfy the court that they did not wish to cause the death of passengers.391 Even 
if the accused in fact sat next to the railway line praying that no passenger would come to harm 
they would still have dolus eventualis in respect of the consequences – not because they did 
not care about the passengers, but because they voluntarily planned and executed the 
derailment despite knowledge of the imminent danger (as a concrete possibility).392 
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Furthermore, Burchell and Hunt393 take the view that recklessness is a colourless concept, 
having nothing to do with the accused’s attitude of mind, and meaning the taking of a conscious 
risk;  
Recklessness in this context is a colourless concept in that it has nothing to do with the accused's 
state of mind to the happening of the consequence. It involves neither desire nor motive nor 
negligence, whether gross or slight. If this were not so the accused would have to be held to lack 
legal intention where, although he foresees a consequence as a real possibility, it is the last thing 
he wants to happen, or he takes precautions in an unsuccessful attempt to avoid it. In these 
circumstances the accused still takes a conscious risk; and at most his absence of desire or his 
attempt to avoid the consequence may affect sentence, not liability. 
This view finds apparent support in a number of cases which emphasize the accused's 
persistence in his conduct, despite his appreciation of the risks.394 In S v Kritzinger,395 for 
example, the court found recklessness to be proved where the accused foresees the possibility 
of harm, but “nevertheless decided to act regardless of the consequences.”396 The first difficulty 
with these cases is that they do not make it clear whether the taking of a conscious risk is itself 
recklessness, or whether it is really evidence of something else, such as indifference.397 The 
second difficulty is that if recklessness is nothing more than the taking of a conscious risk, it 
is, as a requirement in its own right, quite trivial. Whiting observes that the accused who, at 
first foreseeing the possibility of harm, does not take a conscious risk, has either not acted at 
all, or has acted unwillingly, in which case there is no actus reus, or has modified his conduct 
so that he no longer believes that there is any risk of harm, in which case there is no foresight.398 
In this paragraph it has been revealed that the second element of dolus eventualis should be 
done away with, seeing that most courts mention recklessness but do not explain its relevance 
further. 
Another interesting argument against the conative element is that it has on rare occasions been 
of practical importance in the sense that there are no cases where dolus eventualis was explicitly 
found to be lacking on account of an absence of recklessness. Some legal academics have 
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brought it to our attention399 that Chitate400 appears to be the only such case where dolus 
eventualis lacks due to the fact that the recklessness element was not satisfied. In this case the 
court held that the subjective foresight was present and stated that, in addition, it was necessary 
to show that the accused’s attitude of mind was one of heartless disregard of the consequences 
so that possible death was regarded by him as irrelevant when weighed against the attainment 
of his immediate objective.401 The victim died while undergoing an abortion and because it was 
not shown that the incidence of fatal abortions in like circumstances was high, the court found 
that dolus eventualis was not proved. In this regard, some academics argue that a low incidence 
of fatalities in these circumstances could also justify the inference that the accused did not 
actually foresee death as a possible result, and lacked dolus eventualis for this reason.402 Thus, 
it cannot be concluded that the recklessness element was the only determinative issue to 
instigate an absence of dolus eventualis. On this note, the author submits that this paragraph 
serves as a contributory opinion for the view that the second limb of the test for dolus eventualis 
is as significant as the cognitive element. 
In the Beukes case it has firmly been suggested that the second leg of the test will normally 
only be satisfied if the person in question foresaw the consequence as a reasonable 
likelihood.403 The explanation given in the case is that when the person concerned acted he 
foresaw the happening of the result only as a faint or remote possibility; this would tend to 
indicate that he did not take the possibility into the bargain or reconcile himself to it.404 This 
explanation has been rejected. According to Whiting this would mean that, by acting with 
foresight of a remote possibility that a result will occur, one necessarily reconciles oneself to 
there being a remote possibility that it will occur or takes this remote possibility into the bargain 
– such reasoning is confusing.405 Therefore, it has been argued that it will be necessary to reject 
the second limb of the definition of dolus eventualis as being a superfluous appendage which 
in certain forms is also misleading.406 
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In as much as the second limb of the test has been identified as the “distinguishing feature”407 
for dolus eventualis, there is some evidence for the view that this element has shortfalls. First 
and foremost, it can be observed that Jansen JA, in the Ngubane case, describes the conative 
element in a manner that is confusing. He seems to be of the view that the second limb of the 
test for dolus eventualis merely exists to describe the first limb of the test. It was held in the 
Ngubane case that “the “recklessness” of which our courts often speak means no more than 
this consenting, reconciling or taking into the bargain…Provided this element is present, it 
should not matter, for the purpose of determining whether an accused has dolus eventualis, 
whether he foresees the possibility ‘as strong or faint’, as probable or improbable.”408 Paizes 
rejects the views of the Ngubane case and holds that the definition of the second limb of the 
test serves only to describe a state of mind that must necessarily exist if one proceeds to do an 
act which one foresees might possibly cause the unlawful consequence in question.409 It has 
been observed that the existence of the volitional element is, moreover, independent of the 
degree of foresight one chooses to employ in the test for legal intention, and it is pointless to 
attempt to use the way it was used in Ngubane and Beukes to adjust the foresight element of 
that test. If one discards the notion that recklessness has any purposeful effect as a component 
of legal intention, one has, therefore, still, to give flesh to the element of foresight.410 
Consequently therefore, he concludes that the second limb of the test for dolus eventualis is 
confusing, he agrees that it is a “colourless concept.”411 
Van Oosten412 also seems to be of the view that the second limb of the test for dolus eventualis 
is not an independent element. He observes that the volitional element is satisfied only when 
the accused, in addition to foreseeing the result as possible, decides to accept the risk that the 
consequence may ensue (decided to take a chance or run the risk).413 However, Loubser & 
Rabie argue that no example has been forthcoming, practically where an accused acted while 
foreseeing the actual manifestation of a consequence as possible, but did not decide to run the 
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risk that the result may occur. In fact, acting with such foresight seems necessarily to 
incorporate a decision to run that risk.414 It has further been argued that if the volitional element 
is viewed as being constituted by the accused’s decision to act regardless his foresight, it may 
be argued that such decision does not amount to a volitional element, but that it is rather 
necessarily incorporated in the notion of a voluntary action.415 In any case, there seems to be 
little, if any, visible difference between the state of mind of one who proceeds to act after 
concluding that a harmful result may occur in the particular circumstances, and one who 
proceeds to act after resigning himself to and thus accepting the risk of such a result occurring. 
In both cases there is hardly any question of volition; the accused merely forms a conclusion 
that the result may occur and nevertheless proceeds to act.416 
Loubser and Rabie further observe that,  
…the content of the element of volition required for dolus eventualis in case law is uncertain. 
The purported requirement of volition for dolus eventualis appears to be undesirable; first 
because it is difficult to determine the precise content of volition in the form of “acceptance of” 
or “reconciling to” the harmful result in question; and second because the accused who sets in 
motion a criminal course of conduct while foreseeing the possibility of the harmful result 
occurring, should not by mere change of mind and loss of volition obtain the benefit of a 
defence, just as voluntary withdrawal after setting in motion a criminal course of conduct should 
not constitute a defence against conviction of attempt.417  
In this manner, it can be seen that much evidence falls on the view that the conative element is 
redundant because legal academics seem to struggle in pinning out the exact meaning and 
significance of this concept. As indicated in this current subsection, there are various 
definitions of what entails the content of the second limb of the test for dolus eventualis which 
are not clear. 
 
In support of the view that the conative element is redundant, Smith reveals certain aspects of 
the conative element which leaves readers a bit sceptical about the relevance of this element. 
He argues that the meaning of “recklessness” in s 140 of the Transkeian Penal Code gives rise 
to some difficulty because it is a poor expression of the English law.418 In this manner, if s140 
                                                          
414 MM Loubser and MA Rabie (supra note 203) 430. 
415 Ibid, 435. 
416 Ibid. 
417 Ibid, 430. 




is considered a poor expression of the English Law there is all the more reason for rejecting it 
as a good expression of South African law. Recklessness in the English law relates not only to 
the actor's state of mind, but also, like negligence in our own law, to his course of conduct. As 
to state of mind, Smith and Hogan say: “A man is reckless with respect to a consequence of his 
act, when he foresees that it may occur, but does not desire it or foresee it as virtually certain.419 
Recklessness with respect to circumstances means realization that the circumstances may exist, 
without either knowing or hoping that they do.” 420 Once it is established that the actor foresaw 
that the consequences might occur, a second question arises “whether in the circumstances a 
reasonable man having such foresight would have proceeded with his conduct notwithstanding 
the risk”. Only if the accused was acting unreasonably can his conduct be described as 
“reckless.”421 Because of this objective element, recklessness is sometimes called advertent 
negligence.422  
 
This idea of negligence is traditionally the predominant element of recklessness, which has 
evolved simply as a degree of negligence sufficient to warrant criminal sanction. In both its 
legal and its ordinary sense negligence involves at least two ideas.423 First, the actor must 
overlook to take precautions against the occurrence of harm; and, secondly, his failure to do so 
must be culpable. So, in the event of an accident, one would not blame as negligent a driver 
who had taken all proper precautions, however unthinkingly and automatically he did so. Nor 
would one think it negligent of an unskilled driver to take to the roads in a dire emergency. 
English-law recklessness, then, involves a culpable failure to take precautions, coupled with 
foresight of the consequences. To use the term to denote an attitude towards the foreseen risk 
of death is wrong, because in the English law it does not involve that idea at all. 
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In actual fact, the Transkeian Penal Code apparently uses the term recklessness to denote an 
attitude towards the foreseen death. Reckless does not relate to the commission of the act or to 
its culpability: those matters are dealt with in the sections immediately preceding s 140 of the 
Transkeian Penal Code. It can be argued that, the opening sentence of the Act which states, 
“Culpable homicide becomes murder in the following cases”, indicates that what is required in 
that section is additional to an unlawful killing: in the absence of those requirements there 
would still be culpable homicide. Nor is recklessness an entire state of mind, for it does not 
embrace foresight of death that is a separate requirement. It seems rather to be an attitude 
towards the apprehended risk of death.424 The conclusion must be that the requirement of 
recklessness in dolus eventualis is the result of an historical accident. In adopting s 140 of the 
Transkeian Penal Code, the court in Valachia’s case introduced into South African law a 
concept that was not only unwarranted by the weight of previous decisions, but also a 
misleading expression of the English law.425 
 
In the case of Fernandez426 the appellant failed to take proper steps to prevent a baboon from 
escaping while he was engaged in repairing the baboon’s cage. The baboon escaped and 
attacked and killed a child. It appeared that the appellant had fully appreciated the danger posed 
by the escaped baboon on a previous occasion and had approached the baboon with a firearm. 
He also knew that the baboon had previously injured a child standing outside the cage and that 
people, including children, frequented the shop and the vicinity where the baboon was kept. 
He also appreciated the extent of the injuries that an adult baboon is capable of inflicting. On 
these facts the court found that the appellant ought reasonably to have foreseen that death might 
result from the baboon not being prevented from leaving its cage and confirmed a conviction 
of culpable homicide. The court thus found that the accused ought to have foreseen that which 
(by implication) he did not actually foresee.427 It appears therefore that the absence of foresight 
of actual occurrence rather than the absence of volition determined the outcome of the case. 
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In the case of Le Roux428 the question was whether the accused had or should have had 
knowledge of the fact that he had illegally camped within the borders of the Kruger National 
Park. The court held that mens rea in the form of negligence was an element of the offence in 
question429 and that the appellant knew that he was camping in the vicinity of the Park, but did 
not concern himself in the least to find out where the borders of the Park were. The appellant 
was completely careless (“geheel en al onverskillig”) as to whether he illegally entered the Park 
or not and his conviction was therefore upheld. The decision does not deal with dolus eventualis 
at all, but even if dolus eventualis had been the required form of mens rea, it appears that 
primarily the absence of dolus eventualis would have turned on the lack of proof that the 
appellant did actually foresee the fact that he was trespassing, rather than on a lack of volition 
or carelessness as to whether he was in fact trespassing. 
According to Bertelsmann, the conative element is unhelpful because the cognitive element 
encompasses all inquiries that are needed to satisfy the intention of dolus eventualis.430 He 
observes that test of probability or even real possibility in the cognitive element will in practice 
frequently, though not always, lead to the same results as the inquiry of recklessness. The more 
likely the consequences appeared to the actor, the easier it will often be to infer that he 
consented to them.431 In other words this would mean that evidence relating to cognition will 
be used in applying the volitional test. He supports the view that dolus eventualis should be so 
defined that it resembles the meaning ascribed to intention by a reasonable man.432 
Consequently therefore, this may be the most influential argument for recognizing that nothing 
can have been intended unless it was willed. On that basis a definition can be formulated that, 
excluding all cases of conscious culpa, should be more in line with the actual practice of our 
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courts than the current one: “Dolus eventualis means that the actor foresees a result, as possible 
and, not caring whether it ensues or not, is prepared to accept it into the bargain.”433 In this 
regard he concludes by saying that the unhelpful'434 concept of recklessness should thus be 
disregarded. In spite of some overwhelming support of the view that the conative element is 
redundant in this particular subsection, it is also important to turn into other issues raised in 
support of the relevance of the conative element as a significant leg of the test for dolus 
eventualis. 
3.3.2 Arguments in support of the acceptance of the conative element as a significant 
requirement of dolus eventualis 
To begin with, it can be shown from the Ngubane435 case that the conative element is an 
inseparable part of the test for dolus eventualis. Of much significance are the words of Jansen 
JA, in the Ngubane436 case, where he identifies the second limb of the test for dolus eventualis 
as a “distinguishing feature”437 thereby portraying it as a prerequisite of dolus eventualis. 
Furthermore, in the recent case of DPP, Gauteng v Pistorius,438 the judge acknowledged that 
the concept of dolus eventualis involves two tests; “it therefore consists of two parts: (1) 
foresight of the possibility of death occurring, and (2) reconciliation with that foreseen 
possibility.”439 In other words, the court clearly pointed out the fact that the cognitive element 
alone is not sufficient for a finding of dolus eventualis to suffice. As was held,440 it is necessary 
that the possibility of death is foreseen which, coupled with a disregard of that consequence, is 
sufficient to constitute the necessary criminal intent. Furthermore, in the most recent case of S 
v Van Schalkwyk,441 the court acknowledged that the two legs are not considered in isolation. 
Furthermore, in case of S v Beukes,442 Van Heerden JA, made it clear that in most cases 
recklessness would only be satisfied where the perpetrator foresaw the outcome of his conduct 
as a “reasonable” possibility.443 Nevertheless, the Judge of Appeal highlighted that recklessness 
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is of significance as an additional element of dolus eventualis.444 Van Heerden propounded 
that, as the perpetrator would hardly ever admit this element, the court had to draw an inference 
regarding the perpetrator’s state of mind from facts indicative of, objectively considered, a 
reasonable possibility that the result would follow.445 In this manner, it can be inferred that the 
perpetrator reconciled himself to the result from the mere fact that he acted. Van Heerden JA 
further held that the conative element of dolus eventualis would normally be satisfied where 
the wrongdoer had foreseen the result as a reasonable possibility.446 In view of this judgement 
in the Beukes case, the conative element can be understood as a significant element of the test 
for dolus eventualis; therefore, it cannot be said to be redundant.  
To further indicate that the conative element is significant, the judge of the Appeal court in 
Beukes brought forward two situations in which the second limb of the test for dolus eventualis 
is apparent. These are: (i) When the wrongdoer knows that a consequence could certainly 
follow, but then takes steps to prevent that consequence from ensuing; (ii) when, initially, the 
wrongdoer had not foreseen the consequences of the outcome as a reasonable possibility, but 
after the primary chain of events has begun, he or she opts for a different view. In the second 
situation, Van Heerden JA comments that the wrongdoer will be reckless as to the consequence 
if he or she fails to take steps to terminate the chain of events.447 The judge gives an imaginary 
illustration where X who is a party to a common purpose, primarily does not foresee that 
another in the group is armed, but later finds out that he or she is.448 If one has to apply the 
second theory put forward by the judge, it would then mean that if X, after realising that he is 
in a group that is armed must remove himself from the group. Failure to do so then amounts to 
reckless, hence the applicability and significance of conative element in depicting intention. 
The significance of the conative element as a part of the test for dolus eventualis is further 
illustrated by the judgment in the case of S v Maritz.449 It has been argued450 that the facts of S 
v Maritz451 are indicative of an intense instance of police cruelty. The facts of this case included 
a suspect in a murder case who was tied by a rope to a police vehicle and forced to run in front 
of it.452 The rope was stretched tight and he was caught under the wheel of the police vehicle 
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and killed. The Appellate Division held that the intention to kill on the policemen was absent, 
but confirmed a conviction of culpable homicide. In this case, Van der Heever JA, argued that 
a person does not accept a foreseen risk into bargain when he or she is convinced that he or she 
can prevent it from occurring,453 and he or she cannot be held to have the requisite intention to 
cause that result merely because, ex post facto, its occurrence proves the person wrong.454 
Van der Heever JA, was of the view that the appellant had not taken the risk of the deceased’s 
death into consideration, but ought as a reasonable person to have done so. The judgment 
appears to turn on the volitional element of dolus eventualis. Even though it has been argued 
elsewhere on the matter of the appropriate legal classification of the inquiry, it is surely, on the 
facts, indisputable that tying a person to an eight metre rope and forcing him to run in front of 
a vehicle carries the real possibility that death could result from his falling under the vehicle. 
Therefore, judging from the facts of the Maritz case, in my view the conduct of the policemen 
can be said to be reckless, as they completely disregarded the consequences of their actions. 
Thus, seeing that the conative element was assigned to the accused in the Maritz case (as 
recklessness); one can argue that the conative element is a significant part of the test for dolus 
eventualis. 
De la Harpe and Van der Walt are of the view that the conative element of dolus eventualis is 
as important as the cognitive element and therefore both elements are a significant part of the 
test for dolus eventualis. This is particularly shown when they state that it is not sufficient that 
the accused only foresaw the possibility.455 De la Harpe and Van der Walt accept the view 
which was applied in the Ngubane case that it is mandatory for courts to give some meaning to 
the conative aspect in the concept of dolus eventualis which, in theory, has been defined as 
including foresight of even a remote possibility.456 The court emphasised that when taking note 
of the conative element, the accused’s state of mind in regard to that possibility must be one of 
“consenting” to the materialization of the possibility, “reconciling” himself to it, taking the 
foreseen possibility into the bargain or recklessness in regard to that possibility.457 The 
acknowledgement, and suggestions made by Jansen JA regarding the conative element in the 
Ngubane case are in my view an indication that the conative element is an indispensable part 
of dolus eventualis. 
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In the Dhlamini458 case, the issue in concern was whether the accused accepted the possibility 
that one of their members might be killed and were reckless as to this possibility. It is not clear 
from the judgment if and how the court considered this requirement. In the Dhlamini case there 
was a high probability that the accused foresaw the possibility that one of their members might 
be killed during the robbery.459 However, it is difficult to argue that they reconciled themselves 
with that possibility since it is not clear from the judgment to what extent the court entertained 
the requirement of recklessness.460 Therefore, it can be observed that one may apply the 
principles of the case of Maritz461 into the Dhlamini case, that a person does not accept a 
foreseen risk into the bargain when he is convinced that he can prevent it occurring. Such a 
person can, therefore, may not be held to have the requisite intention to cause that result merely 
because its occurrence proves him wrong. In a nutshell, my main emphasis is on the importance 
of the conative element as a part and parcel of the test for dolus eventualis. 
The second limb of the test for dolus eventualis has been said to be redundant due to the fact 
the cognitive element is mainly the centre of attention when courts are drawing inferences in 
the intention of the accused. In the case of S v Dlodlo,462 the court makes a similar observation 
that the second limb of dolus eventualis seldom features in practice. It was held that a possible 
explanation why recklessness so seldom features in practice, is that this element is usually 
almost automatically inferred from the fact that the accused foresaw the possible occurrence of 
the result in question and nevertheless persisted in his conduct.463 It may be assumed that in 
the great majority of cases proof of recklessness would in fact be furnished by the accused's 
action with foresight of the possible consequences. On a different footing, in the Nkombani 
case the court took the view that recklessness may sometimes serve as evidence from which an 
inference may be drawn that the accused in fact foresaw the possible occurrence of the 
prohibited consequence in question.464 With these views, the author argues that it is illogical to 
then conclude that since the recklessness element seldom features it must be discarded. The 
fact that courts do use it to draw inferences as regards the cognitive element outlines it a 
significant leg of the test just like the cognitive element. 
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Paizes is against the notion that the conative element (which he refers to as the “reconciliation 
of harm”) is redundant as he is shown giving strong evidence to support the view that the 
conative element is an independent part of the test for dolus eventualis.465 He argues that 
interpreting the second element in a way that requires the latter instead of the former sets the 
bar too high for the prosecution and leads, if taken to its logical conclusion, to inappropriate 
decisions. Some court decisions are criticized on the basis that they believe that “foresight” and 
“belief” exist on completely different planes, so that an assessment of one cannot have a bearing 
on the measure of the other.466 I agree with Paizes that this cannot be true.467 Where some 
meaning to the conative element is given by ascertaining how much “foresight” will make up 
a “belief” necessarily makes inroads into the meaning of the first element by eroding what 
constitutes foresight of the real possibility of causing the prohibited result.468 This will then 
lead to confusing or wrong results. It can be argued that the best possible solution is to regard 
these two elements469 as independent and separate, thereby regarding the conative element as 
a significant part of the test that requires consideration in the similar way as the cognitive 
element. Thus the conative element cannot be said to be a determinative factor to the cognitive 
element. 
Furthermore, the model for dolus eventualis in the civil law systems from which the South 
African concept originates (Dutch and German law) includes both a cognitive and a conative 
component, in this manner, the second limb of the test for dolus eventualis is as important as 
the first one. In German criminal law, intention is the label used not only for cases of knowledge 
and desire; it also includes cases of what in common law is known as recklessness in dolus 
eventualis. Taylor discusses the historical development of the German concept of intention, 
and shows that dolus eventualis consists of two components: the cognitive element, which (as 
in the common law) considers the state of the accused's knowledge that the offence may occur, 
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and a volitional or dispositional element which is unknown to the common law.470 However, 
in conclusion of his article, Taylor disputes the volitional element saying that it is not plausible, 
and that in any harmonization of concepts of intention in the criminal law of the European 
countries such an element should not be adopted.471 This has become one of the reasons why 
some legal writers believe that the second limb of the test for dolus eventualis in insignificant. 
What remains an important issue however is that, recent case law supports the relevance of the 
conative element. In the recent case of S v Van Schalkwyk,472 it was highlighted that the two 
elements of dolus eventualis must not be analysed in isolation. In this case, “the State had to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (a) the appellant had had the subjective foresight of the 
possibility that striking the deceased on the upper part of his body with the hay hook could 
have fatal consequences; and (b) the appellant had a disregard of that consequence put 
differently, he had reconciled himself with the foreseen possibility”. The two legs are not 
considered in isolation.473 Brand JA in S v Humphreys described the test as follows:  
On the other hand, like any other fact, subjective foresight can be proved by inference. Moreover, 
common sense dictates that the process of inferential reasoning may start out from the premise 
that, in accordance with common human experience, the possibility of consequences that ensued 
would have been obvious to any person of normal intelligence. The next logical step would then 
be to ask whether, in the light of all the facts and circumstances of this case, there is any reason 
to think that the appellant would not have shared this foresight, derived from common human 
experience, with other members of the general population.474  
Similarly, in the recent case of DPP Gauteng v Pistorius, the Supreme Court of Appeal 
confirmed that the conative element is a necessary part of the test for dolus eventualis. It said 
the following:  
A person’s intention in the form of dolus eventualis arises if the perpetrator foresees the risk of 
death occurring, but nevertheless continues to act appreciating that death might well occur, 
therefore gambling as it were with the life of the person against whom the act is directed. It 
therefore consists of two parts: (i) foresight of the possibility of death occurring, and (ii) 
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reconciliation with that foreseen possibility. This second element has been expressed in various 
ways. For example, it has been said that the person must act reckless as to the consequences (a 
phrase that has caused some confusion as some have interpreted it to mean with gross negligence) 
or must have been reconciled with the foreseeable outcome. Terminology aside, it is necessary 
to stress that the wrongdoer does not have to foresee death as a probable consequence of his or 
her actions. It is sufficient that the possibility of death is foreseen which, coupled with a disregard 
of that consequence, is sufficient to constitute the necessary criminal intent.475  
This all goes to prove that the conative element is just as important and useful as the cognitive 
element, and they are different. 
3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter indicated the difficulties that come with the acceptance of the conative element as 
a second limb of the test for dolus eventualis. Although courts476 apply both the conative and 
cognitive elements for dolus eventualis, there have been objections by legal academics where 
the application of the conative element has been regarded as irrelevant. However, as indicated 
in this chapter, there have been some authoritative pronouncements in favour of the view that 
the conative element is significant. Due to these two opposing views about the conative 
element, the relevance of the conative element becomes questionable, or rather confusing. It 
becomes uncertain which of the two views must be acceptable. This chapter supports the view 
that the conative element is not redundant, and that it is in fact a relevant part of the test for 
dolus eventualis. As indicated in the above subsections, much evidence supports the view that 
the conative element is significant. Below is a brief summary in support of the view that the 
conative element is significant (some sections against the conative element shall be discussed 
as well.) 
First of all, this dissertation supports the view of an unqualified cognitive element. In this 
manner, the conative element is relevant in so far as it is a safe guard towards liability. It stops 
liability being too wide and it’s a balance against any possible injustice. Even if there is 
foresight in the accused, the court still has to ascertain that the accused proceeded with his 
actions willingly despite knowing the consequences (reconciliation). Furthermore, (as 
discussed in detail above)477 some legal academics have been seen undermining the relevance 
of the conative element. The outcome of the De Bruyn case according to Whiting did not bring 
a satisfactory explanation on the relevance and content of conative element.478 This is where 
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the court held that dolus eventualis involves the conscious taking of the risk that the result will 
ensure, not caring whether it ensure or not.479 According to Whiting this explanation is 
erroneous and ambiguous; he prefers a more relaxed explanation about the concept. Thirdly, 
Burchell argues that the conative element is an unnecessary appendage. His argument is mainly 
based on the outcome of the Humphreys case. He argues that the approach of the Supreme 
Court of Appeal on the volitional element of dolus eventualis disregards an essential aspect of 
the initial foresight inquiry into dolus eventualis.480 From these views, it has been submitted 
that the conative element is redundant because even the courts fail to give a clear explanation 
about the conative element.  
Furthermore, as indicated above, Loubser and Rabie are against the conative element, as they 
argue that the content of the element of volition required for dolus eventualis in case law is 
uncertain.481 They go on to add that:  
The requirement of volition for dolus eventualis appears to be undesirable; first because it is 
difficult to determine the precise content of volition in the form of “acceptance of” or “reconciling 
to” the harmful result in question; and second because the accused who sets in motion a criminal 
course of conduct while foreseeing the possibility of the harmful result occurring, should not by 
mere change of mind and loss of volition obtain the benefit of a defence, just as voluntary 
withdrawal after setting in motion a criminal course of conduct should not constitute a defence 
against conviction of attempt.482  
However, in my view, the fact that courts may have failed to give a clear picture of the 
relevance of the conative element does not render the element insignificant, as some put it. 
There is some authoritative pronouncement for the view that the conative element is a 
significant part of the test for dolus eventualis.483 In the case of S v Beukes, Van Heerden JA, 
approved that no decision in South African courts has actually turned on the question of 
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recklessness.484 No court in South Africa has actually stipulated that the conative element is 
insignificant. Dolus eventualis cases have been seen defining dolus eventualis as involving 
both a cognitive and conative element. Furthermore, the model for dolus eventualis in the civil 
law systems from which the South African concept originates (Dutch and German law) 
includes both a cognitive and a conative component, which makes the second limb of the test 
for dolus eventualis as important as the first one.485 
Furthermore, some court decisions seem to be of the view that the conative element seldom 
features in practice; therefore it cannot be regarded as relevant. In the case of S v Dlodlo,486 the 
court makes a similar observation that the second limb of dolus eventualis seldom features in 
practice. However, my submission is that, the fact that the conative element seldom features in 
practice does not render it insignificant. It is still a significant limb of the test, which in the 
Ngubane case it was emphasized that it is mandatory for courts to give meaning to the conative 
aspect of dolus eventualis.487 Moreover, in the recent case of S v Pistorius488 the judge 
acknowledged that the concept of dolus eventualis involves two elements; a conative and a 
cognitive element. 
I am of the opinion that the conative element is an essential part to a test for dolus eventualis 
and is a completely independent element separate from the foresight element. In other words, 
foresight of the possibility of harm489 and the decision which thereafter came into the accused’s 
mind about that possibility490 are two different issues. Where the wrongdoer ceases to act 
because he appreciates that a prohibited consequence may follow from his actions, it is because 
of the emergence of a second thought in his mind, which accepts that the foreseen possibility 
may happen. Similarly, if he carries on with his conduct, the judge will draw an inference to 
figure out the state of the wrongdoer’s mind (conative element) in relation to the foreseen 
possibility. If he did not care about the result and still persisted with his conduct, he accepted 
that the forbidden consequence may be the result of his or her action - dolus eventualis will be 
present. If he was acting on the belief that no harm will occur, there is no dolus eventualis. In 
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both situations there are two different phases before the action was taken: foresight of a 
possibility, and what was the state of the mind (the conative element) towards that possibility. 
As such, it may only be reasonable to accept the conative element as a significant part of the 
test for dolus eventualis. Therefore, it can be submitted that the conative element of dolus 












                              
  
                                                          





4. A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE INTERPRETATION OF DOLUS 
EVENTUALIS IN SOUTH AFRICAN LAW 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 and 3 have been critically important in that they examined the elements of dolus 
eventualis in detail. In the current chapter I shall examine the concept of dolus eventualis as a 
whole including how it has been interpreted by South African courts and legal writers. I came 
up with different models for dolus eventualis in South African criminal law based on case law 
and legal writers. Generally, there are three models of dolus eventualis that are accepted by 
South African legal writers. These so far include, first a model which accepts a qualified 
cognitive element and disregards the conative element; secondly, a view that accepts an 
unqualified cognitive element and balances it with the conative element, and thirdly a model 
which favours the qualified cognitive element and accepts the conative element as significant. 
The fourth and additional model (my own) accepts an unqualified cognitive element and 
accepts the conative element plus an additional practical component (for clarity, the fourth 
option shall be referred to as model 4 because I will link its application to what Paizes and 
Whiting suggested in terms of specific cases.) This dissertation supports the latter (model 4) so 
far as it favours the conative element and contains a unique approach to dolus eventualis cases. 
More reasons why this dissertation prefers model 4 shall be indicated later in this chapter. 
Having selected the most preferable model, I shall move on to explain how this model may be 
applied in case law. This dissertation suggests that model 4 may be applied on a case-by-case492 
basis, rather than a one-size-fits-all493 concept. Theoretically, model 4 is a much better 
approach, however, this dissertation partly agrees with Paizes and Whiting in terms of the 
application of the concept in cases. Basically, my approach differs from Paizes and Whiting in 
that it accepts the conative element as significant whereas they494 find it irrelevant, but concurs 
with them in terms of their practical approach to cases. In their practical approach to dolus 
eventualis cases, Paizes and Whiting present some interesting insights against the one-size-fits-
all concept. The one-size-fits-all concept is when all dolus eventualis cases are dealt with using 
the same criteria, regardless of the category each case falls into. If dolus eventualis cases had 
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to be dealt with in terms of a one-size-fits-all concept, the approach used in case A will be used 
in case B regardless of the difference in facts. My argument is that, the fact that there is a 
standard approach to dolus eventualis should not guarantee the outcome of a case in another 
case, because even though we might have two dolus eventualis cases involved, their facts differ. 
It would thus be best to look at these cases individually. Putting them in a one-size-fits-all 
category may lead to incorrect results.  
An example of the one-size-fits-all approach (which shall be discussed in detail below) is: 
where the appellant in Humphreys escaped liability for murder on the basis that it was “not 
immaterial” to him that his manoeuvre would lead to the collision and death of the children 
who were his passengers. Applying the same approach to the Nyalungu495 case would lead to 
a finding that the rapist hoped not to infect his victim even though he accepted the real risk of 
doing so by raping her in the first place. The decision in the Humphreys does not make sense 
if applied in the Nyalungu case. So we might have a standard approach to dolus eventualis, but 
its application in cases must not be the same.  
Furthermore, this chapter will highlight the rule emphasised by the National Prosecution 
Authority that reckless drivers are not to be charged with murder, unless intention in the form 
of dolus eventualis can be proved.496 It shall further be highlighted that because the appellants 
in Maaroahanye497 and Humphreys cases escaped the conviction of murder and attempted 
murder does not necessarily mean that the same should be the case for other reckless drivers. 
In as much as the concept of dolus eventualis has been explained in these high-profile dolus 
eventualis cases, the nature and its content remain ambiguous. The submission of this 
dissertation therefore is that, it would be more helpful to follow a more nuanced approach 
suggested by Paizes, the case-by-case application.498 
This chapter shall further analyse some HIV transmission and road traffic dolus eventualis 
cases. As regards the HIV transmission cases, the dissertation seeks to point out that already 
there is some discrimination and stigma against the HIV infected people. To then go further 
and criminalise such accused on the grounds of attempted murder when they have infected 
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someone with the HIV seems more of an addition to the stigmatisation. Therefore, to categorise 
HIV transmission cases as dolus eventualis cases in the same manner as in road traffic cases 
and other intent-based murder crimes would arguably lead to unjust results. The dissertation 
further analyses certain recent high-profile cases in South African criminal law which have 
applied the concept of dolus eventualis. This shall be done in order to see how the courts have 
succeeded in explaining the concept of dolus eventualis which for years has been regarded as 
an ambiguous concept. The current high profile dolus eventualis cases to be discussed in this 
chapter are, DPP Gauteng v Pistorius,499 S v Humphreys,500 and Maarohanye v S.501 However, 
any other relevant cases502 which might help unravel the problem associated with 
understanding the concept of dolus eventualis shall be discussed in conjunction with the above 
mentioned high-profile cases.503 
4.2 Models of dolus eventualis recognised in South African law 
4.2.1 Model 1: An acceptance of a qualified cognitive element & a disregard of the 
conative element 
According to this model, legal writers accept the view that only one element is sufficient for a 
finding of dolus eventualis, that is, the cognitive element. In this manner, qualifying the 
cognitive element in the test for dolus eventualis to a certain extent makes the conative element 
useless. This can be best illustrated by looking at Professor Burchell’s opinion.504 He believes 
that dolus eventualis should be comprised of a qualified cognitive element, where he advocates 
for foresight of a “real”, “substantial” or “reasonable” possibility.505 He advocates qualifying 
the cognitive element because he believes that defining it in unqualified terms leaves the whole 
concept of dolus eventualis too broad.506 He then goes on to argue that the conative element 
should be rejected as “irrelevant and confusing”.507 It can be observed that Burchell rejects the 
conative element and balances the concept of dolus eventualis with a qualified foresight 
component to ensure that the concept is not too broad, and that people who do not deserve to 
be regarded as acting intentionally are not convicted on the basis of dolus eventualis. By 
insisting on this standard, Burchell further contends that intention would be confined to “a state 
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of mind that can properly be regarded as such and keep the dividing line between intention and 
negligence clear-cut”.508 It is on this basis that some academic writers like Paizes, Smith and 
Morkel have found the view of rejecting the conative element and accepting only a qualified 
cognitive element of dolus eventualis.509  
 
Paizes, Smith and Morkel reject the conative element as redundant and argue that all that is 
required for dolus eventualis is subjective foresight of the possibility of harm ensuing provided 
the possibility is not remote, but substantial or “concrete”.510 It seems that recklessness adds 
nothing to the cognitive element: if the accused foresaw the possibility of the result but 
nevertheless proceeded with his act he was in any event reckless. Recklessness according to 
their511 understanding can be absent only if the accused foresaw the possibility of the result but 
decided not to proceed with his act, in which event he will escape liability on the basis that 
there was no unlawful act.512 This dissertation acknowledges the existence of this particular 
model, but however finds it flawed to its attempt at rejecting the conative element as irrelevant. 
Subsection 4.2.4 discusses the model favoured by this dissertation and how the conative 
element must always fit into the test for dolus eventualis. 
 
4.2.2 Model 2: An acceptance of an unqualified cognitive element & the conative 
element as significant 
The second model recognised amongst legal academics is the one that qualifies the cognitive 
element and further accepts the existence of the conative element. This model is completely 
different from the above one (4.2.1). According to this model, the degree of foresight must be 
of any foresight, no matter how remote, unqualified by any terms with support from the case 
of S v Malinga513 which favours foresight of a remote possibility. In the case of Malinga, it 
was held that remoteness of the possibility is significant in drawing an inference of the 
accused’s subjective foresight of a possibility;514 the more remote the possibility the less likely 
it is that the accused did in fact foresee it.515 But that is not to say that a person who does foresee 
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a possibility of death is entitled, because the risk is slight, and death is unlikely, highly 
improbable or remote, to take a chance and, as it were, gamble with the life of another.516 
It can be observed that the view of an unqualified possibility is more favourable because the 
requirement of a real possibility was expressly rejected in the Fick case.517 The requirement of 
a real possibility was also rejected following a decision in South African case law that what is 
required for dolus eventualis is not foresight of any possibility, but only of a real possibility518 
or foresight of a substantial risk519 or of a reasonable possibility of risk to life.520 In the case 
of Beukes521 reference has been made to foresight of a reasonable possibility,522 but it appears 
that they do not go as far as setting this as a general requirement.523 This requirement would be 
in conflict with the view which either does not qualify possibility or even allows a remote 
possibility to suffice.  
To a certain extent Loubser and Rabie fall in this category. They accept an unqualified 
cognitive element and reject the conative element. According to Loubser and Rabie, the 
cognitive element of dolus eventualis requires foresight of the possibility of the harmful result 
in the sense that the result of the act may occur in a particular manner.524 Once a person comes 
to a conclusion that a certain result will follow from his act, but nevertheless proceeds to act 
appreciates the possibility of the harmful result in question and therefore acts intentionally. It 
has further been observed that, the degree of probability of the occurrence of the harmful result 
will be of evidential importance regarding the inference as to whether the actor subjectively 
concluded that the harmful result may occur, but foresight of a real or substantial possibility of 
such occurrence is not required.525 In as much as the conative element has been accepted as 
significant, it appears that a positive will, wish or desire is not required, but rather a more 
passive “appreciation of” or “reconciling to” the harmful result.526 
                                                          
516 R v Horn (supra note 17) 465C. 
517 S v Fick 1970 (4) SA 510 (N) 514C-G; S v Shaik (supra note 217) 62C-F. 
518 S v Ushewokunze 1971 (1) SA 360 (RA) 364B-C; S v Ostilly (supra note 123) 728D; S v Ncwane 1978 (2) PH 
H218 (A); S v Moodie 1983 (1) SA 1161 (C) 1162B. 
519 R v Steenkamp 1960 (3) SA 680 (N) 684F-G. 
520 S v Tazwinga (supra note 205) at 59 1D; S v Ushewokunze (supra note 280) 363. 
521 S v Beukes (supra note 144). 
522 Ibid, 522E. 
523 Ibid, 521J-522C. 






However, it is hard to determine an extent such acceptance or reconciling constitutes-
something more than a mere awareness or conclusion that the harmful result may occur in the 
circumstances. Loubser and Rabie then conclude that it is hard to determine the exact content 
of volition in the form of “acceptance of” or “reconciling to” the harmful result in question; 
and second because the accused who sets in motion a criminal course of conduct while 
foreseeing the possibility of the harmful result occurring, should not by mere change of mind 
and loss of volition obtain the benefit of a defence, just as voluntary withdrawal after setting in 
motion a criminal course of conduct should not constitute a defence against conviction of 
attempt.527 According to this model, the view of an unqualified component is balanced by an 
additional element, (the conative element) but to avoid some repetition, more on how the 
conative element is linked to an unqualified cognitive element is discussed below at (4.2.4), 
because these two models are almost similar. 
 
4.2.3 Model 3: An acceptance of a qualified cognitive element and the conative 
element as significant 
The third model accepts both the cognitive and conative element, where foresight in the 
cognitive element is qualified. Legal academics like Snyman can be placed into this category. 
According to Snyman, “the cognitive element deals with what the accused conceives to be the 
circumstances of his act and foresees the prohibited result not as one which will necessarily 
flows from his act, but only as a strong possibility.”528 Snyman further submits that the correct 
approach is to assume that there must be a real or reasonable possibility that the result may 
ensue.529 The Supreme Court of Appeal in the Makgatho530 case expressly endorsed this view 
as well.  
According to Model 3, dolus eventualis can be said to be absent where the accused foresees 
the possibility of harm only as remote or far-fetched. In the case of Shaik and Dladla,531 it was 
held that the fact that the possibility is remote may influence the making of deductions 
concerning what the accused subjectively saw. The more remote the possibility that the result 
might ensue, the more difficult it will be to find as a fact that the accused indeed foresaw that 
possibility. Furthermore, if the possibility of the result ensuing was remote or far-fetched, dolus 
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eventualis will probably be absent in that the accused did not reconcile himself to the possibility 
that the result might ensue. 
The relevance of the conative element is highlighted by Snyman where he argues that, “it does 
not follow from the fact that X foresaw the result as a reasonable possibility that dolus 
eventualis is therefore present. A person may foresee a result as possible and nevertheless lack 
dolus eventualis, if he decides or comes to the conclusion that the result will not ensue from 
his act”.532 In this manner, it can be argued that the conative element indeed has to be accepted, 
whereby the accused reconciles himself to the possibility that the result will follow. Notable is 
the fact that, there is almost no direct evidence of the existence of the second element (conative 
element) to determine dolus eventualis. 
 It has been revealed that courts almost always base their findings on whether the second part 
of the test has been complied with on inferences from the facts.533 In summary, the third model 
accepts a qualified cognitive element because a remote possibility of harm means an absence 
of dolus eventualis, and the conative element is relevant because it is completely independent 
of the cognitive element. But if a notion of accepting a “remote” foresight possibility is a firmly 
established concept in South African law, would it be useful to continue neglecting it? Model 
4 attempts to answer this question and gives more reasons why the conative element must be 
accompanied by an unqualified cognitive element in dolus eventualis. 
4.2.4 Model 4: An acceptance of an unqualified cognitive element & an acceptance 
of the conative element plus an additional case-by-case analysis 
There is no court decision so far or any legal academic that has followed this particular model 
in the exact same way as suggested by this dissertation. This is a more nuanced approach to 
dolus eventualis currently suggested as an alternative approach to dolus eventualis. As 
explained above, some legal writers accept a qualified cognitive element but reject the conative 
element, and some writers have accepted the unqualified cognitive element and the conative 
element as significant.534 Looking at the level of confusion associated with dolus eventualis, 
this dissertation seeks to deviate from the above well-known models of dolus eventualis and 
recommends a new one. In this particular model, the dissertation advocates for a concept of 
dolus eventualis which accepts both the cognitive and conative element as significant, further 
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accepting the cognitive element in unqualified terms. As discussed in chapter 2, accepting the 
cognitive element in unqualified terms refers to a situation where foresight of the possibility of 
harm no matter how “remote”535 or “slight” is sufficient for a finding of dolus eventualis.  
Several arguments have been raised against accepting remote foresight, where it has been 
argued that if foresight of a remote possibility is accepted it will lead to inconsistent results536 
and raises the spirit of injustice. This idea has been viewed as “too wide”537 by other academics. 
Burchell and Hunt use an example of a motorist, stating that applying the remote possibility 
principle would mean that whenever someone drives his car, he would have dolus eventualis 
in respect of harm to other users of the road, and therefore would be a murderer should death 
be a consequence of his driving.538 This example is done based on assumption that recklessness 
is present (which is the similar model suggested by this dissertation).539 Morkel argues that if 
a remote possibility amounted to sufficient foresight for liability, this would mean that the 
wrongdoer could be held liable for a crime requiring intention where her conduct did not even 
fall short of that of the reasonable person.540 A closer analysis however reveals that accepting 
a remote foresight is sufficient for the reasons that follow. 
Firstly, accepting the cognitive element in unqualified terms is a notion that has been firmly 
established541 under South African law. It has been observed that the dicta in the Nsele case is 
so effective to the extent that even though it was passed in the 1950s, it has since became the 
prevailing approach to the degree of foresight required for dolus eventualis to suffice.542 
Secondly, the standard approach of accepting proof of an unqualified possibility as adequate 
for the purposes of liability has not been specifically rejected in the case law.543 For example, 
as indicated in chapter 2, in the case of Van Aardt in the court a quo, Froneman J applied the 
standard approach of foresight of an unqualified possibility of the risk of death ensuing ;544 
when the matter was taken for an appeal, the full bench of the Eastern Cape High Court, faced 
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with the argument whether the possibility foreseen should be “strong or slight” held that the 
issue did not merit discussion as the appellant had in fact foreseen the “reasonable” possibility 
of harm on the facts;545 and the Supreme Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, on the basis 
of subjective foresight of the possibility of harm, expressed in unqualified terms.546  
Thirdly, this dissertation favours the view of an unqualified possibility because the requirement 
of a real possibility has been expressly rejected.547 The requirement of a real possibility was 
rejected following a decision in South African case law that what is required for dolus 
eventualis is not foresight of any possibility, but only of a real possibility548 or foresight of a 
substantial risk549 or of a reasonable possibility of risk to life.550 In the case of Beukes551 
reference has been made to foresight of a reasonable possibility,552 but it appears that they do 
not go as far as setting this as a general requirement.553 This requirement would be in conflict 
with the view which either does not qualify possibility or even allows a remote possibility to 
suffice.  
Furthermore, some legal academics554 put forward certain arguments for qualifying the 
cognitive element which are in my view unsatisfactory. They argue that it is doubtful whether 
a person can be said to foresee a possibility if he thinks of it but considers it very remote. This 
opinion may is based on the mere speculation of the imaginary possibility of the consequence 
in question and therefore is ambiguous. Engers555 also argues that, the definite claim that 
foresight of a remote possibility does not amount to foresight, would be straining in both 
language and logic. It can thus be said that too much attention must not be placed upon the 
mere observation by the accused of the hypothetical possibility of the consequence in question, 
with a consequent neglect of his consideration as to whether or not an anticipated result will 
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occur.556 In view of the above reasons and more, the cognitive element of dolus eventualis is 
best defined in unqualified terms.  
An additional acceptance of the conative element is useful because it is an element that has 
originally been appended to the concept of dolus eventualis. The model for dolus eventualis in 
the civil law systems from which the South African concept originates (Dutch and German 
law) includes both a cognitive and a conative component, in this manner, the second limb of 
the test for dolus eventualis is as important as the first one. In German criminal law, intention 
is the label used not only for cases of knowledge and desire; it also includes cases of what in 
common law is known as recklessness in dolus eventualis. Taylor discusses the historical 
development of the German concept of intention, and shows that dolus eventualis consists of 
two components: the cognitive element, which (as in the common law) considers the state of 
the accused's knowledge that the offence may occur, and a volitional or dispositional element 
which is unknown to the common law.557  
 
Dropping the conative element altogether will ultimately make South African law different 
from other laws in the world which may create room for criticism against South African 
criminal law, or even worse, South African legal writers might encounter some difficulties 
regarding sources in their study of our law which requires a literature review. Many countries 
recognize the conative element for example Italy, where dolus eventualis is known as dolo 
eventuale. According to Article 43 of the Italian Codice Penale, all grave crimes require 
evidence of the mental element known as dolo, which means that the prohibited result must be 
both preveduto (foreseen) and voluto (wanted). Nevertheless, a result may be voluto even 
though it is not wanted if, having anticipated the likelihood of bringing it about by pursuing a 
course of conduct, the perpetrator is prepared to run the risk of doing so (dolo eventuale). Even 
a small risk may be voluto if the defendant has reconciled himself to, or accepted it as a part of 
the price he was prepared to pay to protect his objective.558  
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Furthermore to note is the fact that German courts, following the tradition of the 
Reichsgericht559 and the jurisprudence of the Federal Supreme Court of Justice (BGH), “adhere 
to a somewhat watered-down approval theory, yet the approval does not need to be explicit and 
the offender need not morally approve of the result – it is sufficient if he or she accepts it 
nevertheless in order to reach his or her ulterior goal.”560 It can be observed that German courts 
have put much emphasis on differentiating between the principle of the cognitive and volitional 
elements and inferring their existence from the evidence about the external conduct of the 
defendant.561 The Federal Supreme Court has adopted the approach that if the defendant ‘is 
acting in an objectively highly dangerous situation and still goes ahead with his or her plans 
without being able to claim realistically that nothing bad will happen, the volitional element 
may be more easily inferred than in less clear-cut situations, where the danger is not readily 
recognisable.562 
The prevailing opinions of legal writers in Germany, as well as the German courts’ view, show 
that in the case of dolus eventualis, both knowledge and wilfulness must be present. As for the 
requisite component of knowledge, however, it is sufficient that the offender foresees the 
consequences as possible; as for the component of wilfulness, the offender has to approve the 
result or reconcile himself to the result. The Federal Supreme Court went on to draw some lines 
between bedingter Vorsatz or dolus eventualis and bewusster Fahrlässigkeit or conscious 
negligence assuring that the perpetrator who trusts in the non–occurrence of the undesired 
result is merely acting with conscious negligence and not with dolus eventualis.563 What 
therefore remains important and the main reason for briefly discussing international law is to 
prove that the conative element is internationally recognised a part of the test for dolus 
eventualis, therefore South African legal writers must accept it as such as well. In this manner 
a model that favours the unqualified cognitive component and the conative element is 
favourable.  
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4.2.5 Giving effect to model 4 by including a case-by-case analysis in dolus eventualis 
cases 
In the above subsection, a unique approach to dolus eventualis which deviates from the general 
South African approach has been suggested. Here is the reason why. In the case of S v Van 
Schalkwyk,564 Willis JA analyses the concept of dolus eventualis in a way in which one can 
argue that a more nuanced approach for this concept might help solve its uncertainty. The issue 
in the Van Schalkwyk565 case was whether the appellant was correctly convicted of murder in 
the form of dolus eventualis in the trial court. More specifically, the issue was whether the 
appellant had actually foreseen that his actions might cause the death of the deceased. This case 
involved the deceased, Klaaste, a farm worker who was employed by the appellant at the time 
of his death on 14 February 2014. The appellant had instructed the deceased to feed the cattle 
over the weekend of 12 to 13 February 2014. The deceased failed to do so.566 It was harvest 
time and the appellant’s seasonal workers were already in the vineyard ready to harvest the 
grapes, but the crates for packing them were not in the vineyard. The appellant instructed 
Kalanie, another farm worker, to fetch the tractor and a second trailer, load the crates and 
deliver them to the workers in the vineyard. When Kalanie returned with the trailer, the 
deceased was standing on it holding two iron hay hooks, apparently intending to do the work 
he had neglected to do over the weekend. The appellant, standing on the ground next to the 
trailer, instructed the deceased to leave the hooks and get off the trailer. The deceased remained 
unresponsive, standing on the trailer holding the two iron hay hooks. All this was common 
cause.567 
The State’s version, as told by Kalanie and Persoon, another farm worker, was that the appellant 
grabbed the hooks from the deceased and hit him with one of the hooks on the left side of his 
chest. It was common cause that the iron hay hook pierced ten centimetres into his heart and in 
the process also severed his fifth rib; he died pursuant to that injury. This version was accepted 
by both the trial court and the court below, sitting as court of appeal. There were discrepancies 
between Kalanie’s and Persoon’s versions that both courts acknowledged and found 
immaterial.568 The appellant denied striking the deceased with the hook. Instead, he admitted 
grabbing the hooks from the deceased, at which point the deceased moved backwards and 
turned his chest to the left before immediately moving forward towards the hooks and falling 
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to his knees. The appellant said that after he had seized the hook, he threw it to the floor and 
reached for the other hook, which he realized had become hooked onto the deceased’s overalls. 
The appellant allegedly unhooked it and threw it to the ground. Following this incident, the 
deceased got up, got off the trailer, and walked off.569 
The majority, per Lewis JA (Tshiqi JA and Plasket AJA concurring) held that intentional killing 
had not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The minority, Baartman AJA and Willis JA, 
who delivered separate judgments, disagreed. Willis JA’s judgement is the most relevant one 
in so far as this dissertation is concerned. It is very important to first of all go through the 
judgement by Willis JA before making a brief commentary on it. Willis JA directs the court to 
the case of S v Dladla en andere,570 where Botha AJA examined the Dutch writers in order to 
help one better appreciate “opset by moontlikheidsbewussyn” (intention in regard to an 
awareness of possibility) and quotes Van Hattum as saying:  
The reasoning concerning the question of intention puts the question differently (from culpa), 
namely in this way: what would the perpetrator rather have intended, the realisation of that which 
accompanies his intended act together with that which had been intended or the abandonment of 
his act (and therefore the setting of his face against that which he had intended)? If one comes to 
the conclusion that the perpetrator was so focused on achieving that which he had intended that 
he would rather continue with his intended act, despite its unintended consequences, rather than 
set his face against it, then one deduces therefrom that the perpetrator brought into his intention 
even that emergent possibility. That is then dolus (eventualis).571 
Willis JA mainly focused on the second element of dolus eventualis, where he explains that it 
is this concept of “bringing into” one’s intention an emergent possibility that explains why the 
presence of dolus eventualis as an element of the crime results in a conviction.572 Murder is an 
intentional act. So too, the concept of “afzien”573 is important. He thus argues that the failure 
to abandon something once one has foreseen the possibility of the consequence ensuing is 
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uncertain. This is similar to the requirement of “nevertheless proceeding recklessly”, which has 
been recognized as being part of South African criminal law since the case of R v Valachia.574  
In S v Swanepoel,575 said Willis JA, the court referred with approval to the views of Snyman 
who said that, in addition to the requirement of subjective foresight, the perpetrator must 
“versoen hom met hierdie moontlikheid”. Snyman, according to Willis JA, however, “subtly 
reinterpreted a negative obligation—to refrain or abstain from doing something into a positive 
requirement that the perpetrator must “versoen” himself with the possibility of it occurring. 
And, apparently influenced by Swanepoel, the (then) Appellate Division in S v Ngubane576 
began using terminology like “taking a conscious risk”, “consenting”, “reconciling”, “taking 
into the bargain” in addition to “nevertheless persisting in his conduct” in order to describe the 
volitional element of dolus eventualis. In his article Dolus eventualis reconsidered,577 Professor 
Paizes gives a useful outline of the conceptual evolution of this volitional element.578 
Willis JA further goes on to explain that the term “versoen” translates into English as “be 
reconciled with”.579 Some words, nevertheless, were lost in translation in the process. “To be 
reconciled” has connotations of mature and considered intellectual and moral reflection, an 
introspection and self-examination, often over a period of time. This is not what is required 
before a conviction based on dolus eventualis can ensue. He argues that “nuances of 
translation” may explain some of the difficulties that appear to have been associated with the 
term “be reconciled with” in regard to this volitional element. “Versoen” derives from the root 
word “soen” - a kiss.580 In his view, the ordinary, everyday idiomatic expressions in the English 
language such as “do not flirt with death”, “do not court death”, “do not play with death” and 
“do not dance with death” follow better, what the law stresses, rather than an abstract 
conceptualization as to what it means to be “reconciled with” the possibility of death 
occurring.581  
Willis JA further accepts that, as was noted in S v Dougherty582 the law requires that the 
prohibited act must have been committed dolo malo, that is, with a bad, evil or wicked 
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intention. A value judgment has to be made concerning this volitional element – as to whether 
or not the accused should “afzien” at the critical moment.583 He finds it quite helpful to refer 
to another article by Paizes,584 – a development to his earlier one on the topic – in which he 
refers to an article by Professor Roger Whiting585 to underscore the point that the type of 
activity involved may be critical in determining whether dolus eventualis was present and that, 
for example, even though the foresight of the possibility of death and a person’s being 
reconciled thereto may be present in everyday activities such as driving or mining, deaths that 
result from such activities ordinarily do not result in a conviction of murder. Dolus eventualis 
is a tainted intention.586 As Paizes said in his earlier article on the subject, when all is said and 
done, a moral judgment has to be formed to determine whether dolus eventualis is present. In 
his later article Paizes argues that factors such as callousness and the purpose of exposing the 
victim to the risk of death all weigh in the equation to determine whether dolus eventualis was 
present.587  
The case of S v Humphreys588 makes it clear that ordinarily a denial of foreseeing that a stab 
wound in the chest may be fatal is not credible.589 The inference is irresistible that when the 
accused was about to strike the deceased with a hay hook, he foresaw the possibility that death 
might ensue even though that may not have been what he wanted to happen. He should have 
stopped himself there and then. He did not do so. He flirted with death. He did not “afzien” 
from his intended act. Having gone ahead, despite having foreseen such a well-known risk and 
of which he, as a farmer, must have been acutely conscious, the accused is confronted with a 
moral judgment of the community that is one of deep opprobrium. He is therefore guilty of 
murder. 
In light of this judgment by Willis JA in the Van Schalkwyk case, it can be seen that his opinions 
are part of a minority recalcitrant judgment, nonetheless, it must be kept in mind that he was 
not agreeing with the majority who, having held that the appellant had not foreseen the 
possibility of his conduct causing the death of the deceased, found no point in examining the 
second leg of the test for dolus eventualis. Paizes argues that Willis JA was, on this particular 
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phase of the test not necessarily “swimming against the judicial current”.590 Interestingly, the 
judgment by Willis JA is, in part, consistent with with the full bench decision of the High Court 
in S v Maarohanye & another where it was accepted that “dolus eventualis . . . is not amenable 
to containment within a simple formula, the facts of the matter having a lot to do with the 
ultimate conclusion”.591 
 
Paizes observes that the judgment of Willis JA is to be welcomed because it may contribute to 
the liberation of dolus eventualis from its limitation of mechanical formulation.592 This is 
certainly the submission of this dissertation. It is a salutary reminder that fault or 
blameworthiness593 requires a suitably tainted state of mind. Furthermore, it recognizes that 
any attempt by the courts to identify a universal solvent to describe what state of mind in all 
cases attracts the dolus eventualis label would, no matter how carefully that test is crafted, 
necessarily be imperfect. It is common cause that if the wrongdoer commits an act that has no 
social utility and that is certainly dangerous and prima facie unlawful, for example, hitting 
another person on the head with a heavy object, there will be dolus eventualis in respect of that 
person’s death if the wrongdoer proceeds with the act after having foreseen the possibility of 
causing that result.  
 
However, as Paizes observes, it would not be the same if wrongdoer runs a huge mining 
operation594 with a similar state of mind. If it were, the wrongdoer would be guilty of attempted 
murder every time a miner went down your mine and all mining operations would have to 
close. Furthermore, driving a car would draw a similar treatment, and transport would cease to 
function. In short, economic reality and common sense dictate that you cannot ordinarily be 
regarded as having mens rea in the form of dolus eventualis if you cause another’s death in a 
driving accident-even if you drive recklessly and even if you foresee the possibility that another 
person may be killed as a result of your conduct. Mining and traffic accidents are properly and 
suitably the province of another form of fault designed for this purpose: culpa or negligence.595 
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In both Van Schalkwyk and Maarohanye the courts have endorsed the various factors identified 
by Whiting and Paizes as being relevant and influential in making a non-formulaic 
determination of dolus eventualis. These, it is hoped, will be relied on further by the courts in 
developing a more flexible and nuanced approach. It seems that Willies JA came very close to 
the arguments raised by Whiting and Paizes: that the second limb of the test adds nothing to 
the first one since, once an accused goes ahead and commits the act that constitutes the conduct 
element of the actus reus, foreseeing that this act might cause the death of the victim, he will 
necessarily have failed to “afzien” or “set his face against” that act. Had he not done so, he 
would have stopped from performing it.  
As regards the volitional element of dolus eventualis, Whiting and Paizes maintain that it is 
only descriptive of what must have been the wrongdoer’s state of mind when he performed the 
act. It has no additional value and cannot usefully be considered a separate condition for 
determining dolus eventualis.596 Willis JA, though not a direct opinion, seemed to accept that 
this was so. This is found in his conclusion597 after finding on the facts that the inference was 
irresistible “that when the accused was about to strike the deceased with a hay hook, he foresaw 
the possibility that death might ensue even though that may not have been what he wanted to 
happen.”598 My opinion however, is that, the volitional element actually has some additional 
value. It should be there as a safeguard, of stopping some liability being too wide. The court 
will have to ascertain that the accused decided to proceed in crime through his own willful 
action regardless of his knowledge of the consequences. 
If what Whiting and Paizes submit (and what Willis JA seems to accept) is correct, no murder 
trial where dolus eventualis is relied on by the prosecution should turn on whether or not the 
second “leg” of the test is satisfied. The recent decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal in S v 
Humphreys599 was a case which did. Paizes again argued in the Criminal Justice Review article 
that the correct result was reached in the Humphreys case, but for the wrong reason. The 
appellant was correctly found not guilty of murder, not because he did not take the risk of death 
into the bargain, but because the activity in which he was involved which is, driving a motor 
vehicle, was not one in respect of which the foresight of causing death could appropriately be 
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viewed as resulting in liability for murder by applying the conventional test for dolus 
eventualis. 
It has further been argued that if the more flexible approach to blameworthiness recommended 
by Willis JA finds its way into the judicial mainstream, and if model 4 suggested in this 
dissertation is accepted, a more realistic and sharper conceptual framework for undertaking a 
wide range of circumstances may emerge, and our criminal law will be the richer for it.600 Most 
importantly, however, it may easily be anticipated that the courts will not easily give up their 
attachment to the one-dimensional formula they have used for so long. The standard approach 
to dolus eventualis, indeed, works quite well in most of the cases, and even though the approach 
supported by Paizes in the 2016 Criminal Review may seemingly be difficult to accept, it might 
yield good results if it is given a try. In this manner, there is a huge call upon legal academics 
to remember that “our analytical tools are no more than a means to the greater end of achieving 
just results”.601 What should then be borne in mind is that, if our analytical tools no longer 
achieve just results, they must be revised and either modified or replaced.  
4.3 Have the high-profile cases succeeded in elaborating on the concept of dolus 
eventualis? 
The current high-profile cases provide a very detailed explanation of the concept of dolus 
eventualis, but are somehow creating more complications in as far as the concept of dolus 
eventualis is concerned.602 Murder cases resulting from reckless drivers and murder in other 
intent-based crimes seem to use the same concept of dolus eventualis, which of course is the 
ordinary standard concept. Van Der Merwe acknowledges that dolus eventualis cases involving 
reckless drivers are controversial. He argues that our courts and most importantly the National 
Prosecution Authority must be careful in their analysis of the judgments for use in future dolus 
eventualis cases involving risk-laden or reckless driving which result in death and, or serious 
injury to one or more persons.603 This cautiousness has to be achieved by, for example, 
analysing dolus eventualis cases on a case by case basis rather than the current one-size-fits-
all604concept. Inconsistency in the concept of dolus eventualis in my view is detrimental to the 
substantive law. As indicated above, the recent case of Van Schalkwyk605 is a perfect example 
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for the view that a more nuanced approach to dolus eventualis must be followed and the current 
one-size-fits-all must be abandoned. The starting point to indicate how some high-profile cases 
have not succeeded in resolving the ambiguous nature of dolus eventualis is the case of S v 
Humphreys.606 
 
4.3.1 Humphreys v S 2013 (2) SACR (1) SCA   
The facts of this case involved the appellant, Humphreys, who ran a transport service for school 
children.607 When he was driving a minibus in August 2010 he had a head-on collision with a 
train at a railway crossing.608 The minibus he was driving was hit by a train and ten children 
were fatally injured and only four survived with serious injuries.609 This whole accident 
occurred after Humphreys ignored the warning signs and overtook a lot of cars which were on 
the queue to cross the railway line.610 Humphreys was then convicted on ten counts of murder 
and four counts of attempted murder, which altogether amounted to 20 years’ imprisonment.611 
In the High Court, it was held that Humphreys had acted with dolus eventualis, in that he had 
foresaw the likelihood of harm occurring, but had nevertheless taken a risk.612 The matter was 
then taken for appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal.613  
In the Supreme Court of Appeal it was held that Humphreys did not contemplate his death or 
that of the children. Consequently, therefore he had not reconciled himself with the fact that a 
collision with the train was predictable. It can be observed that the Supreme Court of Appeal 
concluded that, in jumping the queue to cross the railway tracks as he did, Humphreys took a 
risk that he did not think would materialise”. In his state of mind (subjective inference), 
Humphreys did not believe that a train would hit the minibus. A further observation can be 
made that the Supreme Court of Appeal had another basis for finding that Humphreys did not 
meet the requirements of dolus eventualis. The Supreme Court of Appeal found that, as 
Humphreys had formerly jumped the queue amongst other motorists and crossing successfully, 
it would appear that he was subjectively convinced that he would do so again. Subjectively, he 
had not foreseen the harmful consequences that eventuated. It can be argued that, the fact that 
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his foresight deceived him does not mean that, (for the purposes of the second element of the 
test for dolus eventualis), he had not accepted the possible consequences of his actions. 
Humphreys had succeeded in crossing in such a manner before, at least twice, so he believed 
he could do so again. He was clearly wrong. However, this was sufficient to exclude a finding 
of intent on the basis of dolus eventualis – which is sufficient to avoid a conviction on a charge 
of murder.  
The fact that the conviction excluded a charge of murder is matter under examination and that 
which needs to be clarified in this instance. It seems difficult to obtain some clarity as regards 
to this issue, which then becomes a problem to future dolus eventualis cases. Van Der Merwe 
argues that the Humphreys judgment does not provide a perfect answer to the question of the 
apposite charges to bring in cases relating to dangerous driving which lead to a loss of innocent 
life or serious injury.614 It has further been argued that, in particular, there may be very serious 
situations where the requirements of dolus eventualis are satisfied and where charges of murder 
or attempted murder (and also convictions on such charges) may not only be justified, but also 
necessary to safeguard the public’s faith in the law.615 Thus, the Humphreys judgement re-
affirms the fundamental view that the legal principles of dolus eventualis must be judged on 
the merits and applied on a case-by-case basis before the court. 
It has further been observed that, if, by means of reasonable inference, we are led to the 
conclusion that the accused had no subjective intention to risk the lives of others, he or she 
cannot be liable for murder or attempted murder.616 The judgment in the Humphreys case does 
not create a model for making it generally impossible, more difficult or ill-advised to 
incriminate dangerous or reckless drivers with murder.617 This basically means that, it may be 
difficult to find cases in which incriminating reckless drivers can be done with some reasonable 
hope of maintaining a successful conviction. Consequently, therefore, due consideration must 
be given to the fact that the case against Humphreys was, like all cases, bound by an unusual 
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set of events.618 This therefore echoes with my point of departure that, dolus eventualis cases 
are very controversial, therefore they need extra caution when interpreting.  
I believe that the trial court in Humphreys erred in finding dolus eventualis to be present. In 
support of this contention, Paizes states that, “it has become clear over the years that the test 
set out by our courts is insufficiently subtle, nuanced or elastic to cover the entire range of 
situations that fall to be considered in such cases”.619 Whiting provides us with a better method 
of understanding this issue better.620 He explains using an illustration of a situation where the 
wrongdoer takes part in an activity which, although it involves some risk of harm, is not only 
socially acceptable but also legally acceptable, pointing out that different issues arise.621  
These will be social activities including mining and driving of a car. Whiting observes that, 
even if a person drove at an extreme speed and was also aware that the brakes were faulty to 
an extent that he must have realised how he was jeopardizing the lives of others to a degree 
which was substantially beyond what was permissible, it would, in the case of a fatal collision, 
still offend one’s sense of what is right to convict him of murder.622 Dolus eventualis, in 
Whiting’s opinion would not have been established.623 Other issues of concern, in his view, 
include the type of risk involved; the specific question being was it of a generalised statistical 
nature or was it a specific, concrete risk?624 Another factor is, whether the accused’s behaviour 
involved was a positive act or a mere omission; and whether his aim was to expose the victim 
to death or whether he merely accepted that the threat was present.625 Paizes observes that some 
of these factors will be applicable to a degree upon which the wrongdoer must have foreseen 
the possibility of death and, to the question of whether it is proper to be speaking of dolus 
eventualis in the first place.626 It has thus been argued that, while the conventional test for dolus 
eventualis will produce the correct results in a number of cases, there will be cases like that of 
Humphreys, where it will not. In such cases, conforming properly to the test will lead to the 
wrong result. 
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It is also of paramount importance to take cognisance of other factors affecting the test for 
dolus eventualis as they help in understanding the concept. There is no closed list as regards to 
these factors. The attitude of the accused to the taking of the risk, the question being whether 
it was immaterial to him that his actions exposed the victim to danger, or did he strongly believe 
that such danger would not occur.627 Thus, the principle of dolus eventualis works, relatively, 
on a scale where black and white are separated by substantially many shades of grey. Therefore, 
it is safe to say that the strongest case for dolus eventualis is likely to be found where there is 
foresight of a substantial possibility of causing the result in question; where the activity is part 
of an explicitly dangerous and unlawful venture. 
It is also important to compare the judgement in the Ndlanzi628 case with that of Humphreys. 
This comparison plays an important role in clarifying the ambiguous nature of the concept of 
dolus eventualis, and hence the advocacy for a more nuanced approach of treating all dolus 
eventualis cases individually. The facts of the Ndlanzi case took place on the afternoon of 18 
April 2005. The complainant, Macala, and Ndlela, stood at the corner of Bree and Sauer streets 
in Johannesburg intending to cross Sauer Street to an adjacent taxi rank. The complainant (the 
deceased), Macala proceeded to cross “the robot when it turned green and her friend Ndlela 
followed her. Whilst in the middle of the street, a taxi came from around the corner and hit 
Macala who fell on the ground. Ndlela immediately helped Macala to her feet and they walked 
to a nearby police station to report the incident but found it closed. Ndlela told Macala that she 
had written down the registration number of the taxi that hit her, but she could not identify its 
driver.629 Later on, Macala was informed about an article which had appeared in the newspaper 
which carried a report about the accident and which seemingly had the details of a police officer 
called Owen who could be contacted. Supplied with this information, Macala and Ndlela went 
to the police station to report the case.630 
In finding out whether the second element of dolus eventualis had been established, the 
Supreme Court of Appeal in Ndlanzi applied the approach from the Humphreys case. It was 
held that the second element of dolus eventualis requires proof that the appellant reconciled 
himself with the foreseen possibility of the death of a pedestrian.631 Brand JA in Humphreys 
pointed out that: 
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The true enquiry under this rubric is whether the appellant took the consequences that he foresaw 
into the bargain; whether it can be inferred that it was immaterial to him whether these 
consequences would flow from his action. Conversely stated, the principle is that if it can 
reasonably be inferred that the appellant may have thought that the possible collision he 
subjectively foresaw would not actually occur, the second element of dolus eventualis would not 
have been established. 632 
The most apparent interpretation of this judgment is that the appellant must have foreseen the 
possibility of causing the death of a pedestrian by his actions. However, the court accepted that 
he “believed he would be able to avoid colliding with the pedestrians on the pavement by 
turning to the right back onto the road”633 and that, as a result, “it could not be inferred that it 
was immaterial to the appellant whether he collided with a pedestrian on the pavement”. It 
could also reasonably be inferred that he may have thought that a collision with a pedestrian, 
which he subjectively foresaw, would not actually occur. Bosielo JA held that, the appellant 
“took a risk which he thought would not materialise.”634 It was on this basis that the second 
element of dolus eventualis was not established. 
 
It can be argued that the application of dolus eventualis in the Ndlanzi case is susceptible to 
attack. The Supreme Court of Appeal in Ndlanzi & Humphreys is seemingly of the view that 
“foresight” and “belief” exist on entirely different planes, so that an assessment of one cannot 
have a bearing on the measure of the other.635 Paizes argues that the two planes intersect, it is 
impossible to have two seemingly separate elements that use essentially the same currency, in 
this case the extent of the appreciation of the risk. Therefore, what must be acceptable in South 
African law is that dolus eventualis is built on the conscious acceptance of risk. Our courts 
have accepted, quite properly, that conscious risk-taking is based on what is foreseen as a real 
possibility, not a probability.636 In this manner, it can be submitted that dolus eventualis cases 
must be treated on a case by case basis, because dealing with them as a uniform concept can 
lead unjust results or confusion.  
4.3.2 Maarohanye and Another v S 2015 (1) SACR 337 (SG). 
This case is of great relevance in further demonstrating the argument at hand. It shall be 
highlighted how the Maarohanye case differs from the Humphreys case, even though they 
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might both be categorised as reckless driving cases where dolus eventualis was in issue. In the 
Maarohanye case,637 the charges against the appellants arose from an unpleasant event which 
occurred on 8 March 2010 in Mdlalose Street, Soweto. The appellants, Maarohanye and 
Tshabalala were the drivers of two Mini Cooper vehicles and whilst driving these vehicles in 
Mdlalose Street, they caused a collision which resulted in the fatal injuries of four school-
children and in serious injuries to two others.638 Another important fact to note is that these 
school-children were all pedestrians on the road and were on their way to their homes from 
school. 
In reaching its judgment, the appeal court made a background analysis of the current 
application of dolus eventualis in South African courts. It was held that, the application of dolus 
eventualis in situations involving the driving of motor vehicles has been contentious judging 
by what has been seen in the law reports.639 The usual procedure had constantly been to charge 
such drivers with reckless driving and culpable homicide. It was further held that this case was 
one of the cases in which the prosecution authorities decided to charge the appellants for 
murder based on dolus eventualis. The appeal court accepted that it would be more reasonable 
for the prosecution authorities to pursue this course when one considers the high number of 
fatalities on South African public roads that occur as a result of dangerous or reckless driving. 
However, the appeal court found it wiser to follow the decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal 
in the case of Humphreys.640 
The appeal court in Maarohanye held that the trial court erred in its conclusion that the 
appellants were liable on the basis of dolus eventualis. In reaching its finding, the appeal court 
stressed that the drug-induced state of mind of the appellants had a direct bearing on how the 
trial court was to evaluate the evidence in determining whether dolus eventualis had been 
satisfied. Further the court held that, the finding by the trial court that the effect of the drugs 
on the appellants was to induce a sense of euphoria in them and which led them to believe that 
they would not cause any accident and that other road users would make way for them, should 
have left the trial court with huge doubt regarding an appreciation and, importantly an 
acceptance, by the appellants of the consequences of their driving conduct causing death or 
serious injury. The appeal court went on to add that, based on the facts of this matter this state 
                                                          
637 Maarohanye and Another v S (supra note 49). 
638 Ibid, para 2. 
639 The appeal court in Maarohanye and Another v S (supra note 49) para 15, makes reference to S Van Der 
Merwe’s article at (supra note 584) 72 -75. 




of mind is completely different from that required to establish an acceptance of the 
consequences of one’s actions, and further reconciling one to such consequences taking place. 
Therefore, the appeal court held, “whilst the trial court was clearly justified in concluding that 
the appellants had used drugs before they embarked on the driving leading to the collision with 
the school children, that court erred in concluding that dolus eventualis had been established 
on the facts found by it to have been proven.641  
In view of the Maarohanye judgment, it can be submitted that the Humphreys judgment does 
not automatically create a window of opportunity for irresponsible or dangerous drivers to 
escape intent-based criminal liability.642 Even though the appeal court in Maarohanye followed 
the Humphreys approach, their final decision emanated from the issue of the appellants’ use of 
drugs, an issue which was completely different from the Humphreys case. In this manner, it 
would be wrong, in my view, to argue that they reversed the charges of attempted murder and 
murder in the Maarohanye case because of the Humphreys judgement. Commenting on the 
Maarohanye case in the Criminal Justice Review of 2015, Paizes adds that, the value of the 
pronouncement in Maarohanye is that it invites the courts to engage in assessments of this kind 
and moves away from the one-size-fits-all approach to dolus eventualis which has 
characterized many previous judgments on this question.643 They are basically calling on legal 
academics to try a new approach of treating dolus eventualis cases individually, which is good 
at creating the public faith in law. 
In view of the Maarohanye case, it can be argued that it is ordinarily inappropriate to convict 
a person of murder in deaths arising out of the driving of a motor vehicle, even if it can be 
established that the accused did foresee the real possibility of causing death. This is so even 
where the accused is grossly negligent, as in Humphreys, since the act of driving a car is not to 
be placed in the same category as, say, an assault, but should be treated in the same way as 
other socially and economically useful and important activities such as mining or running a 
factory. However, once the activity is undertaken in a manner that is, at its outset, clearly 
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unlawful and lacking in any kind of social or economic value, it may be argued that it falls out 
of this category and that it is no longer inappropriate to consider a conviction of murder.644 
Snyman also adds that it is entirely possible for a court of appeal to conclude that there is intent 
in the form of dolus eventualis from the wrongdoer’s conduct and the surrounding 
circumstances of the case.645 An accused can be found guilty of crimes requiring fault in the 
form of intent if his foresight could not deter or discourage him or change his mind from going 
ahead with a course of action from which it can be reasonably inferred that he had truly 
accepted to risk the lives of others.646 Snyman observes that, an actual or specific intent to kill 
is not the only form of intent sufficient for criminal liability in respect of charges of murder 
and attempted murder in South African criminal law.647 Dolus eventualis may show that the 
wrongdoer’s state of mind was less blameworthy but is enough for convictions of murder and 
attempted, if by all means, it has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The second limb of 
thee test for dolus eventualis is the distinguishing feature between cases of dolus eventualis 
and conscious negligence, since both these modes of fault are accompanied by subjective 
foresight of the possibility of causing death or serious injury.648 The Supreme Court of Appeal’s 
ruling in the Humphreys case has clarified and emphasised the importance of this already 
existing distinction.  
Burchell and Snyman argue that the Supreme Court of Appeal in the Humphreys case attached 
too much weight to the second element of the dolus eventualis.649 In view of this argument, it 
has been observed that such dolus eventualis should be determined by focusing primarily on 
whether the wrongdoer had foreseen a substantial or tangible likelihood at the time that he was 
taking part in the unlawful activity.650 Snyman observes that this is an indefensible argument, 
which is commonly not supported by South African courts.651 The issue cannot be resolved 
only with reference to the probability of death or serious injury foreseen by the wrongdoer 
because we are dealing with a subjective state of mind inquiry.652 Van Der Merwe observes 
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that, it would be incorrect to conclude that we have enough proof in relation to the true will of 
the accused because the accused had foreseen an actual or real likelihood of death ensuing or 
serious injury.653 
4.3.3 Director of Public Prosecutions, Gauteng v Pistorius 2016 (2) SA 317 SCA 
Briefly, the facts of the Pistorius case were that on the 14th of February 2013, screams were 
heard from the accused’s house. The accused (Oscar Pistorius) is believed to have fired four 
shots at the toilet door while on his stumps. At the time the shots were fired the deceased was 
in the toilet and three of the four shots hit the deceased. The deceased (Reeva Steenkamp) 
sustained a wound on the right thigh, a wound on the left upper arm, a head injury and a wound 
on the web of the fingers and the deceased died from multiple gunshot wounds. Soon after the 
gunshots, the accused called for help, he was very emotional and was seen trying to resuscitate 
the deceased.654 One of the issues was whether at the time the accused shot and killed the 
deceased he had the requisite intention, and if so, whether there was any premeditation.655 
My main point of departure in analyzing the Pistorius case is to further emphasis on the 
complexity of the concept of dolus eventualis and also indicate that dolus eventualis cases 
should be treated with caution. The submission of this dissertation is that Oscar Pistorius’ 
evidence was contradictory and controversial656 and does not raise any reasonable doubt in so 
far as murder is concerned. However, the main emphasis in this section is not to deal with the 
factual events but the issue of intention itself. It is apparent from the Supreme Court of Appeal 
judgment that the trial court incorrectly applied the principles of dolus eventualis. Masipa J in 
the trial court, in dealing with legal intent phrased her questions in this manner: 
(i) Did the accused subjectively foresee that it could be the deceased behind the toilet door and 
(ii) Notwithstanding the foresight did he then fire the shots, thereby reconciling himself to the 
possibility that it could be the deceased in the toilet?657 
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In respect of the question in the first leg of the test, Masipa J responded with a rhetorical 
question, “How could the accused reasonably have foreseen that the shots he fired would kill 
the deceased?”658 This shows that the judge was strongly convinced that the accused did not 
subjectively foresee death as a possibility as he believed that the deceased was in the bedroom. 
Taitz, a legal academic, does not believe that Masipa J was correct in acquitting Pistorius of 
the murder charge, but he (Taitz) understands the way Judge Masipa J applied the principle of 
dolus eventualis- he defends the judge’s application of law.659 He argues that if Pistorius had 
the intent to kill anyone who was in the toilet, and also believed that whoever was behind that 
door was a threat to his life, it would then mean he has a successful defence to murder of 
putative self-defence. He further argues that this is an intention-based defence and such an 
intention (which he did not have) is an essential element of any murder conviction.660 In my 
view, Taitz’s opinion is definitely incorrect because he is focusing on the identity of the person 
behind the toilet door rather than the foreseeability of death itself. 
In a different article, De Vos is of the view that Masipa J’s application of the law was incorrect. 
He expresses some confusion at how the judge concluded that all the evidence suggests that he 
was truly distressed about having murdered his girlfriend. His question is, “…how could he 
subjectively have foreseen that he would kill her if after the fact he was so distressed?”661 He 
observes that give all the evidence presented in court about Pistorius’s knowledge of guns and 
what the bullets he used would do to a person; it is unlikely in the extreme that Pistorius did 
not foresee that the person behind the door would be killed.662 He goes on to argue that an 
important question which should have helped reach a convincing decision is whether there was 
any reason to believe Pistorius did not share the foresight that his actions could lead to the 
killing of a human being.663 This inquiry is true and echoes with what was eventually held by 
the Supreme Court of Appeal in the Pistorius case.  
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The Supreme Court of Appeal664 in the Pistorius case held that, the question posed by Masipa 
J: “How could the accused reasonably have foreseen that the shots he fired would kill the 
deceased or whoever was behind the door?” incorrectly applies an objective rather than a 
subjective approach to the question of dolus eventualis. The issue was not about what was 
reasonably foreseeable when the accused fired at the toilet door but whether he actually foresaw 
that death might occur when he did so.”665 The Supreme Court of Appeal referred to the case 
of Sigwahla, where Holmes JA pointed out that: 
The distinction must be observed between what actually went on in the mind of the accused and 
what would have gone on in the mind of a [reasonable person] in the position of the accused. In 
other words, the distinction between subjective foresight and objective foreseeability must not 
become blurred.666 
The Supreme Court of Appeal further observed that the rhetorical question667 indicates that the 
trial court found the presence of a person behind the door not to have been reasonably 
foreseeable; but this conflicts with its conclusion later which stated that the accused was guilty 
of culpable homicide, on the basis that a reasonable person in the same circumstances would 
have foreseen the reasonable possibility the shots will kill the person in the toilet. Furthermore, 
the finding that the accused had not subjectively foreseen that he would kill whoever was 
behind the door and that if he had he intended to do so he would have aimed higher than he 
did, conflates the test of what is required to establish dolus directus with the assessment of 
dolus eventualis. The issue was not whether the accused had as his direct objective the death 
of the person behind the door. What was required in considering the presence or otherwise of 
dolus eventualis was whether he had foreseen the possible death of the person behind the door 
and reconciled himself with that event.  
 
It was further clarified in the Supreme Court of Appeal that, at the time the fatal shots were 
fired, the possibility of the death of the person behind the door was clearly an obvious result.668  
And in firing not one, but four shots, such a result became even more likely. But that is exactly 
what the accused did. A court, blessed with the wisdom of hindsight, should always be cautious 
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of determining that because an accused ought to have foreseen a consequence, he or she must 
have done so. But in the present case that inference is irresistible. A person is far more likely to 
foresee the possibility of death occurring where the weapon used is a lethal firearm (as in the 
present case) than, say, a pellet gun unlikely to do serious harm. Indeed, in this court, counsel for 
the accused, while not conceding that the trial court had erred when it concluded that the accused 
had not subjectively foreseen the possibility of the death of the person in the toilet, was unable 
to actively support that finding. In the light of the nature of the firearm and the ammunition used 
and the extremely limited space into which the shots were fired, his diffidence is understandable. 
In order to disturb the natural inference that a person intends the probable consequences of his 
actions, the accused was required to establish at least a factual foundation for his alleged genuine 
belief of an imminent attack upon him. This the accused did not do. Consequently, although 
frightened, the accused armed himself to shoot if there was someone in the bathroom and when 
there was, he did. In doing so he must have foreseen, and therefore did foresee that the person he 
was firing at behind the door might be fatally injured, yet he fired without having a rational or 
genuine fear that his life was in danger. The defence of putative private or self-defence cannot be 
sustained and is no bar to a finding that he acted with dolus eventualis in causing the death of the 
deceased.669  
It was further held that, 
In the result, on count 1 in the indictment the accused ought to have been found guilty of murder 
on the basis that he had fired the fatal shots with criminal intent in the form of dolus eventualis. 
As a result of the errors of law referred to, and on a proper appraisal of the facts, he ought to have 
been convicted not of culpable homicide on that count but of murder. In the interests of justice, 
the conviction and the sentence imposed in respect thereof must be set aside and the conviction 
substituted with a conviction of the correct offence.670  
The conclusion of the trial court that the accused had not foreseen the possibility of death 
occurring as he had not had the direct intent to kill, shows that an incorrect test was applied. In 
this regard, the author is of the view that extra caution must be taken when dealing with this 
complex concept of dolus eventualis.671 
 
4.4 Dolus eventualis cases based on sexually transmitted diseases 
The advocacy for courts to be cautious when dealing with judgments in relation to dolus 
eventualis can further be illustrated from the view of sexual intercourse cases. In my view, if a 
person infects another with the HIV virus deliberately, they must be convicted of attempted 
murder. In support of this view, in the case of S v Nyalungu672 the court held that, if a person 
who has knowledge that he was infected with the HIV virus, rapes another person without 
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taking any precautionary measures, he could be found guilty of attempted murder. This 
decision has now been followed in S v Phiri.673 The difference between the two cases is that 
the accused in Nyalungu had raped the complainant; in Phiri the act of sexual intercourse was 
consensual and took place within a love relationship. This difference was not mentioned by the 
court. It was enough in its view that the appellant, who knew he was HIV positive, engaged in 
sexual intercourse with the complainant, whom he knew to be HIV negative, without any 
preventative measures, since he had mens rea in the form of dolus eventualis.674 The court took 
judicial notice of the fact that, at present, the disease has no cure and is likely to lead to a 
reduced life span, and seems to have inferred that the appellant must have been aware of that 
fact as well.675  
The court in Phiri did not, however, consider the second leg of the test for dolus eventualis 
currently favoured by the courts. Did the appellant “reconcile himself” to the result foreseen 
by him? If the appellant in Humphreys could, in cases involving motor accidents, escape 
findings of dolus eventualis on the ground that it was “not immaterial” to him whether his 
conduct caused the death of the victims in question, should it not have been asked whether the 
appellant in Phiri, who was in a love relationship with the complainant, and who had had 
intercourse with her on no more than two occasions, should have been treated in the same way? 
It is unlikely that the appellant in Phiri “reconciled himself” with the possibility of causing his 
lover’s death in the sense in which that term has been understood by the Supreme Court of 
Appeal. It is not suggested, however, that that approach should be employed in the first place.  
The situations in Nyalungu and Phiri demonstrate the need for the more nuanced approach to 
dolus eventualis advocated by Paizes.676 In application of the legal principle of dolus eventualis 
in relation to this issue, the courts too have to be quite thorough. To elaborate this better, if the 
Humphreys approach was applied in the Nyalungu case, the statement would be rephrased as 
follows: “…the rapist in the Nyalungu who hoped not to infect his victim even though he 
accepted the real risk of doing so by raping her in the first place, should escape liability for 
murder because it was not immaterial to him whether his victim died or not”. By all means, 
there is no logic in this statement.  
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Important questions need to be asked in light of these two cases: is it appropriate to be speaking 
of dolus eventualis and murder when one is dealing with acts of sexual intercourse within a 
loving relationship? Is it different when the intercourse is an act of rape?677 Does it matter that 
the acts of intercourse were infrequent or regular features of a long-term relationship? And 
these are questions best considered as part of the fine-grained approach to dolus set by Paizes, 
and not within the inquiry into the second leg as that has come to be understood by the courts: 
to conclude, for instance, that the appellant in Phiri should escape liability for murder because 
it was “not immaterial” to him whether his lover died or not would allow the terrorist in the 
above example to escape for the same reason.678 Similarly, a rapist with no hope of infecting 
his victim even though he accepted the real risk of doing so by raping her in the first place 
should escape liability.679 Furthermore, as indicated in subsection 4.1, people living with the 
HI Virus suffer much stigma as it is already, so criminalising them with murder when they 
infect someone in a love relationship is rather unjust. 
4.5 Conclusion 
From the issues raised in this chapter, it has been indicated that there are three general 
approaches to the elements of dolus eventualis recognised in South African law. There is a 
model which accepts a qualified cognitive element and disregards the conative element, a 
model that accepts an unqualified cognitive element and balances it with the conative element, 
and thirdly a model which accepts a qualified cognitive element and the conative element. The 
fourth model (my own) accepts an unqualified cognitive element and accepts the conative 
element plus an additional practical component. This fourth model partly agrees with Paizes, 
Whiting and Wills JA as held in the case of S v Van Schalkwyk. A closer analysis of the case 
of S v Van Schalkwyk reveals that a more nuanced approach to dolus eventualis is needed, one 
which deviates from the one-size-fits-all concept. To give effect to this newly suggested 
approach, this dissertation added the view of an appreciation of the unqualified cognitive 
component, and the conative element which operates as a safe guard in terms of stopping the 
liability from being too wide. If this more flexible approach finds its way into our law, the 
controversies associated with dolus eventualis may be reduced. The ongoing controversies 
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5. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 Introduction 
Dolus eventualis is the widest form of intention known in South African criminal law. As 
indicated in the previous chapters, the concept has been controversial for years. Problems 
associated with the concept of dolus eventualis have been indicated in this dissertation through 
a critical examination of some earliest cases and current high-profile dolus eventualis cases. 
More specifically, the dissertation was aimed at highlighting the controversies associated with 
the elements of the concept, where it aimed at answering the following questions: 
(i) How should the cognitive element be expressed? Should it be defined in qualified or 
unqualified terms? 
(ii) How should the conative element be expressed?  
(iii) Is the conative element a relevant part of the test for dolus eventualis? 
(iv) What are the general models of dolus eventualis in South African Law? 
(v) Should the approach to dolus eventualis be similar in all cases? 
 
5.2 Main issues and findings 
5.2.1 How should the cognitive element be expressed?  
As discussed above, this dissertation favours the view that the cognitive element should be 
defined in unqualified terms. There are so many reasons why this approach should be followed, 
and most of these reasons have been partially hinted upon in the chapters above. One of the 
reasons why the cognitive element should be defined in unqualified terms is that such a view 
is the predominant one in jurisprudence. Professor Hoctor observes that such predominance 
reflects the acknowledgement by the courts that if it is indeed established beyond reasonable 
doubt, whether on the basis of inferential reasoning or direct evidence, that the accused had 
actual subjective foresight of the possibility of harm, whilst continuing to act despite such 
foresight, a finding that the accused acted intentionally is in accordance with the principles of 
mens rea.683 In Marshall’s words, the cognitive component of dolus eventualis may be 
                                                          




encapsulated as follows; “…in acting despite sustained foresight that the harm might occur, the 
accused is attentive to the risks involved in doing so”.684 
Another reason why the cognitive element of dolus eventualis should consist of foresight of an 
unqualified possibility is Burchell and Hunt’s approach685 which is flawed. As Van Oosten has 
pointed out, if only foresight of a real possibility amounts to foresight for the purposes of 
intention, and an accused with less than such foresight could only be found guilty on the basis 
of conscious negligence, then even if the accused has reconciled himself to the consequences, 
there would be no dolus eventualis. Furthermore, it must be highlighted that all expressions 
used to describe foresight of a qualified possibility is subject to interpretation, and bears all the 
usual difficulties of trying to apportion a legal meaning to an everyday term- how does one 
clearly define terms such as “reasonable”, “real” or “substantial”? Furthermore, the view of 
foresight of a reasonable possibility, preferred in Beukes, Van Wyk and Makgatho presents 
certain problems in the context of intention, looking at the first leg of the classic test for 
negligence in Kruger v Coetzee,686 which provides that the first leg of the test for culpa asks 
whether a reasonable person would have foreseen the reasonable possibility of his conduct 
injuring another person and causing her harm. Applying the same principle in the test for 
intention and negligence does not help in maintaining the difference between the subjective 
and objective forms of mens rea. 
The cognitive element must be described in unqualified terms because the logic, language, the 
longstanding recognition of the unqualified possibility in practice, and the failure of the 
contrary arguments to provide a cogent alternative, all negatively affect the acceptance of the 
approach adopted in Van Wyk and Makgatho. Professor Hoctor goes on further to argue that, 
in fact none of the qualifying adjectives in either side of the debate are helpful. Du Plessis’ 
words are accurate, “it would be extremely difficult if not impossible to distinguish between 
very remote, fairly remote, real, substantial and concrete possibilities objectively as questions 
of fact”.687 It has been argued688 that attempts to draw such distinctions derive from a mistaken 
conflation of issues of proof and issues of principle, and that it is far more sensible to consider 
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the cognitive component to simply be established in terms of actual subjective foresight of the 
possibility of harm.  
There may still be concerns that adopting this approach may open the floodgates of liability for 
crimes such as murder. Accordingly, it should be clarified that even if foresight of an 
unqualified possibility satisfies the cognitive component of dolus eventualis, there are still safe 
guards to ensure that unfair convictions do not occur. First, the probability of a consequence 
occurring will be relevant in drawing an inference of actual foresight on the part of the accused. 
As Loubser and Rabie point out, “the greater the likelihood or the probability of death, the 
stronger would be the inference that the accused foresaw it”.689 It follows that the more 
improbable the consequence in question, the more difficult it would it would be to prove 
foresight on the part of the accused by way of inferential reasoning.690 
Secondly the fact of foresight does not suffice for dolus eventualis liability; the accused must 
have reconciled himself to the risk of harm. It should also be noted that remoteness of the 
foreseen possibility could be relevant to punishment: if an accused had foresight of a remote 
possibility of death, but regarded death as “although possible, extremely unlikely”, this could 
constitute mitigating circumstances in taking the risk of the occurrence of death.691 Therefore 
even if the remote foreseen possibility founds a conviction, the punishment is likely to be 
reduced by virtue of the remoteness of the foresight. In this regard, the above reasons can safely 
be used towards support of the view that the cognitive element must be defined in unqualified 
terms. 
5.2.2 How should the conative element be expressed?  
As indicated in chapter 3, the Valachia692 case set a precedent for giving effect to the second 
element of dolus eventualis, which it explained as recklessness. It can be argued that the 
requirement of recklessness in dolus eventualis is the result of a historical accident. In adopting 
Section 140 of the Transkeian Penal Code,693 the court in Valachia case introduced into South 
African law a concept that was not only unwarranted by the weight of previous decisions, but 
also a misleading expression of the English Law.694 The conative element has been defined in 
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interchangeable terms amongst courts and academic writers. Some define it as 
“recklessness”,695 some say it is the “reconciliation of harm”,696 some express it as “persistence 
in such conduct, despite such foresight”697 and some say it is the “volitional element”.698 The 
most remarkable definition of the conative element is the phrase “distinguishing feature of 
intention”,699 which was derived from the Ngubane case. These expressions can be explained 
to mean that the wrongdoer must be in a position where he accepts the possibility of a 
consequence, where even if it is clear that the consequence is unlawful, he reconciles himself 
with that possibility and proceeds with his actions. My submission is that a person is said to 
have reconciled himself700 when he accepts the possible consequences that can be brought 
about from his actions and lives with it when it happens.    
5.2.3 The conative element outlined a relevant part of dolus eventualis  
The significance of conative element as the second leg of the test for dolus eventualis has been 
questioned by many legal writers, and this leaves the element quite vulnerable. It has been 
argued that the conative element is unnecessary.701 What has been suggested is that the inquiry 
of “foresight” is the one to be recognised (the same one which the Supreme Court of Appeal in 
Humphreys ignored) and argued that the volitional addition to the dolus eventualis formulation 
is an unnecessary addition.702 In other words, the inquiry in the cognitive element is wide to an 
extent that it covers all the questions involved in the conative element. By acting with foresight 
of the possibility that a result will ensue, one necessarily reconciles oneself to the possibility 
that it will ensue or takes this possibility into the bargain, hence the argument that the conative 
element is unnecessary. 
It can further be observed that, the other reason why it has been argued that the conative element 
is redundant is the fact that it is sometimes referred to as a descriptive part of the cognitive 
element.703 Apparently recklessness is primarily to be inferred from the consequences which 
result from the accused’s act and the still graver consequences which might be expected to 
                                                          
695 S v Sigwahla (supra note 67) 570B-C. MA Rabie, A Bibliography of South African Criminal Law (General 
Principles) (1987) 68 also defines this element as recklessness. 
696 S v De Bruyn en ‘n ander (supra note 160) 510H. 
697 MM Loubser & MA Rabie (supra note 203) 415. 
698 F Ahadi ‘Re-visiting the Concept of Mens Rea: Challenging the Common Approaches Employed under Islamic 
Jurisprudence and Statute Law.’ (2016) Journal of Politics and Law 9, 2-7. 
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reconciles himself to it, he takes it into the bargain.  
700 My italics, for emphasis. 
701 JM Burchell (supra note 53), 369. 
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result from it.704 According to Morkel, dolus eventualis can be understood as a concept that 
only consists in foresight of the possible consequences combined with persistence in the 
relevant course of conduct. Therefore, two views emerging are that dolus eventualis either lacks 
a volitional element and contains only the cognitive element of foresight; or contains a 
volitional element that may be inferred from the fact that the accused persisted in his conduct 
despite foresight of the harmful result.705 This is actually confusing; it is therefore 
understandable that some legal writers are finding the second limb of the test for dolus 
eventualis to be irrelevant. 
Regardless of the above views, this dissertation supports the view that the conative element of 
dolus eventualis is a significant leg of the test. The single and most important reason for the 
acceptance of the conative element is that, in this dissertation, it has been argued that acceptable 
foresight in the cognitive element should be defined in unqualified terms. In this manner, the 
conative element should be an additional component to safeguard against any possible 
injustices pertaining to liability. Particularly the fact that foresight on its own is not enough to 
determine intention, it will have to be determined whether the accused actually reconciled 
himself with his act and proceeded with his unlawful conduct regardless. 
Furthermore, the original definition of dolus eventualis from the Roman-Dutch law includes 
the conative element and this makes it important. There are some academics who in their 
writings accept the view that the conative element is a significant part of the test, like Taylor,706 
who discusses the historical developments of the German concept of intention, and shows 
that dolus eventualis consists of two components: the cognitive element, which (as in the 
common law) considers the state of the accused’s knowledge that the offence may occur, and 
a volitional or dispositional element which is unknown to the common law.707 De la Harpe and 
Van de Walt also favour of the view that the conative element is significant. They accept the 
view which was applied in the Ngubane708 case that it is mandatory for courts to give some 
meaning to the conative aspect in the concept of dolus eventualis which, in theory, has been 
defined as including foresight of even a remote possibility.709  
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Furthermore, as indicated in the dissertation, there have been some authoritative 
pronouncements in favour of the view that the conative element is significant, for example the 
cases of S v Beukes,710 S v Ngubane,711 S v Valachia712 amongst others,713 where courts strongly 
hold the view that the conative element of dolus eventualis is a relevant inquiry despite the 
acceptance of the cognitive element in qualified terms. Some jurisdictions too outside South 
Africa actually support the relevance of the conative element in the test for dolus eventualis. 
For example, Italy in the Italian Codice Penale, which states that all grave crimes require 
evidence of the mental element known as dolo, where both the conative and cognitive element 
of dolus eventualis are considered.714 The submission of this dissertation is that neglecting the 
conative will not only undermine the relevance of the concept of dolus eventualis but will also 
create uncertainties in our law.  
5.2.4 A summary of the dolus eventualis models recognised under South African law     
It has been indicated that there are generally three approaches to the elements of dolus 
eventualis recognised in South African law. This involves a model which accepts a qualified 
cognitive element and disregards the conative element, a model that accepts an unqualified 
cognitive element and balances it with the conative element, and thirdly a model which accepts 
a qualified cognitive element and the conative element. Loubser and Rabie accept an 
unqualified possibility and then reject the conative element. They argue that the content of the 
element of volition required for dolus eventualis in case law is uncertain.715 Further argued 
that; 
…the requirement of volition for dolus eventualis appears to be undesirable; first because it is 
difficult to determine the precise content of volition in the form of “acceptance of” or “reconciling 
to” the harmful result in question; and second because the accused who sets in motion a criminal 
course of conduct while foreseeing the possibility of the harmful result occurring, should not by 
mere change of mind and loss of volition obtain the benefit of a defence, just as voluntary 
withdrawal after setting in motion a criminal course of conduct should not constitute a defence 
against conviction of attempt.716  
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I disagree. My view is that the conative element is indeed necessary as it operates as a safeguard 
to liability. The court needs the conative element to ascertain that the accused has decided to 
go through with the prohibited act using his own will, despite his knowledge of the 
consequences. 
The fourth model (my own) favours an unqualified cognitive element and accepts the conative 
element plus an additional practical component. In this third model, it is suggested that dolus 
eventualis cases must be analysed on a case-by-case717 basis, rather than a one-size-fits-all718 
concept. Theoretically, model 4 is a much better approach and it concurs with Paizes, Whiting 
and Wills JA in his judgement of the Van Schalkwyk case in terms of the application. In other 
words, my approach differs from Paizes and Whiting in that it accepts the conative element as 
significant whereas they719 find it irrelevant, but concurs with them in terms of their practical 
approach to cases. In their practical approach to dolus eventualis cases, Paizes and Whiting 
present some interesting insights against the one-size-fits-all concept. 
5.2.5 A newly suggested model for dolus eventualis: A case-by-case analysis    
From the issues in this dissertation, it can be noted that the traditional approach to dolus 
eventualis as applied by legal writers in South African criminal law is different from the one 
proposed in this dissertation, though some issues shall be agreed upon. This dissertation aims 
at proposing a new approach where both the cognitive and conative elements are equally 
relevant. Starting with the cognitive element, the degree of foresight must not be qualified by 
any adjective. My proposal is that any amount of foresight no matter how remote shall be 
enough to constitute the cognitive element. The idea of foresight has to be flexible. Intent has 
to require only some awareness of the possibility, wilful conduct and consciousness of 
unlawfulness. Furthermore, the conative element is a necessary element for dolus eventualis. 
While foresight of possible consequences is present in both conscious negligence and dolus 
eventualis, the latter also requires a volitional element. There is dolus eventualis only if the 
actor consents to, or approves of, or reconciles himself to the consequences; if they should 
ensue, he accepts them into the bargain.  
This approach might seem like it does not differentiate between conscious negligence and 
recklessness. But a closer analysis reveals that in conscious negligence, too, there is a certain 
volitional element, which, however, relates only to the risk the actor willfully creates a 
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dangerous situation while the element of volition in dolus eventualis always relates to the 
consequences. However, it is very important to be careful with this crucial distinction as it can 
easily become blurred. For instance, in S v Van Zyl,720 it was held that the use of conscious 
negligence in a specific sense, namely as an equivalent of recklessness, is inappropriate and 
could cause confusion, hence it needs to be noted. Some academic writers might reject the 
conative element as too wide or state that it does not differentiate conscious negligence from 
recklessness. What therefore remains a fact is that there is dolus eventualis only if the actor 
consents to, or approves of, or reconciles himself to the consequences; if they should ensue, he 
accepts them into the bargain. Such an inquiry cannot be deduced by an acceptance of the 
cognitive element only. 
In this alternative approach to dolus eventualis that I propose, (which accepts both the cognitive 
and conative element as relevant), the application of these concepts in cases must not be the 
same. Like Paizes and Whiting suggested, a concept must be adopted depending on the various 
circumstances of a case. For example, the similarity of case conclusions in the appeal court of 
Humphreys721 and Maarohanye722 must not be interpreted to mean that the Humphreys case is 
the standard decision for all reckless driving cases. Furthermore, because a concept has been 
adopted in the reckless driving cases we should not apply it HIV murder cases. To clearly set 
out the proposed approach, I shall refer back to the introductory hypothetical scenario in 
chapter 1. In my view, Tim can be said to have foreseen the possibility of killing Baby-X by 
firing towards Peter who happened to be holding Baby-X in his hands. His foresight need not 
be of any amount, any foresight no matter how remote is enough in this instance. As regards 
the second leg of the test, the conative element is established from his failure to refrain from 
his conduct though he noticed that it is unlawful. It does not matter whether his unlawful 
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conduct was directed at Peter or Baby-X. What remains an issue is that he was careless as 
regards the outcome of his actions.  
Having satisfied the cognitive and conative element he would be found guilty of murder dolus 
eventulias as regards Baby-X. If ever Tim had been drinking and driving, where he ended up 
killing Baby-X, the criteria will have to be different. New circumstances have to come into the 
picture, for example, an inquiry of the presence of foresight that he might crush and kill Baby-
X followed by a complete disregard of the consequences. We cannot then determine the 
outcome of latter scenario by referring to the former scenario (for example, to say the conative 
element was present in the latter scenario because that is what normally happens in dolus 
eventualis cases and that it what scenario (i) said). Essentially that is the view that is currently 
adopted by our courts which I disagree on.  
A thorough analysis of the current high-profile dolus eventualis cases is an indication that the 
standard approach to dolus eventualis must be deviated from. The minority judgement in the 
Van Schalkwyk case has been hinted upon deviating from the standard approach. My thoughts 
are that if this new approach is adopted, the confusion relating to dolus eventualis may 
decrease. It may easily be predicted that the courts will not easily give up their attachment to 
their basic formula they have used for so long. If this “alternative approach” is given a fair 
chance to be followed, it may work well in some cases. In this manner, there is a huge call upon 
legal academics to consider the proposed approach to dolus eventualis. In the event that it has 
been tried and creates more confusion, it may gladly be accepted that it will be inimical to the 
public faith in law. It can then be abandoned. 
5.3 Contributions of the study 
This was a study aimed at highlighting the ambiguous nature of the concept of dolus eventualis 
in South African criminal law. This study was mainly based on a critical analysis of some dolus 
eventualis cases and legal writings. It examined how case law has handled the concept of dolus 
eventualis, and how these have been interpreted by South African legal writers. As indicated 
above, the concept of dolus eventualis has been associated by an overwhelming lack of clarity. 
The submission of this dissertation therefore is that legal academics must deviate from the 
standard notion of dolus eventualis, which can be described as a one-size-fits-all concept. This 
work is also aimed at calling upon some legal writers to conduct further studies regarding the 
newly suggested approach to dolus eventualis. For if much attention is given to it, its 
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